Sunday, September 4, 2011

Muscat Confidential Mentioned in Dispatches: Wiki leaks releases thousands of Muscat sourced US cables


Finally. After having made Muscat sourced US Diplomatic cables only a handful of the early cable leaks, Wikileaks has released the whole shebang.

Excellent.






There's some great stuff in there, and I'm still working through it.

And really nice to get an actual quoted suggested link for the President mention for Muscat Confidential in one one I found about Blue City and the legal case between the partners:

...

SUBJECT: AN AL-SAID LOSES HIS DAY IN COURT
REF: MUSCAT 188
-------
Summary
-------

¶1. (C) An investment group reportedly controlled by a
prominent member of Oman's ruling family failed to persuade a
Muscat court to remove a Bahraini investor from the
multi-billion dollar Blue City real estate venture. The
episode suggests that the Sultanate sees preserving its
reputation for judicial fairness and independence and its
image as an attractive site for foreign investment as a
higher priority than intervening in its legal system to
benefit a prominent member of the royal family. End Summary.

...


¶3. (U) Although only one Omani newspaper, the private Arabic-language daily "al-Azzamn," published a story on the verdict, popular English-language blog sites "Muscat Confidential" and "Muscati," as well as the Bahraini press, have written in detail about the dispute, which became public late last year. ...



Neat! The President reads Muscat Confidential!

These cables are perfect for students of US-Oman relations, Omani Foreign Policy, Miltary relationships, economics, strategic business, the FTA, man, you name it. The Omani twitterati are already long a buzz with the material.

And to start with a highlight cable, here is a complete summary by the US State Dept. on the Oligarchical "Big Families" of Oman: Zawawi, Zubair, Shanfari, Al Sultan, Bahwan, Kimji, ... so here it is. Our favourite Blue City royal businessman, astute investor HH Sayyid Haitham, gets a section too.


SUBJECT: OMAN, INC.: BUSINESS OLIGARCHS AND GOVERNMENT IN OMAN'S
ECONOMY


REF: A. 09 MUSCAT 845; B. 08 MUSCAT 540; C. 08 MUSCAT 501
¶D. 08 MUSCAT 430; E. 08 MUSCAT 384; F. 08 MUSCAT 256
¶G. 08 MUSCAT 188

Summary:
¶1. (C) Oman's business landscape remains dominated by a handful of
local families who work either in tandem with, or in the shadow of,
government-run enterprises. As the Sultanate's economy diversifies
away from petroleum into fields such as industrial production and
tourism, these families have parlayed their privileged positions
and government ties into developing new business opportunities.
While the government publicly has called for an increase in the
number and participation of small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), the major role of the state and omnipresence of the large
trading houses will ensure these families' continued dominance as
Oman's economy continues to expand. End Summary.



An Oligarchy Takes Hold
¶2. (C) Oman's private sector is best described as an oligopoly.
After Sultan Qaboos assumed power from his father in 1970, a
handful of families came to dominate the private sector. These
families are similar in many respects: many come from humble
beginnings, most are not directly related to the al-Said ruling
family, but almost all owe their fortunes in part to ties to the
Sultan or members of his government. As Oman's economy developed
and evolved, these families extended their business reach to meet
the growing needs of the government, Omani consumers, and, more
lately, the tourism industry. As a result, they control
conglomerates that operate in a wide array of sectors, from
construction to cars, and from manufacturing to hotels.

¶3. (SBU) In recent years, Oman's government has encouraged the
development of industrial areas, most notably the northern port
city of Sohar, as well as large real estate projects. These
initiatives are part of a long-term effort to diversify the economy
and reduce the country's dependence on hydrocarbons, which
currently account for 79% of state revenues. The government's new
economic priorities - industrial ventures and real estate
development - have provided new opportunities for Oman's oligarchy.

¶4. (C) Given the state's substantial role in economic planning, it
is not surprising that the family with the closest relationship to
the Sultan - the Zawawis - is one of the country's richest. While
the Zawawi fortune remains large, it also has remained relatively
unchanged over time, according to post contacts. By contrast,
other private sector leaders - the Zubair and Bahwan families and
the Sultan's cousin, Sayyid Haitham bin Tariq al-Said - have become
more involved in new and growing sectors, raising their rank within
the business community's hierarchy.



The Zawawi Family - OMZEST Group
¶5. (C) The Zawawis, a merchant family with origins in Saudi
Arabia, have had a close relationship with the ruling al-Said
family for over a century. The relationship blossomed under Sultan
Qaboos as Oman's economy rapidly expanded. Omar Zawawi, who
attended Harvard in the 1960s and was trained as a physician and
holds an MD, is currently the head of the family and possibly the
richest man in Oman. He is also a member of the Sultan's "kitchen
cabinet," a handful of individuals who are not government cabinet
members, but have regular access to the Sultan and advise him on
key matters. Zawawi's brother Qais had a more visible role in the
government as Deputy Prime Minister until his death in 1995. Omar
Zawawi's official title, Senior Advisor for External Affairs, is
somewhat misleading, as he plays a highly influential role in
domestic economic policy making in addition to foreign policy
matters. He has an unmatched combination of acuity regarding
international affairs and direct access to the Sultan; his hand may
be detected in Oman's recent and surprisingly quick decision to
permit the transit of anti-piracy security teams (ref A.).



¶6. (SBU) Zawawi's company, OMZEST Group, is the umbrella for 75
wholly owned and associated companies with an estimated 4,000
employees. The group's activities include agriculture, banking,
contracting, manufacturing, and travel and tourism, among others.
OMZEST's key business, however, is manufacturing, from which it
derives approximately 43 percent of its revenue. (Note: OMZEST's
exact revenue and profits are not known. End Note.) OMZEST is
heavily involved in new manufacturing ventures at the burgeoning
Sohar port, which the government has targeted for development as
part of its drive to diversify the Omani economy. OMZEST, for
example, controls a 30 percent stake in Oman Methanol Company, a
joint venture that has built a $450 million methanol plant with a
production capacity of one million tons per annum (tpa). Oman
Methanol is in the midst of constructing a second plant, also
capable of producing one million tpa. OMZEST also holds a 10
percent stake in Alsig, a joint venture that owns an industrial gas
production facility in the Sohar port area with an initial
production capacity of 200 tons per day of nitrogen. The plant may
be upgraded over time to produce oxygen and other gases, depending
on demand from industries in the Sohar Port complex.



¶7. (C) OMZEST is a player in the banking arena, with a controlling
interest in Oman's third largest bank, Oman International Bank.
While it benefited, as did all Omani banks, from the liquidity
generated from high oil prices, as well as several government and
Royal Diwan accounts under its purview, the bank appears not to be
particularly well-run and therefore by local standards vulnerable
in the face of regional and international economic difficulties.
One banking contact noted that he would "never work for Oman
International Bank," while another complained about the
difficulties in working under the bank's micro-managing chairwoman
- Reem Zawawi, Omar's daughter.



The Bahwan Family - Suhail and Saud Bahwan Group
¶8. (C) The Bahwans, members of the Mukhaini tribe from the coastal
city of Sur, got their start as the exclusive agents for Toyota in
Oman, a right they received thanks to Sultan Qaboos' direct
intervention. Until 2002, brothers Suhail and Saud Bahwan jointly
operated the Bahwan group, most likely the second largest
conglomerate in Oman in terms of profits. While the brothers have
split the firm, the two new companies remain leaders in the
economy. Much has been made about the alleged bad blood in the
separation, but post contacts believe that it is overplayed, and
that the two companies remain somewhat aligned. One company
official noted to Econoff that while the brothers are fiercely
competitive, even with each other, they remain "family."

¶9. (SBU) The Suhail Bahwan Group appears to be the larger and more
diversified of the two. It employs approximately 10,000 people and
includes interests in engineering and construction, automobile
sales, telecommunications, software design, structural steel, and
chemicals and fertilizer products, among others. While the group
retains some ties to the original family automobile business as the
exclusive agent in Oman for BMW, Nissan and Renault, like OMZEST,
Suhail Bahwan has invested heavily in industrial projects,
including recent projects near the ports at Sohar and Salalah, as
well as in the National Bank of Oman, the country's second-largest
financial institution. The group is expanding its profile in
vocational training and education; partnered with Virginia Tech, it
is currently waiting for Ministry of Higher Education permission to
found Oman's fourth private university.

¶10. (SBU) Bahwan Engineering is a heavyweight in the local
economy, and has grown its business beyond Oman's borders by
establishing offices in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. It has participated
in the construction of a number of high-profile projects in Oman,
including LNG facilities (Oman LNG, Qalhat LNG), power stations
(Sohar, Barka, Ghubra), hospitals (Ibra), industrial plants (Sohar
Aluminum), banks (Central Bank, Bank Dhofar, Oman International
Bank), shopping malls (Msucat's two City Centre malls, along with
th city's thid largest mall, the Markaz al-Bahja), and hotels
(Muscat Intercontinental, Muscat Crowne Plaza).

¶11. (U) The company's industrial ventures include Suhail Chemical
Industries, which manufactures sulfuric acid in the Sohar
Industrial Area, and the Sohar Fertilizer Project, a $638 million
complex that includes an ammonia plant with a production capacity
of 2,000 metric tons per day (mtd) and two granular urea plants
with a combined production capacity of 3,500 mtd. The group also
plans to add 30,000 tons per year of structural steel component
manufacturing capacity at Sohar. Finally, Suhail Bahwan is an
investor in Octal Petrochemical, a U.S.-based firm which controls a
plant in the Salalah free zone that produces 30,000 tons per year
of polyethylene plastics and has plans for major expansion (ref D).


¶12. (C) The Saud Bahwan Group has approximately 9,400 employees
and annual sales of more than $3 billion. Growing in recent years
from a base of 3,000 employees, the company's primary business is
automotive and heavy equipment sales, as well as sales of
automotive parts and accessories. The group represents Toyota,
Ford and MAN commercial trucks, as well as Komatsu construction
equipment in Oman. In addition, the group acts as the exclusive
agent for Hertz Rent-a-Car. Patriarch Saud Bahwan died in late
2008, but as he had in recent years passed most executive authority
to his children, the company's direction has been relatively
unaffected. Sheikh Saud was long Oman's highest profile
(non-royal) philanthropist, one whose gifts included a generous
(anonymously given ) sums to The American International School of
Muscat (TAISM).



The Zubair Family - Zubair Corporation
¶13. (C) The Zubairs are ethnically Baluchi from the Huti tribe, a
group traditionally with a humble social status. However, the
family's long-standing personal relationship with Sultan Qaboos has
brought them tremendous wealth. The founder of Zubair Corporation,
Mohammed Zubair, is believed to have been a childhood companion of
the Sultan, as their mothers were close friends. Zubair became
Minister of Commerce in 1974, four years after Sultan Qaboos took
power, and remained in that position until 1983, after which he
became the Sultan's advisor for economic planning affairs. (Note:
While like Zawawi a "special advisor" to the Sultan, he is not as
close to Oman's ruler. And, unlike Zawawi, Zubair has generally
steered clear of politics, domestic or international, to focus on
his business interests. End Note.) While Mohammed Zubair remains
associated with Zubair Corporation, his son Hani al-Zubair now
serves as its chairman. The Zubairs have long been considered
locally the Sultanate's most cultured family; the family's private
collection of Omani arts and crafts are now housed in Oman's only
truly world-class museum, the Bait al-Zubair.

¶14. (SBU) Zubair Corporation has an estimated 2,400 employees and
is the parent company of 60 firms, subsidiaries, and associated
ventures. The company's divisions include automotive sales, art
and heritage, hospitality, telecom and IT, construction, retail
manufacturing, and advertising and publishing. Zubair represents
Volkswagen, Chrysler, Jeep, Mitsubishi, Peugeot, and Yamaha, among
other companies.

¶15. (SBU) One of the Zubairs' most prominent and successful
ventures to date is the Shangri La Barr Al Jissah hotel complex,
which opened outside Muscat in 2006. The Zubairs, in partnership
with the government, invested $180 million in the site, which
covers 124 acres and contains three hotels with a total of 640
rooms. Further development on the project has added luxurious
private residences, including apartments and villas. The success
of the Barr Al Jissah complex has encouraged more large-scale real
estate development construction in Oman, including projects under
construction at Sifah, Yenkit, and Blue City.

¶16. (SBU) The Zubair Corporation is dabbling in the Sohar port
industrial area as well. It holds a 10% stake in the Sohar Power
Company, the owner of the $550 million Sohar Power and
Desalinization Plant, which has a power generation capacity of 585
megawatts (MW) and desalinization capacity of 33 million gallons
per day. Recently, the Zubairs entered into a $30 million joint
venture with an Indian engineering and construction company, Larsen
and Toubro, to build a plant in Sohar that will manufacture
products for the offshore oil and gas sector.

¶17. (C) Post contacts report that the Zubair Corporation is
undergoing a shake-up in personnel to inject new blood into the
company. In 2008, Zubair appointed Giles Cunningham as the
company's new Chief Executive Officer. In a conversation with
Econoff, Cunningham viewed the company as a leading economic
powerhouse in Oman, but commented that it needed to gain focus in
determining which new opportunities to pursue. A former banker in
the region, Cunningham stated that the company's potential for
growth and the Zubairs' keen sense of business attracted him to
Oman.



The Sultan Family - W.J. Towell
¶18. (SBU) The Sultan family is an established Lawatiya Shi'a clan
(Ref B) that in 1866 founded W.J. Towell in partnership with the
company's namesake William Jack Towell. Towell, who is believed to
have been an American citizen, later, sold his share in the firm to
the Sultans in the 1890s. After Sultan Qaboos came to power in
1970, W.J. Towell managed some of the country's first major
infrastructure projects.

¶19. (C) The family's head is Kamal Sultan, who is now
incapacitated and serves as Honorary Chairman of the firm. His
son, Jawad Hussein Sultan, is Chairman. The company's main market
advantage is family member Maqbool bin Ali Sultan, who was a
director of the firm before he became Minister of Commerce and
Industry in 1991. Maqbool is well-connected in Oman's business
landscape, as he also serves as the Chairman of Oman Oil Company, a
primary investment arm of the government, and Chairman of the Sohar
Industrial Port Corporation, the landlord of the Port of Sohar. He
also is a close colleague of Ahmed bin Abdul Nabi Macki, who is the
Sultanate's powerful National Economy Minister, as well as the
Deputy Chairman of the National Resources Council, Chairman of Oman
Shipping Company, and Chairman of Oman Air.

¶20. (SBU) W.J. Towell currently has an estimated 1,000 direct-hire
employees and is involved in healthcare products, furniture sales,
automobile sales, cleaning services, construction services, real
estate, and grocery retailing and distribution, among other areas.
The firm also represents a variety of foreign companies in Oman,
including Mazda, Mars, and Chicago Pneumatic. Given the family
connection to Sohar, W.J. Towell has become involved in
industrialization efforts in the port city. The company drafted
the port's master plan, holds a 10% stake in Sohar Power Company,
and for years been the chief advocate for constructing a
multi-billion aluminum smelter near Sohar, a project that is now
being implemented as a joint venture of Abu Dhabi Water and
Electricity Authority, Oman Oil Company and Alcan. Towell is a
major property developer in Oman, with signature projects in the
expat-heavy neighborhoods of Madinat al-Sultan Qaboos and Shatti
al-Qurm, developments whose success has cushioned the cancellation
or postponement of additional residential and resort properties.



Al Sa'id Family - A Growing Force in Business?
¶21. (C) The royal Al Sa'id family has long had a notable, if low
profile, role in the private sector, but in recent years some
members have expanded their commercial activities. The more
traditional (less commercially minded) branch of the family is led
by the Sultan's paternal uncle, Sayyid Shabib bin Taimur Al Sa'id.
In 1982, Sayyid Shabib established the Tawoos Group, a diversified
firm with interests in telecommunications, agriculture, and oil
field supplies. Tawoos Group is now run by Sayyid Shabib's
half-brother, Samir Fancy, and has not significantly changed its
business in recent years. Tawoos' main division, Renaissance
Services, was one of the first family-owned companies to become
publicly traded on the Muscat Securities Market. Renaissance
focuses primarily on services, including facilities management,
cleaning and catering, IT services, and education and training.
Tawoos is interested in further expanding its overseas presence,
evidenced by the company's participation in an official Omani
commercial delegation to Baghdad in 2008 (ref C).


¶22. (C) The business interests controlled by Sultan Qaboos'
cousin, Sayyid Haitham bin Tariq Al Sa'id, the Minister of Heritage
and Culture and one of the possible successors to the Sultan, and
his brother, Sayyid Talal, appear far more dynamic than those
controlled by Sayyid Shabib. The brothers have interests in two
major firms - National Trading Company and Oman Holdings
International (OHI) - which are active in advertising and media,
telecommunications, tourism, energy services and construction,
among other sectors. National Training Company's financial results
are not available publicly.

¶23. (SBU) National Trading Company is the quieter of the two
firms. Established in 1982, the company - like the Zubair
Corporation and W.J. Towell - holds a 10% stake in the Sohar Power
and Desalinization Plant. It also has a 6.4% stake in Oman
Chlorine, a publicly traded firm that controls a chemical plant in
Sohar. It created "National Trading and Projects Company" in 2005,
which works closely with OHI in the fields of oil and gas, water,
power, and telecommunications.

¶24. (C) Sayyid Haitham and another brother, Sayyid Qais, are the
primary investors in the Muscat Hills Golf and Country Club, a
swank development near Muscat International Airport. The $110
million venture includes an 18-hole championship golf course
surrounded by a planned community. Phase 1 of the community is
expected to be complete by late 2009 and consists of 80 deluxe
villas around Muscat's first green golf course. The course itself
opened only after Sayyid Haitham shook up the project management
staff and reportedly brokered a deal with Muscat Municipality
Chairman Abdullah bin Abbas for use of the municipality's recycled
water.

¶25. (C) Sayyid Haitham's most important and visible project,
however, is the mega-real estate venture Blue City, in which he
shares a 30% stake with another investor. Blue City (Al Medina Al
Zarqa in Arabic), was announced as by far Oman's most ambitious
development, with a total expected cost of $20 billion. Its
original plans called for the construction of an entirely new urban
area, with residences, schools, health facilities and hotels for
200,000 people. The development was the subject of a legal battle
in which Sayyid Haitham's company "Cyclone" unsuccessfully tried to
acquire full ownership of the project from Bahrain-based AAJ
Holdings, which controls 70% of Blue City (Ref F). Its prospects
have been the subject of significant local gossip over the past
year, as ambitious plans for an urban center that would have
challenged Sohar and even Muscat have been gradually scaled back to
a more realistic (if still highly ambitious)
residential/resort/commercial complex. The project's difficulties
have, to an extent, tarnished Sayyid Haitham's reputation, if not
his prospects in the succession.


Ma'shani Family - Muscat Overseas Group
¶26. (C) The Ma'shanis are another family with close ties to Sultan
Qaboos, in this case through his late and much-loved mother; the
clan elder, Sheikh Mustahail bin Ahman al-Ma'shani, is the Sultan's
maternal uncle. He previously served as Minister of Social Affairs
and Labor and is now a State Advisor, as well as chairman of the
family company he started in 1974, Muscat Overseas Group. One of
his sons, Salim bin Mustahail, is an advisor at the Diwan of Royal
Court (a position that carries ministerial rank), as well as
vice-chairman of the family business. In July 2008, Salim was
appointed chairman of Nawras Telecommunications, the second largest
provider of cellular phone service in Oman. (Note: Qatar Telecom
is the majority shareholder in Nawras. End Note.)

¶27. (SBU) Reflecting the family's power base in the southern
Dhofar region, Muscat Overseas Group is the most powerful business
group in Salalah, Dhofar's capital. Its business operations
include trading, contracting, oil field supplies and drilling,
tourism, agriculture and real estate. It also is a 4% stakeholder
in Bank Muscat, Oman's largest bank.

¶28. (SBU) The firm's investments are channeled, in part, through
the Dhofar International Development and Investment Holding Company
(DIDIHC), where Sheikh Mustahail's son Khalid was appointed
chairman in 2008. (Note: The Shanfari family from Dhofar is also
a player in DIDIHC, with the family patron, Saeed bin Ahmen Al
Shanfari, previously serving as the chairman. End Note.) DIDIHC
holds a 30% stake in Bank Dhofar, 25% in Dhofar Insurance, 25% in
Salalah Medical Supplies Manufacturing Company, 16% in Dhofar
University, 14% in Dhofar Tourism Company, 10% in Salalah Port
Services Company, 5% in Oman Oil Company, 4% in Dhofar Power, and
an unknown stake in Octal Petrochemicals.



Shanfari Family - Shanfari Group
¶29. (C) The Shanfari represent the other prominent Dhofari family.
Shanfari Group Chairman Saeed al-Shanfari was a close contact of
Sultan Qaboos before his ascent to power. In 1974, Shanfari was
rewarded for his loyalty by being named Minister of Oil and Gas, a
position he held until 1997, when he was "retired" by the Sultan.
Post contacts report that his personal connection to the Sultan has
all but disappeared.

¶30. (C) Nevertheless, the Shanfari Group of Companies, established
by Saeed in 1970, remains a well-known trading house in Oman. In
addition to military sales, the group is involved in the
construction, transport and logistics, manufacturing, and tourism
sectors. It serves as one of the representatives of the Jeep and
Harley Davidson brands in Oman. (Note: the Shanfari Group had
exclusive rights to Jeep until 2005, when it reluctantly agreed to
share the brand with the Zubair Corporation after the U.S.-based
vehicle manufacturer complained of poor marketing efforts.
However, in 2008, Chrysler awarded Shanfari the right to market
Dodge, a brand previously reserved for Zubair. End Note.) The
Shanfari Group also holds the exclusive rights to a string of
luxury brands, such as Ferrari, Lamborghini, Maserati, and also
Saab, though one company official admitted to Econoff that those
are "just for show," since they generate negligible business in
terms of volume. Saeed Shanfari further retains significant stakes
in Dhofar-based projects through his stake in DIDIHC.

¶31. (C) Saeed's son Adil serves as the Shanfari Group's chairman
and CEO and is fond of the U.S., with several of his children
studying at a military school in Kansas. Another of Saeed's son,
Thamer, a U.S. university graduate and former participant in a
State Department International Visitor Program, was in 2008
designated for sanctions by the U.S. Treasury Department for his
questionable business dealings - which did not involve other family
members - in the Democratic Republic of the Congo benefiting
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe.



Darwish Family - Mohsin Haider Darwish (MHD LLC)
¶32. (C) The Darwish family is part of Oman's Baharna Shi's
community (Ref B), a group that is believed to have its roots in
Bahrain. The Darwishes have been notable merchants in the Gulf
since the late nineteenth century. Mohsin Haider Darwish is the
family's patriarch and managing director of the family company, MHD
LLC, while his two daughters, Lujaina Mohsin Darwish and Areej
Mohsin Darwish, serve as deputy managing directors (as such, they
are among the Sultanate's leading businesswomen). MHD, which has
an estimated 750 employees, remains an important player in the
local economy, but observers do not see it as being as dynamic as
top-tier firms such as OMZEST, Bahwan, and Zubair. MHD's divisions
include automotive sales, electrical goods and electronics
merchandising, chemicals, medical equipment and building materials.
In the automotive sector, MHD represents Jaguar, Land Rover and
Volvo. MHD retains a 10% stake in the industrial gas venture
"Alsig," in which OMZEST also has a 10% share.



Khimji family: Khimji Ramdas and Ajit Khimji
¶33. (C) the Khimjis are of Indian origin with commercial ties to
Oman that go back more than a century. The family lent money to
Sultan Qaboos' father, Sultan Sa'id; Sultan Qaboos granted Omani
citizenship to the Khimjis after he came to power. Notably, as
Hindus, the family traditionally has not intermarried with
non-Indians, but one member of the family, Rishi Khimji, is now
married to Sayyida Tania al-Sa'id, the daughter of Sayyid Shabib
al-Sa'id, the founder of Tawoos Group; Sayyida Tania is an
increasingly visible environmental activist and among the most
publicly active female al-Saids.

¶34. (SBU) Established in 1870, the family's operations are now
split into two - Khimji Ramdas and Ajit Khimji. Khimji Ramdas is
divided into four sectors: consumer products, lifestyle,
infrastructure, and projects and logistics. Much of its business
revolves around the retaining sector; it represents such prominent
brands as Proctor & Gamble, Ralph Lauren, and Samsonite. In
addition, the company acts as the exclusive agent for Pizza Hut,
and runs its own "Khimji Mart" consumer goods stores. The projects
and logistics division supplies military and firefighting equipment
to the government, while in the defense sector the company
represents Humvee.

¶35. (SBU) Ajit Khimji's business line takes a smaller, though
parallel, focus on consumer products, dining, and retailing. It
runs a number of well-known and highly regarded restaurants (among
the handful of non-hotel-based restaurants to hold liquor
licenses), , holds the franchise for Europcar, and serves as the
general services agent for Swiss (the national carrier) through its
travel agency. In addition, it owns an insurance company, several
coffee shops, bookstores, and dry-cleaning outlets.



State Reigns Supreme
¶36. (SBU) The strong position of Oman's leading families will
continue to benefit from the government's pre-eminent role in the
economy. At the forefront of the government's significant holdings
is Petroleum Development Oman (PDO), which s the country's primary
oil producer. Established in 1951, PDO is 60%-owned by the Omani
government and 34%-owned by Royal Dutch Shell, with the remaining
shares held by French-based Total and Portuguese-based Partax. PDO
controls 90% of Oman's reserves, 109 of the 130 fields, and the
lion's share of total production. In 2004, the government renewed
PDO's concession for another 40 years, though there was some
grumbling about the generosity of the extension, given falling
production rates and Shell's fudging of its Omani reserves
estimates, which greatly embarrassed the Omani government.
Nevertheless, the government has committed itself to making
significant investments in enhanced oil recovery techniques on
behalf of PDO during the course of the current five-year economic
plan (2006-2011), with an estimated investment in 2008 of $1.74
billion in petroleum production.

¶37. (SBU) In spite of the significant investment figures in PDO,
the government has moved to allow greater foreign competition in
the development of its petroleum fields. It is careful, however,
to retain a sizable equity stake in new oil-related ventures. For
example, complementing PDO's production is U.S.-based Occidental
Petroleum, which is investing over $3 billion in its Mukhaizna
field concession. In transferring the concession to Oxy from PDO,
the government acquired a 20% stake in "Occidental Mukhaizna"
through its Oman Oil operations. (Note: Occidental retains a 45%
stake, while Shell Oman has 17% and UAE-based Liwa Energy has a 15%
share. End Note.)

¶38. (SBU) In addition to its efforts in the petroleum sector, the
Omani government has substantially invested in the liquefied
natural gas (LNG) industry. In 1994, the government established
Oman LNG, which began operations in April 2000 with two 3.3 metric
ton pr annum (MTPA) LNG production trains. Heading the consortium
is the government, with a 51% stake, followed by Royal Dutch Shell
(30%), Total (5.5%), and Portuguese and Japanese equity holders.
In 2003, the Omani government formed Qalhat LNG to operate a third
train along side those managed by Oman LNG. Qalhat's primary
stakeholder is the government (47%), followed by Oman LNG (36.8%),
Union Fenosa (7%), and a collection of Japanese equity partners.
LNG shipped from Oman to points in Asia and Europe is carried by
seven tankers owned by the Oman Shipping Company, which is 80%
owned by the Ministry of Finance and 20% owned by the Oman Oil
Company. Domestic distribution of gas is handled by the Oman Gas
Company, which is 80% owned by the Ministry of Oil and Gas, and 20%
owned by the Oman Oil Company.



Investing through Oman Oil
¶39. (U) The Oman Oil Company plays a key role in the private
sector. In 1992, the government established Oman Oil to invest
surplus oil revenues both domestically and internationally. The
company is chaired by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, with
the Minister of Oil and Gas serving as the Vice chairman. Other
government officials, including the Secretary General of the
Ministry of National Economy and a Board Member of the Central
bank, round out the board. On the domestic front, in addition to
its stakes in Oman gas Company and Oman Shipping Company, Oman Oil
is involved in the Dolphin Energy Project (cross-border gas sales
to the UAE) and the Oman Oil Marketing Company (retail distributor
of gasoline).



¶40. (U) In 2002, the government entered into a 50-50 joint venture
with the Port of Rotterdam to create the sohar Industrial Port
Corporation (SIPC), which serves as the landlord for the industrial
complex. (Note: The Minister of Commerce and Industry serves as
the Chairman of SIPC. End Note.) Since SIPC's establishment, Oman
Oil has attracted a number of foreign participants into joint
ventures, including a polypropylene and aromatics plant with
Korea-based LG and an aluminum smelter with Canada-based Alcan.
Oman Oil is also a 20% owner in the Sohar Refinery Company, with
the Ministry of Finance holding an 80% stake.




Thursday, August 4, 2011

Implications of the Norway Terrorist Attack for Oman - and you

The recent horrific terrorist attack in Norway by a right-wing Fascist 'Christian' highlighted many things - the rush by everyone to immediately assume it was perpetrated by Islamic extremists; the extent to which even 'peaceful' countries like rich & civilised Norway are at risk; and the tremendous loss of lives that one individual can achieve.

But the attack also offers some learnings for all of us about this sort of threat - the fact that a 'lone wolf' psychopathic nutcase can kill a lot of innocent people, anywhere.


Photo: A lone wolf - perhaps the biggest threat for terrorism in Oman. Pic ripped from Yoav Perlman


In Oman, we are not Norway. Oman is surrounded by unstable countries with militant groups: Yemen, Saudi, Pakistan, etc, and the long land and sea borders are porous. South Yemen has a history of antipathy against Oman, supporting the 1960-1970s war in Dhofar. There is also a history of domestic militants, usually centered on the old Nizwa notion of overthrowing the coastal Government and implementing a radical Ibadhi Imamate theocracy. This was the supposed aim of those arrested and tried in recent times for attempting to bomb the Muscat Feastival, as well as a protracted civil war in the 1950s between the Sultan and the Imam (For those unfamiliar, see wiki's Oman History).

While Oman still dedicates a significant % of GDP to internal security, and its security forces have been very successful at arresting several such homegrown terrorist cells, what can be done against such acts by dedicated and disciplined individuals? A great article by Muscat Confidential favourites STRATFOR highlights that such individuals can be identified and stopped, not by the dedicated Internal Security/Counter Terrorism forces, but by people like you.

It depends on the fact that even in the case of such a 'lone wolf' terrorist, they must still do several things operationally to conduct such an attack that exposes them to discovery at a few key stages in the process, such as obtaining funding, acquiring weapons, scoping potential targets, and often seeking support.

So whether it's AQAP; some radicalised idiots centered around the recent protests, or simply when your weird next door neighbour has a psychotic episode, there are things you can and should do to help stop such horrible things happening in Oman. As an earlier excellent STRATFOR article ('How to Tell if Your Neighbor is a Bombmaker') says:

... Many of the steps required to conduct a terrorist attack are undertaken in a manner that makes the actions visible to any outside observer. It is at these junctures in the terrorist attack cycle that people practicing good situational awareness can detect these attack steps — not only to avoid the danger themselves, but also to alert the authorities to the suspicious activity.

Detecting grassroots operatives can be difficult, but it is possible if observers focus not only on the “who” aspect of a terrorist attack but also the “how” — that is, those activities that indicate an attack is in the works.
.

Exactly. While Omanis of late may tend to look to the all-powerful Government to do pretty much everything for them, it is critically important for ordinary Omani citizens to be on the lookout for such suspicious activity. It is very difficult, as discussed in the article below, for the dedicated guys and gals in the ISS to stop such dangerous people on their own. In being alert and aware, ordinary people and ROP officers may save lives. The same would also hold for the many Omani students at University abroad, where they are potentially in daily contact with disaffected and radicalised religious extremists without even realising it.

Here's the full STRATFOR article:


Fighting Grassroots Terrorism: How Local Vigilance Can Help
August 3, 2011. By Scott Stewart

In the wake of the July 22 Oslo attacks, as I have talked with people in the United States and Europe, I have noticed two themes in the conversations. The first is the claim that the attacks came from an unexpected source and were therefore impossible to stop. The second theme is that detecting such attacks is the sole province of dedicated counterterrorism authorities.

As discussed in last week’s Security Weekly, even in so-called “unexpected” attacks there are specific operational tasks that must be executed in order to conduct an operation. Such tasks can be detected, and unexpected attacks emanating from lone wolf actors can indeed be thwarted if such indicators are being looked for. Alleged Oslo attack perpetrator Anders Breivik reportedly conducted several actions that would have made him vulnerable to detection had the authorities been vigilant and focused on those possible actions.

This is why it is critical to look at the mechanics of attacks in order to identify the steps that must be undertaken to complete them and then focus on identifying people taking such steps. Focusing on the “how” rather than the “who” is an effective way for authorities to get on the proactive side of the action/reaction continuum.

Considering this concept of focusing on the how, one quickly reaches a convergence with the second theme, which involves the role and capabilities of dedicated counterterrorism resources. The primary agency tasked with counterterrorism in most countries tends to have limited resources that are stretched thin trying to cover known or suspected threats. These agencies simply do not have the manpower to look for attack-planning indicators — especially in a world where militant actors are increasingly adopting the leaderless-resistance model, which is designed to avoid detection by counterterrorism forces.

When these factors are combined they highlight the fact that, as the threat posed by militants adhering to the leaderless-resistance model (whom we frequently refer to as “grassroots militants”) increases, so does the need for grassroots defenders.

Grassroots Threats
As we noted last week, Breivik’s concept of self-appointed and anonymous “Justiciar Knights” who operate as lone wolves or in small phantom cells is not a unique concept. Breivik was clearly influenced by the militant-group case studies he outlined in his manifesto. In recent decades, governments have become fairly efficient at identifying and gathering intelligence on known groups that pose a threat to conduct violent attacks. This is especially true in the realm of technical intelligence, where dramatic increases have been made in the ability to capture and process huge amounts of data from landline, cellphone and Internet communications, but governments have also become quite adept at penetrating militant groups and recruiting informants. Even before 9/11, government successes against militant groups had led white supremacist groups and militant animal-rights and environmentalist groups to adopt a leaderless resistance model for their violent and illegal activities.

In the post-9/11 world, intelligence and security services have dramatically increased the resources dedicated to counterterrorism, and the efforts of these services have proved very effective when focused on known organizations and individuals. Indeed, in recent years we have seen a trend where jihadist groups like al Qaeda and its franchises have encouraged aspiring militants to undertake lone wolf and small cell activities rather than travel to places like Pakistan and Yemen to link up with the groups and receive training in terrorist tradecraft. For several years now, STRATFOR has emphasized the nature of this decentralized threat.

We see no sign of this trend toward leaderless resistance reversing in the near future, and our forecast is that the grassroots threat will continue to grow, not only from the jihadist realm but also from far-right and far-left actors.

Stretched Thin
As noted above, most counterterrorism intelligence efforts have been designed to identify and track people with links to known militant groups, and in that regard they are fairly effective. However, they have been largely ineffective in identifying grassroots militants. The focus on identifying and monitoring the activities of someone connected to a known militant group is understandable given that operatives connected to groups such as Hezbollah or al Qaeda have access to much better training and far greater resources than their grassroots counterparts. In general, militants linked to organizations pose a more severe threat than do most grassroots militants, and thus counterterrorism agencies focus much of their attention on the more potent threat.

That said, grassroots operatives can and do kill people. Although they tend to focus on softer targets than operatives connected to larger groups, some grassroots attacks have been quite deadly. The July 2005 London bombings, for example, killed 52 people, and Breivik was able to kill 77 in his twin attacks in Norway.

One problem for most counterterrorism agencies is that counterterrorism is not their sole (and in some cases even primary) mission. Often, such as the case with MI5 in the United Kingdom, the primary counterterrorism agency also has substantial foreign counterintelligence responsibilities. In the case of the FBI, it has not only counterterrorism and foreign counterintelligence missions but also a host of other responsibilities such as investigating bank robberies, kidnappings, white-collar crime, cyber crimes and public corruption.

The resources of the primary counterterrorism agencies are also quite finite. For example, the FBI has fewer than 14,000 special agents to fulfill its many responsibilities, and while counterterrorism has become its top mission in the post-9/11 era, only a portion of its agents (estimated to be between 2,500 and 3,000) are assigned to counterterrorism investigations at any one time.

Counterterrorism investigations can also be very labor intensive. Even in a case where a subject is under electronic surveillance, it takes a great deal of manpower to file all the paperwork required for the court orders, monitor the surveillance equipment and, if necessary, translate conversations picked up from the surveillance efforts and run down and or task out additional investigative leads developed during the monitoring. Seemingly little things like conducting a “trash cover” on the subject (sifting through the trash a subject places out on the curb for evidence and intelligence) can add hours of investigative effort every week. If full physical and electronic surveillance is put in place on a subject, such a 24/7 operation can tie up as many as 100 special agents, surveillance operatives, technicians, photographers, analysts, interpreters and supervisors.

Again, given the potential threat posed by known or suspected al Qaeda, Hezbollah or, currently, Libyan government operatives, it is understandable why so many resources would be devoted to investigating and neutralizing that potential threat. However, the problem with this focus on known actors is that it leaves very little resources for proactive counterterrorism tasks such as looking for signs of potential operational activities such as preoperational surveillance or weapons acquisition conducted by previously unknown individuals. Indeed, this is a huge undertaking for agencies with limited resources.

Furthermore, in the case of a lone wolf or small cell, there simply may not be any clear-cut chain of command, a specific building to target or a communication network to compromise — the specialties of Western intelligence agencies. The leaderless-resistance organization is, by design, nebulous and hard to map and quantify. This lack of structure and communication poses a problem for Western counterterrorism agencies, as Breivik accurately noted in his manifesto. Also, since this grassroots threat emanates from a large variety of actors, it is impossible to profile potential militants based on race, religion or ethnicity. Instead, their actions must be scrutinized.

Grassroots Defenders
All grassroots militants engage in activities that make their plots vulnerable to detection. Due to the limited number of dedicated counterterrorism practitioners, these mistakes are far more likely to be witnessed by someone other than an FBI or MI5 agent. This fact highlights the importance of what we call grassroots defenders, that is, a decentralized network of people practicing situational awareness who notice and report possible indications of terrorist behavior such as acquiring weapons, building bombs and conducting preoperational surveillance.

Clearly, the most important pool of grassroots defenders is ordinary police officers on patrol. While there are fewer than 14,000 FBI agents in the entire United States, there are some 34,000 officers in the New York City Police Department alone and an estimated 800,000 local and state police officers across the United States. While the vast majority of these officers are not assigned primarily to investigate terrorism, they often find themselves in a position to encounter grassroots militants who make operational security errors or are in the process of committing crimes in advance of an attack, such as document fraud, illegally obtaining weapons or illegally raising funds for an attack.

In July 2005, police in Torrance, Calif., thwarted a grassroots plot that came to light during an investigation of a string of armed robberies. After arresting one suspect, Levar Haney Washington, police searching his apartment uncovered material indicating that Washington was part of a small jihadist cell that was planning to attack a number of targets. Hezbollah’s multimillion-dollar cigarette-smuggling network was uncovered when a sharp North Carolina sheriff’s deputy found the group’s activities suspicious and tipped off the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives, thus launching the massive “Operation Smokescreen” investigation.

Traffic stops by regular cops also have identified several potential grassroots jihadists. In August 2007, two Middle Eastern men stopped by a sheriff’s deputy for speeding near Goose Creek, S.C., were charged with possession of a destructive device. Likewise, a traffic stop by a police officer in September 2001 in Alexandria, Va., led to an investigation that uncovered the so-called Virginia Jihad Network. At the time of the 9/11 attacks, the operation’s leader, Mohamed Atta, was the subject of an outstanding bench warrant for failing to appear in court after being stopped for driving without a license. More recently, in May 2011 we saw the New York Police Department disrupt an alleged jihadist plot. Then in June, the Seattle Police Department detected a plot that it thwarted with the cooperation of the FBI. Both of these plots were disrupted during the weapons-acquisition phase.

In some countries, networks have been established to promote this concept of heightened local-police vigilance and to provide training for officers and crime analysts. The U.S. government has established something it calls the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, which is an attempt to provide local police with training to optimize their situational awareness and to help them collect and analyze information pertaining to potential terrorist-planning activity and then to share that information with other agencies enrolled in the program. However, the initiative has only a handful of state and local law enforcement agencies participating at the present time.

But police are not the only grassroots defenders. Other people such as neighbors, store clerks, landlords and motel managers can also find themselves in a position to notice operational planning activities. Such activities can include purchasing bombmaking components and firearms, creating improvised explosive mixtures and conducting preoperational surveillance. On July 27, 2011, an alert clerk at a gun store in Killeen, Texas, called the local police after a man who came into the store to buy smokeless powder exhibited an unusual demeanor. They located the individual and after questioning him learned he was planning to detonate an improvised explosive device and conduct an armed assault against a local Killeen restaurant popular with soldiers from nearby Fort Hood. The clerk’s situational awareness and his decision to call the police likely saved many lives.

And it’s important to remember than an alert street vendor was the first person to sound the alarm in the failed May 2010 Times Square bombing attempt, and it was a concerned family member who provided authorities with the information to thwart a planned November 2010 attack against a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon.

Ordinary citizens exercising situational awareness can and have saved lives. This reality has been the driving force behind programs like the New York Police Department’s “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign. This program was subsequently adopted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as a means of encouraging citizens to report potential terrorist behavior.

There is one other factor to consider. As we have previously discussed, counterterrorism spending comes in a perceptible boom-and-bust cycle. Next month will mark the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Since those attacks there has not been a successful large-scale terrorist attack on U.S. soil. This, along with the budget problems the United States is facing, will increase the current downward trend of counterterrorism funding in the United States and accentuate the need for more grassroots defenders.


This article was reproduced with permission from STRATFOR

Tuesday, August 2, 2011

Happy Ramadan, plus a plug for blogger The Linoleum Surfer

Yes, Ramadan, the holy month of feasting, over-eating, day time sleeping, night time partying, Egyptian TV soap operas, extra-crazy driving, and holidays is here!

Enjoy, those few of you who are choosing to stay in Oman. A tip to new arrivals who are staying in Oman while all the bars and bulk stores are closed - the 5 star hotels are often an effective Ramadan-free zone AND offer low special summer rates to residents. As a hotel guest the mini-bar is always open and you can still have wine with dinner. Tourism Enriches indeed.

Please drive with extra care in the hour or so before Iftar. In fact, best to avoid driving altogether at this time. And keep your fingers crossed as you take off from Muscat folks, as last month Oman's Air Traffic Control allowed yet another near miss between a recent PIA flight and a Kingfisher aircraft. Although the Omanis blame the pilots (naturally), my sources indicate it was clearly a fault of the Oman ATC system procedures.


Meanwhile, Big Brother here:
The Oman Telecoms Regulator, the TRA, is planning to increase controls on Expat mobile communications further by explicitly linking your SIM card to your residency permit.

Oman's Telecom Regulatory Authority (TRA) is considering plans to link mobile phone SIM cards of expatriates to their resident card, Muscat Daily has reported. The SIM card will automatically get cancelled along with their resident card upon their exiting the country at the end of their service contract.


Obviously, demanding a residency card to even get a SIM card, and then listening in on all your phone calls and text messages is not enough.


And, a plug:
A big plug to relatively new Oman-based blogger The Linoleum Surfer. Sarcastic & witty political & social commentary. Wonderful. Highly recommended.



Apologies it took me this long to add you to my blog list.

Wednesday, July 27, 2011

A question for the reader: Oman for Gay Expat?

While I'm away, one I'd like to pass to my many readers and facebook fans.

Answers please (as comments) to a fellow reader of Muscat Confidential, who asks:

Hello there,

I may be moving to Oman, I am from [Somewhere in Europe] and I am gay. I have a partner and we have been together for 6 years. We are thinking about getting married.

Now I have the chance to move to Oman for work and we are quite worried about him getting a visa. Since homosexual acts, per se, are outlawed, I would like some recommendation by perhaps another expat on how to proceed when requesting the visa. Should we say we are married? should we look for an alternative?

By Anonymous on Sexual Adventures in Oman on 7/26/11


Over to you. My answer soon.

Tuesday, July 26, 2011

Apologies - still alive, just still on vacation

Readers,

I realise I've not posted for a while. Sorry if I worried any of you.*

All is fine in the Dragon's Lair.

I'm still on vacation. Or Holiday, depending where you are. I got very busy flying all around collecting treasure and spending quality time with Ms Dragon. And then I went on vacation.

I'll be back on-line presently. It's all been pretty quiet in Muscat anyhow it seems, and with all the joys a summer Ramadan is about to kick in, I guess it's 'run away' to other places for a while for many of you as well!

Meanwhile, send me emails if you have any news.


* No, no conspiracy, not in/just out of prison, nor ill, nor in any dire straights what so ever. Nor am I in Oman.

Thursday, May 19, 2011

New Amnesty appeal for latest arrests. Protesters in court. HM makes CBS list of World's enduring Dictatorships.



Amnesty International have just updated their campaign in support of the arrested peaceful protesters. They also report the verdicts from todays trial in Al Khuwair.

OMAN MUST CHARGE OR RELEASE DETAINED PROTESTERS
Since February, Omanis have called for change in largely peaceful protests
© Demotix

18 May 2011
The Omani authorities must say where and why they are holding some six people arrested during a recent peaceful protest in the capital Muscat, Amnesty International said today, as more than two dozen others faced trial on protest-related charges.

Fifteen people were arrested by Omani security forces on 14 May during a protest in Muscat calling for the release of others detained two days earlier in pro-reform protests.

Prominent female lawyer Basma al-Kiyumi was released on 16 May, and on 17 May some eight other activists were released, among them Muhammad al-Habssi and Ibrahim Sa’id al-Hajri. It is not known where the remaining six – including Nabhan al-Hanashi – are, or if any charges have been brought against them.

“The authorities in Oman must immediately provide details on the whereabouts of all protesters being held and either charge them with a recognizable criminal offence or release them,” said Malcolm Smart, Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa Programme Director.

“If they are being detained solely for participating in a peaceful public protest they should be released immediately and unconditionally.”

“Any charges should be made public, and trials against the accused must conform to international fair trial standards.”

Amnesty International is concerned that those who continue to be held following the protest in Muscat on 14 May are being detained incommunicado and may be at risk of torture or ill-treatment.

Basma al-Kiyumi was charged in connection with participating in an unlawful gathering and released on bail to await trial at future date. It is not clear if other protesters who were released on 17 May were charged or not.

Another group of 27 men who had taken part in protests during March and April appeared before a Muscat court today and were charged with a number of offences including banditry, setting fire to government buildings, and insulting officials. The men pleaded not guilty and the case was adjourned until 23 May. Two of the men, Khaled al-Hantholi, and ‘Ammar al-Hani’i, were not granted bail and remain detained at the Central Prison.

At least three people have been killed and others injured during recent public protests in Oman amid allegations that the security forces have used excessive force against protesters. Many people have been arrested, including dozens who were detained in the northern city of Sohar on 29 March.
...





More 'Oman in the news'
CBS, mega US media corp, just released their latest edition of 'Enduring Dictators, show casing all the world's dictatorships. Naturally, it's Oman. There are a few small errors, but, this is how Oman is seen in some circles.

CBS News: Enduring Dictators.
May 18, 2011 4:54 PM

The world's enduring dictators: Qaboos bin Said, Oman

By Joshua Norman

Oman's leader Sultan Qaboos bin Said attends the third day of celebrations marking 40 years since he took the throne at Midan al-Fath Stadium in Muscat on December 1, 2010. (Credit: Getty Images) This is an installment in the WorldWatch series, "The world's enduring dictators," inspired by events in Tunisia and Egypt, in which CBSNews.com takes a look at the men who continue to rule their lands unimpeded by law. See a complete explanation of the series and a list of others profiled here.
Qaboos bin Said, Oman



Length of rule: 41 years.
Sultan Qaboos took the throne in 1970 after deposing his father in a palace coup, and has put his stamp on his country in many ways, even changing its name from "Muscat and Oman" to the "Sultanate of Oman." His part of the Arabian peninsula has been ruled by the al-Said family since 1744.

Most despotic acts:
The current "Arab Spring"-inspired protests in the country have seen at least two deaths. Protesters have complained about rampant government corruption, high unemployment and the lack of a parliament with legislative powers. There has been several waves of arrests of anti-government protestors amid an ongoing and aggressive crackdown against discontent. Although Oman has been accused of human trafficking - especially of foreign laborers - for some time, the government has allegedly begun enforcing laws against on the practice.

Outlook for change:
As mentioned earlier, several protest leaders have been detained and released in rolling waves of arrests in the past few months, and dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the country is high. While disgruntlement amongst the populace is obvious, the extreme dearth of foreign press coverage and lack of general press freedom there leaves it unclear as to whether the protesters want the sultan to leave, or simply want their government to function better. Beyond the recent protests, there is concern about succession in the country, as there is no heir apparent or any clear legislation on who may be the next Sultan.



Read more: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20064069-503543.html#ixzz1MkSaLBG1

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

Oman's heavy handed treatment of peaceful protestors may catch the Global media's attention.

Tension remains high in Salalah, as the families and friends of those arrested on Thursday & Friday - having been rounded up by the Army for protesting via a sit-in outside the Governor's place downtown - are now forming a second protest outside the local prison demanding their release.

According to reports from Salalah local blogger Dhofari Gucci, several of the protests lead 'speakers' were arrested and immediately taken back to Muscat "...namely Nasser Sakroon, Bakhit Al Mahri, Fahim Al Mashani, Salim Al Mashani, Amer Hardan , and others...."

Oman does not provide its citizens subjects the right of habeous corpus**, and so I presume these gentlemen are getting the extended VIP tour of the Dark Castle, ISS's brand new mega-bunker-fortress up above Qurm.

Photo 23.589849, 58.477162: Oman's Internal Security Services new building: The Dark Castle. The Government is currently hosting extended tours for a few lucky representatives of Salalah-based human rights activists.

The Ministry of Information dismissed the press release and described the arrests as yet another example of the caring nature of Oman's Government: "We're simply giving these long suffering protesters a chance to get away from it all, with an unforgetable trip away, and all expenses paid too. It's an experience I'm hoping our guests will find quite... enlightening." The Minister of the Interior added, "We've always been a Government that listens to the people. In the case of our new guests from Salalah, we'll even be recording what they say! I think reasonable people will see how we want to hear absolutely everything they have to tell us."



Meanwhile,
News of the surprise round-up of what had been a generally peaceful scene has reached the wire services, and despite the dominance of extremely violent reports coming from Syria and Yemen, Oman's news often made the editorial cut too. So far, Sultan Qaboos is still generally being portrayed as responding with moderation. So far.

But the release of an international press statement condemning the arrests of "human rights activists" issued by 'a group of Omani Activists', and picked up by wire service AFP, was soon appearing on hundreds of media outlets, including The LA Times (see a few others below*). At a stroke, this has successfully branded the protesters as the good guys. Does Oman News Agency not realise that by refering to them with words like "provocateurs" and "attempt[ing] to incite sedition", it makes HM sound just like Ghaddafi or Ahmadinejad?

Omani authorities have carried out a wave of arrests against human rights activists calling for reforms in the Gulf monarchy, a group of activists says in a statement received by AFP on Tuesday.

"We strongly condemn the repression and restrictions to the legitimate right of activists to express themselves peacefully," said the statement. The activists described the "arrests targeting those who were calling for rational dialogue" as "disappointing".


Great PR for the (un-named) 'activists'. The protesters are learning fast.

I think the Government's agressive move on what was a peaceful sit-in was pretty damn stupid. They could have just left them there, harmlessly talking to each other and delegations of minor civil servants, while in the real world simply by-passing them, ignoring most of their 'demands' and doing what-ever the Government wanted. If the protesters ever really got out of hand and used violence, then they could properly arrest those breaking the law, and deal with them in the courts.

Detaining people against their will for the "seditious crime" of peacefully sitting around and voicing an opinion comes across as simultaneously despotic and weak. Doing under cover of night with APCs & military troops from the north of the country, while shutting down the internet and mobile phones... well, it just lets everyone around the world play the 'spot the dictatorship' game.

For now, HM's reasonable reputation is standing. But that won't last very long.

I can only suggest readers support Amnesty International's approach to this. While they have not yet responded to the latest arrests, from their recent release about the earlier detention of the Sohar protesters, here is the informattion you need:

PLEASE WRITE IMMEDIATELY in Arabic, English or your own language:
 Welcome the release without charge of those arrested following the protests in Sohar and Muscat;
 Urge the authorities to ensure that the at least nine men who remain detained are protected from torture and other
ill-treatment, and given regular access to their families, lawyers and any medical attention they may require;
 Call for their immediate and unconditional release if they are prisoners of conscience held solely for peacefully
exercising their rights to freedom of expression and assembly; otherwise they should be released unless they are
promptly charged with recognizable criminal offences and tried in conformity with international fair trial standards;
 Ask for details of any charges brought against them and clarification of their current legal status and whereabouts
in detention.

PLEASE SEND APPEALS BEFORE 2 JUNE 2011 TO:

His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id
Head of State, Prime Minister, Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Finance Minister
Diwan of the Royal Court
The Palace, Muscat 113
Sultanate of Oman
Fax: +968 24 735 375

Salutation: Your Majesty


His Excellency Sayyid Hamoud bin
Faisal bin Said Al Busaidi
Minister of the Interior
Ministry of Interior
PO Box 127
Ruwi 112, Muscat
Sultanate of Oman

Salutation: Your Excellency


And copies to:
Mohammed bin Abdullah Al Riyam i
Chairman
National Human Rights Commission
P.O.Box 29, Postal Code: 103
Bareq A' Shati, Muscat, Sultanate of
Oman
Fax: +968 24648801
Email: enquiry@nhrc.om


Also send copies to diplomatic representatives accredited to your country. Please check with your section office if sending appeals after the above
date. This is the first update of UA 96/11. Further information: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE20/001/2011/en




* Reports:
AFP, Iran TV, the medialine, Zaywa, etc.




** Habeous Corpus
I'd recommend to interested readers the history of this important principal of English common law. (from wikipedia): The first recorded usage of habeas corpus was in 1305, during the reign of King Edward I. However, other writs were issued with the same effect as early as the reign of Henry II in the twelfth century. Blackstone explained the basis of the writ, saying "The King is at all times entitled to have an account, why the liberty of any of his subjects is restrained, wherever that restraint may be inflicted."

Indeed. Note this does not prevent people being held without trial where such things are deemed legal, nor does it ensure a fair trail. But it does force an explanation of their imprisonment, which only seem just.


wiki again:
...
The writ of habeas corpus is one of what are called the "extraordinary", "common law", or "prerogative writs", which were historically issued by the English courts in the name of the monarch to control inferior courts and public authorities within the kingdom. The most common of the other such prerogative writs are quo warranto, prohibito, mandamus, procedendo, and certiorari. The due process for such petitions is not simply civil or criminal, because they incorporate the presumption of non-authority. The official who is the respondent has the burden to prove his authority to do or not do something. Failing this, the court must decide for the petitioner, who may be any person, not just an interested party. This differs from a motion in a civil process in which the movant must have standing, and bears the burden of proof.
...

Sunday, May 15, 2011

UAE - as always, best avoided. Crown Prince Al Nahyan sets up mercenary army

It's long been the advice of Muscat Confidential that the UAE is 'best avoided'. A thin veneer of oil wealth supplied shiny stuff barely covers a culture of intolerance and expat exploitation. There is little true rule of law.

As recently commented in the previous post, The New York Times has just broken a big story that Sheik Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan has established a secret UAE based mercenary army in copperation with Blackwater founder Eric Prince. The outfit, staffed with mercs from Latin America to South Africa [but specifically no Muslims] is tasked with a mission scope that includes suppressing local riots, from expat labour camps or locals, plus defending islands from occupation by a few Iranians.

Photo: Effective ruler of the UAE, Sheik Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan.

While the unit was set up long before the Arab Spring swept the region, old Ghaddafi has shown that when you're a dictator it's useful to have a few rentals on hand who have no qualms shooting the local civilian populace.

...
Mr. Prince, who resettled here last year after his security business faced mounting legal problems in the United States, was hired by the crown prince of Abu Dhabi to put together an 800-member battalion of foreign troops for the U.A.E., according to former employees on the project, American officials and corporate documents obtained by The New York Times.

The force is intended to conduct special operations missions inside and outside the country, defend oil pipelines and skyscrapers from terrorist attacks and put down internal revolts, the documents show. Such troops could be deployed if the Emirates faced unrest in their crowded labor camps or were challenged by pro-democracy protests like those sweeping the Arab world this year.

The U.A.E.’s rulers, viewing their own military as inadequate, also hope that the troops could blunt the regional aggression of Iran, the country’s biggest foe, the former employees said. The training camp, located on a sprawling Emirati base called Zayed Military City, is hidden behind concrete walls laced with barbed wire. Photographs show rows of identical yellow temporary buildings, used for barracks and mess halls, and a motor pool, which houses Humvees and fuel trucks. The Colombians, along with South African and other foreign troops, are trained by retired American soldiers and veterans of the German and British special operations units and the French Foreign Legion, according to the former employees and American officials.
...


It's a long article. You can read it in full here.


Meanwhile, a UAE man was busted in Thailand while attempting to board a 1st class flight to Dubai with carry on that contained a baby leopard, panther, bear and monkeys. He obviously wasn't too worried about being searched on arrival in the UAE...

Post-script: The smuggler was one Noor Mahmoodr, a 36 year old male from UAE, according to freeland.org. No word on who he was smuggling them for...

UAE: Best avoided.

Saturday, May 14, 2011

123Orion May charity gig huge success (as usual!). Government patience snaps in Dhofar, everybody arrested




As the powers that be open up a giant can of military-backed wuppass on the peaceful demonstrators in Salalah, using a huge force of army troops + ROP & ISS + teargas, and switching off south Oman's entire mobile phone network and internet for 2 hours while doing so, it's good to know good folks have been keeping it real in Muscat.

123Orion's sell out charity gig in Muscat on May 5th raised 360 rials [US$900] for the Japanese Earthquake victims.

Photo" 123Orion rock the house for earthquake victims.

Well done JON G. Wish I could have been there.


Meanwhile in Salalah, things are going to get worse I suspect. Hopefully no-where near neighbouring Yemeni levels, but Dhofaris are not the sort to take being forced to shut up lying down. Keep checking Dhofari Gucci for latest news folks.

Sitting around in a roundabout calling for investigations into Ministerial corruption is, of course, extremely illegal in Oman.

Someone's patience has clearly expired.

PS
As posted in a comment on Muscat Mutterings, the Oman News Agency explained the situation quite clearly, here repeated in the Oman Observer (The Government owned newspaper):

Provocateurs held
Fri, 13 May 2011
MUSCAT — An official security source said security and military authorities yesterday arrested a number of provocateurs in Muscat Governorate and Wilayat of Salalah.
The source said deliberate inciting of rioting and public disorder by the detainees has reached a level that necessitated intervention to prevent them from continuing to break the law and stop their attempts to incite sedition, which has nothing to do with the public interest.

The source said security authorities commends citizens and those who co-operated for they know the real intentions of those persons who committed the unacceptable and who have no justification to continue gatherings and sit-ins. The authorities affirmed they will not hesitate to apply the law and protect the security of citizens and the nation.


Quite right. Sit-ins are very provocative.

repost JIC - Capital Area Yacht Centre under attack by new Minister of Tourism

Blogger acting up, so reporting just in case, with restores comments: check them out!

Photo: Capital Area Yacht Centre, CAYC, Oman. Marina Bandar Rowdha is just visible next door.

Background
Regular readers will know that Muscat's Capital Area Yacht Centre has been under attack from the Ministry of Tourism and their various bully-boys (such as OMRAN) for some time.

The previous Minister of Tourism, HE Rajiha bint Abd al-Amir bin Ali, recently passed away after loosing a battle with cancer. She was replaced by Mohsin Bin Mohammed Al Shaikh in February, but he was swiftly moved on in the big March-protests' cabinet reshuffle to become an advisor at the Diwan of Royal Court with Ministerial rank.

His replacement, Sheikh Abdulmalik bin Abdullah bin Ali al Khalili, was perhaps a surprising choice for Minister of Tourism. Previously he was strictly a money-man, chairman of BankMuscat and chairman of the Board's Audit Committee since 2001. Additionally, he served as the executive president of the Pension Fund of the Diwan of the Royal Court.

He might be new in the job, but his underlings made sure he got right onto the CAYC.


New Minister refuses to meet 'Expats'.
Demands CAYC move

I'm reliably told that HE Sheikh Abdulmalik requested a meeting on 25th April with CAYC's representatives in order to 'discuss the future of CAYC'. All the elected CAYC committee members** duly attended at the Ministry, but after being kept waiting for over an hour, they were informed that the minister would not meet the committee because there were two British expatriates present. He only wanted to talk to Omanis.

Really. (I wonder what he's got against expats? Maybe they don't respond as easily to the ol' Vitamin W?)

A new meeting was thus arranged for May 3rd, with only the Omani committee members present as instructed. They attended the meeting and were then told by the good Sheikh Abdulmalik that CAYC had to move to Azaiba, and the present beach would be made into a 'public beach'. End discussion. (Afterall, the Ministry of Tourism is reknowned for doing things for the benefit of the Omani public. Just look at what they did to Yeti, a beautiful public beach*.)

Azaiba, of course, is a pretty terrible place for a yacht club, being on a long stretch of boring sandy beach far away from the nice rocky bits one would actually sail a boat around. Places like, er, exactly where CAYC is already located. Although perhaps a banker can be excused for not knowing that.

I do have to wonder if the new Minister actually got a proper unbiased briefing of the CAYC situation (e.g. summary of previous meetings, Directives from H.M., and all the various court cases) from his senior advisor and Director of Tourism Mr. Mohammed Ali Said?


Photo: One of Oman’s most influential tourism figures.


Because the very same Mohammed Ali Said is also on the steering committee of the Marina Bandar Al Rowdha next door to CAYC. Rumour has it he has vowed to take the beach from CAYC for use by the Marina. Coincidentally, the Marina has been struggling financially ever since it opened, and does not currently have a nice beach of its own.

It seems very odd that The Ministry of Tourism feel themselves to be under no obligation to respect the title to the land personally given by His Majesty Sultan Qaboos to the CAYC.

[from CACY website]
His Excellency Mohammed Zubair officially opened the Capital Area Yacht Centre located on a beach, which was known locally as ‘Lone Tree Beach’, near Sidab on Saturday 2nd June 1979. This was the culmination of a good deal of community spirit, effort and imagination and very soon blossomed into the success story of Lone Tree Beach. The intention was to provide a safe beach and boat club with social facilities and amenities open to all residents of Oman, and also to provide a relaxed meeting place.
...
A meeting was held in the Ruwi Hotel in December 1976 to discuss the possibile formation of a beach club in Oman and a site was selected in the Sidab area then known as Lone Tree Beach. His Majesty Sultan Qaboos Bin Said, graciously granted the use of the land on condition that the Club should be open to anyone resident in Oman, and that it should be financially self-sufficient....


The centre can be joined by any resident of Oman to this day, and is financially self sufficient. But the will of HM doesn't seem to count for much in the Ministry of Tourism. Instead they have pursued a policy of intimidation and multiple legal actions.

One suspects there is more to this story, as you might notice that the CAYC land would be a very nice place to have available, should some of that land that end up excess to The Marina's the public's requirements. Some of it could perhaps get given to someone for, say, some beach front development.

Afterall, the Ministry of Tourism's "Senior Adviser to the Minister of Tourism and one of Oman’s most influential tourism figures", one Mohammed Ali Said, has stated his aim is to increase the Sultanate's 4 & 5 star hotel capacity from ~10,000 rooms in 2010 to 25,000 rooms by just 2015. Those Club Meds and Banyan Trees can hardly be put in the middle of Ruwi can they? So what if the CAYC has been there since 1979 providing the ONLY place where ordinary urban Omanis and Expats can keep a small boat at a reasonable price and bring their families to relax in a safe, hassle free environment?

I'd also be interested to know what legal authority the Minister of Tourism thinks gives him the power to single-handedly over-rule legal title and expropriate beach-front land? Isn't this exactly the sort of high-handed attitude that ordinary people here have been protesting against?

In a totally unrelated fact, with nothing to do with the Ministry of Tourism's campaign to get CAYC's land, I'm told Mr. Mohammed Ali Said was the brother in law of the previous Minister of Tourism HE Rajiha bint Abd al-Amir bin Ali. It's a small world.

Speaking of coincidences, it's ironic that on April 17th, BankMuscat’s Corporate Banking Team had
a day out at the CAYC which was full of excitement, fun and activities. “BankMuscat’s team truly enjoyed their day out at the CAYC and would like to thank the club’s management for a job well done”, Said Afaf Al Humaid who was organizing the event from the Bank.



Perhaps Said could call his old boss the Minister and ask him to keep his land-grabbing hands off what is already an excellent public venue for all residents of Oman, Omani and Expat alike?

*Yeti beach was redeveloped by MoT as a mega Integrated Tourist Development complex of private houses, 5 star hotels and expensive golf courses and marinas. Except the only thing to happen in the past 3 years is the beach was taken and the bay filled in with masses of imported rocks and sand to create more building area. The development is suspended.

**The six member CAYC committee is fully elected by members and comprises 4 Omanis and 2 Expats.

Wednesday, May 11, 2011

Capital Area Yacht Centre [CAYC] under renewed attack from latest Minister of Tourism

Photo: Capital Area Yacht Centre, CAYC, Oman. Marina Bandar Rowdha is just visible next door.

Background
Regular readers will know that Muscat's Capital Area Yacht Centre has been under attack from the Ministry of Tourism and their various bully-boys (such as OMRAN) for some time.

The previous Minister of Tourism, HE Rajiha bint Abd al-Amir bin Ali, recently passed away after loosing a battle with cancer. She was replaced by Mohsin Bin Mohammed Al Shaikh in February, but he was swiftly moved on in the big March-protests' cabinet reshuffle to become an advisor at the Diwan of Royal Court with Ministerial rank.

His replacement, Sheikh Abdulmalik bin Abdullah bin Ali al Khalili, was perhaps a surprising choice for Minister of Tourism. Previously he was strictly a money-man, chairman of BankMuscat and chairman of the Board's Audit Committee since 2001. Additionally, he served as the executive president of the Pension Fund of the Diwan of the Royal Court.

He might be new in the job, but his underlings made sure he got right onto the CAYC.


New Minister refuses to meet 'Expats'.
Demands CAYC move

I'm reliably told that HE Sheikh Abdulmalik requested a meeting on 25th April with CAYC's representatives in order to 'discuss the future of CAYC'. All the elected CAYC committee members** duly attended at the Ministry, but after being kept waiting for over an hour, they were informed that the minister would not meet the committee because there were two British expatriates present. He only wanted to talk to Omanis.

Really. (I wonder what he's got against expats? Maybe they don't respond as easily to the ol' Vitamin W?)

A new meeting was thus arranged for May 3rd, with only the Omani committee members present as instructed. They attended the meeting and were then told by the good Sheikh Abdulmalik that CAYC had to move to Azaiba, and the present beach would be made into a 'public beach'. End discussion. (Afterall, the Ministry of Tourism is reknowned for doing things for the benefit of the Omani public. Just look at what they did to Yeti, a beautiful public beach*.)

Azaiba, of course, is a pretty terrible place for a yacht club, being on a long stretch of boring sandy beach far away from the nice rocky bits one would actually sail a boat around. Places like, er, exactly where CAYC is already located. Although perhaps a banker can be excused for not knowing that.

I do have to wonder if the new Minister actually got a proper unbiased briefing of the CAYC situation (e.g. summary of previous meetings, Directives from H.M., and all the various court cases) from his senior advisor and Director of Tourism Mr. Mohammed Ali Said?


Photo: One of Oman’s most influential tourism figures.


Because the very same Mohammed Ali Said is also on the steering committee of the Marina Bandar Al Rowdha next door to CAYC. Rumour has it he has vowed to take the beach from CAYC for use by the Marina. Coincidentally, the Marina has been struggling financially ever since it opened, and does not currently have a nice beach of its own.

It seems very odd that The Ministry of Tourism feel themselves to be under no obligation to respect the title to the land personally given by His Majesty Sultan Qaboos to the CAYC.

[from CACY website]
His Excellency Mohammed Zubair officially opened the Capital Area Yacht Centre located on a beach, which was known locally as ‘Lone Tree Beach’, near Sidab on Saturday 2nd June 1979. This was the culmination of a good deal of community spirit, effort and imagination and very soon blossomed into the success story of Lone Tree Beach. The intention was to provide a safe beach and boat club with social facilities and amenities open to all residents of Oman, and also to provide a relaxed meeting place.
...
A meeting was held in the Ruwi Hotel in December 1976 to discuss the possibile formation of a beach club in Oman and a site was selected in the Sidab area then known as Lone Tree Beach. His Majesty Sultan Qaboos Bin Said, graciously granted the use of the land on condition that the Club should be open to anyone resident in Oman, and that it should be financially self-sufficient....


The centre can be joined by any resident of Oman to this day, and is financially self sufficient. But the will of HM doesn't seem to count for much in the Ministry of Tourism. Instead they have pursued a policy of intimidation and multiple legal actions.

One suspects there is more to this story, as you might notice that the CAYC land would be a very nice place to have available, should some of that land that end up excess to The Marina's the public's requirements. Some of it could perhaps get given to someone for, say, some beach front development.

Afterall, the Ministry of Tourism's "Senior Adviser to the Minister of Tourism and one of Oman’s most influential tourism figures", one Mohammed Ali Said, has stated his aim is to increase the Sultanate's 4 & 5 star hotel capacity from ~10,000 rooms in 2010 to 25,000 rooms by just 2015. Those Club Meds and Banyan Trees can hardly be put in the middle of Ruwi can they? So what if the CAYC has been there since 1979 providing the ONLY place where ordinary urban Omanis and Expats can keep a small boat at a reasonable price and bring their families to relax in a safe, hassle free environment?

I'd also be interested to know what legal authority the Minister of Tourism thinks gives him the power to single-handedly over-rule legal title and expropriate beach-front land? Isn't this exactly the sort of high-handed attitude that ordinary people here have been protesting against?

In a totally unrelated fact, with nothing to do with the Ministry of Tourism's campaign to get CAYC's land, I'm told Mr. Mohammed Ali Said was the brother in law of the previous Minister of Tourism HE Rajiha bint Abd al-Amir bin Ali. It's a small world.

Speaking of coincidences, it's ironic that on April 17th, BankMuscat’s Corporate Banking Team had
a day out at the CAYC which was full of excitement, fun and activities. “BankMuscat’s team truly enjoyed their day out at the CAYC and would like to thank the club’s management for a job well done”, Said Afaf Al Humaid who was organizing the event from the Bank.



Perhaps Said could call his old boss the Minister and ask him to keep his land-grabbing hands off what is already an excellent public venue for all residents of Oman, Omani and Expat alike?

*Yeti beach was redeveloped by MoT as a mega Integrated Tourist Development complex of private houses, 5 star hotels and expensive golf courses and marinas. Except the only thing to happen in the past 3 years is the beach was taken and the bay filled in with masses of imported rocks and sand to create more building area. The development is suspended.

**The six member CAYC committee is fully elected by members and comprises 4 Omanis and 2 Expats.

Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Thank you to followers of Muscat Confidential... and a repost of Muscat Mutterings Rock Bottom assault

Firstly, a big thank you to all of the readers and the 1,825 Facebook followers of Muscat Confidential for making us rank as Number 1 in Oman Collective Intelligence's* list of the top Omani English language blogs.

Associated apologies for being a bit quiet of late. The Dragon is very busy finding treasure for my new employers right now. Normal service will be resumed very soon. Blue City Part III, a shocking report from CAYC, and more details on the misguided Oil Nationalisation 'campaign'.

(*and a special thank you to OCI & Mohammed Al Tamami too, !)

But, time for a very quick repost of Muscat Mutterings report on the violent assault upon a patron by the infamous steroid-muscle-building-mullet-squad that are the 'bouncers' at Rock Bottom, night club of the down-market Ramee Guest Hotel in Qurm. It seems being charged a special cover fee for being Indian-looking is company policy there. And if you get uppity, you get a free GBH!

Photo (file): It's hard to beat Jet Driver's classic snap of the type that bounce at Rock Bottom.

Muscat Mutterings: Rock Bottom's Racism and Violence continues.

...
There were 4 bouncers wearing white shirts in the entrance area to the club, 2 chased after the man, the other two went into the club and presumably called in reinforcements.

Outside, the first of the two bouncers ran up behind the man, who was now walking away, and with absolutely no verbal warnings just smashed his fist into the back of the man's head, dropping him to the floor. More white-shirted bouncers appeared onto the scene, a total of around 15, and proceeded to kick and punch the man who was now on the floor. A white companion of the victim on the floor attempted to pull people off his friend and pull the man up from the ground. This man took a reported 8 punches to his face from the bouncers, and did not throw one single punch in his own defence - purely only looking to save his friend on the ground from a very serious mauling. Thats some dedication right there I'd say.

There were many witnesses, including the Manager of the hotel, a certain "Ms Mimi", who then threatened the white man that the ROP were coming to the scene, and that she had video evidence of assault on her staff. 15 men kicking the living sh** out of one customer victim (of racism) on the floor apparently constitutes assault of her staff.

Now, this may sound like a drunken story of a typical night gone wrong involving bouncers. Except this is an all too common occurrence that happens at the Rock Bottoms club here in Muscat, and these bouncers appear to think that they can get away with stuff like this. And evidentially, they are getting away with this outrageous behaviour.

If you are going out this weekend, consider visiting another bar. Why take the risk of being abused like this, why give an establishment that allows it's staff to act this way your patronage? There are other options out there. Have you experienced problems with the staff at Rock Bottoms? Let us all know below.
...


So please go post your opinions on Rock Bottom at Mr Sythe's blog.

And stay tuned. More blogs coming soon.

And why not 'Like' Muscat Confidential on Facebook while you're here?

Tuesday, May 3, 2011

Mass murderer finally gets what he richly deserved

Quick one: Mass murderer Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi man who had done more than anyone in recent history to degrade the reputation of Islam, finally reaped a bit of what he sowed last night when American special forces raided his compound near Islamabad and shot him. He had killed innocent civilians across the globe.




Excellent.