Showing posts with label wikileaks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wikileaks. Show all posts

Sunday, September 4, 2011

HM Sultan Qaboos interview with US in 2005: On Women wearing Hijab, Free speech, Iran, and a whole heap more.

As I wrote when Wikileaks released the first few cables, one of the best parts of the material were the possibility of more interviews with HM Sultan Qaboos.




HM does not do many interviews, and getting to 'sit in' on a small discussion with His Majesty is a rare and wonderful honour. HM is one smart cookie, and his advise and observations are generally pretty spot on.

In this cable from 2005, just released, he gives a far ranging view of his opinions across the Middle East: Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi, and some domestic issues.

In the middle of the discussion is this, HM is reported to have discussed (* see disclaimer) the Hijab.


...

¶8. (C) Revealing much about his own views on religion, the Sultan observed that religion combines many features: fundamental pillars of belief, rules of interpersonal behavior, and a kind of social contract, among others. Islam, he said, strictly proscribes only a very narrow band of activities, such as drinking blood and eating pork; everything else is simply cultural interpretation.

He finds it ridiculous that some people claim women must wear a hijab as an article of faith, whereas the Quran makes no such requirement.

...



Wow. Once again, HM totally rocks. Take that creeping Wahabi-ism. Ladies, over to you! You are free to wear what you want - including the Hijab - but the reason you can wear a hijab is because it's up to you and your cultural traditions, NOT because someone has the right to tell you to wear it or force you to wear it under a religious threat. I guess it wasn't necessary to mention the Niqab.

Photo: Omani Hijab - not prescribed by Quran.


On freespeech and extremism:
Later, he talks about freedom of expression. As well as saying (when discussing Iraq) that "Ordinary people do not want religious or ethnic strife, but rather jobs and personal security", HM expanded on the importance of Arabs expressing their opinions more openly. :


...
¶15. (C) Asked to gauge the strength of terror groups today, the Sultan agreed with GEN Abizaid that they appear to be weaker, but that it is difficult to know what they may be organizing themselves for in the future. He felt extremist ideology has been discredited by its senseless violence.

The Sultan argued that freedom of conscience and speech were the best antidote to extremist ideology, and was encouraged that Arabs appear to be getting over their fear of speaking out and expressing their views. It is time, he said, to let the silent majority speak and exile extremists to the margins of society where they belong.

He also thought that couching harsh ideologies in religious cloaks was likewise losing its appeal, in part given the human nature of fearing eternal damnation for violating true religious tenets.

...


So HM also supports free speech, and cites the connection between free speech and its impact of suppressing extremism. People have always wondered how the Sablas and Forums and blogs remained on-line, now we know! It also speaks to HM's responses to the protests this year.


Advice on Iran:
Earlier, HM generously gives his visitor, the US CENTCOM General Abizaid, some really excellent advice on Iran:




...
Offering the unique perspective of an ancient state that has always bordered Iran, the Sultan cautioned the U.S. not to be fooled by the superficial patina of the "Islamic Republic of Iran." "You are dealing with Persia, not the 'Islamic Republic.'"
...


This is so true. Every Iranian I meet just wants a peaceful secure economy in Iran, and almost always they have relatives in the USA, and actually really don't mind the USA at all. I wish the new Republican presidential candidates could get that. That one observation contains a heap of deep strategic wisdom, IMHO.

He gives more advice on Iran to the General, detailed in a different cable here


Implications for Oman
I just wish HM would give more speeches and interviews of this nature, in public. In this way his views would have a more pervasive and perhaps longer lasting impact, as he is so sensible in his prescriptions. His arguments are so convincing and imbued with integrity. What a leader. He should show it off a lot more.

How can Omanis get a chance to share more directly in this leadership via the media? Can you imagine HM tweeting?

President Obama has a blog, website, tweeter account, photos, speeches, etc etc etc. Why doesn't HM bypass the MOI and get some young Omani on-line intelligensia to hook him up on the information superhighway?

Follow this link to see the whole interview. It's too big to post here in full.


IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER: * These alleged confidential documents are more accurately "what wikileaks and their anonymous source purports to be what those representatives from the US State department chose to commit formally in writing (and after editing and review) to the US Secretary of State about what HM Sultan Qaboos was perceived by them to have probably said, or inferred, to them about what HM's opinions were, in an unstated context, and when knowingly shared by HM with official representatives of the US State Department in a non-121 meeting attended by other persons".

Gedit? Caveat Emptor indeed. We weren't there, so you don't know what really happened, right?

In this world, some (or most) of these cables may be official unoffical propaganda/black intel, from almost anyone. It's just the internet after all. So readers are advised that all this is for entertainment value only. Treat it as a novel. For god's sake don't go off and do anything silly based on these digital bits and bytes. And that advice applies to professionals and amateurs alike!




Muscat Confidential Mentioned in Dispatches: Wiki leaks releases thousands of Muscat sourced US cables


Finally. After having made Muscat sourced US Diplomatic cables only a handful of the early cable leaks, Wikileaks has released the whole shebang.

Excellent.






There's some great stuff in there, and I'm still working through it.

And really nice to get an actual quoted suggested link for the President mention for Muscat Confidential in one one I found about Blue City and the legal case between the partners:

...

SUBJECT: AN AL-SAID LOSES HIS DAY IN COURT
REF: MUSCAT 188
-------
Summary
-------

¶1. (C) An investment group reportedly controlled by a
prominent member of Oman's ruling family failed to persuade a
Muscat court to remove a Bahraini investor from the
multi-billion dollar Blue City real estate venture. The
episode suggests that the Sultanate sees preserving its
reputation for judicial fairness and independence and its
image as an attractive site for foreign investment as a
higher priority than intervening in its legal system to
benefit a prominent member of the royal family. End Summary.

...


¶3. (U) Although only one Omani newspaper, the private Arabic-language daily "al-Azzamn," published a story on the verdict, popular English-language blog sites "Muscat Confidential" and "Muscati," as well as the Bahraini press, have written in detail about the dispute, which became public late last year. ...



Neat! The President reads Muscat Confidential!

These cables are perfect for students of US-Oman relations, Omani Foreign Policy, Miltary relationships, economics, strategic business, the FTA, man, you name it. The Omani twitterati are already long a buzz with the material.

And to start with a highlight cable, here is a complete summary by the US State Dept. on the Oligarchical "Big Families" of Oman: Zawawi, Zubair, Shanfari, Al Sultan, Bahwan, Kimji, ... so here it is. Our favourite Blue City royal businessman, astute investor HH Sayyid Haitham, gets a section too.


SUBJECT: OMAN, INC.: BUSINESS OLIGARCHS AND GOVERNMENT IN OMAN'S
ECONOMY


REF: A. 09 MUSCAT 845; B. 08 MUSCAT 540; C. 08 MUSCAT 501
¶D. 08 MUSCAT 430; E. 08 MUSCAT 384; F. 08 MUSCAT 256
¶G. 08 MUSCAT 188

Summary:
¶1. (C) Oman's business landscape remains dominated by a handful of
local families who work either in tandem with, or in the shadow of,
government-run enterprises. As the Sultanate's economy diversifies
away from petroleum into fields such as industrial production and
tourism, these families have parlayed their privileged positions
and government ties into developing new business opportunities.
While the government publicly has called for an increase in the
number and participation of small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), the major role of the state and omnipresence of the large
trading houses will ensure these families' continued dominance as
Oman's economy continues to expand. End Summary.



An Oligarchy Takes Hold
¶2. (C) Oman's private sector is best described as an oligopoly.
After Sultan Qaboos assumed power from his father in 1970, a
handful of families came to dominate the private sector. These
families are similar in many respects: many come from humble
beginnings, most are not directly related to the al-Said ruling
family, but almost all owe their fortunes in part to ties to the
Sultan or members of his government. As Oman's economy developed
and evolved, these families extended their business reach to meet
the growing needs of the government, Omani consumers, and, more
lately, the tourism industry. As a result, they control
conglomerates that operate in a wide array of sectors, from
construction to cars, and from manufacturing to hotels.

¶3. (SBU) In recent years, Oman's government has encouraged the
development of industrial areas, most notably the northern port
city of Sohar, as well as large real estate projects. These
initiatives are part of a long-term effort to diversify the economy
and reduce the country's dependence on hydrocarbons, which
currently account for 79% of state revenues. The government's new
economic priorities - industrial ventures and real estate
development - have provided new opportunities for Oman's oligarchy.

¶4. (C) Given the state's substantial role in economic planning, it
is not surprising that the family with the closest relationship to
the Sultan - the Zawawis - is one of the country's richest. While
the Zawawi fortune remains large, it also has remained relatively
unchanged over time, according to post contacts. By contrast,
other private sector leaders - the Zubair and Bahwan families and
the Sultan's cousin, Sayyid Haitham bin Tariq al-Said - have become
more involved in new and growing sectors, raising their rank within
the business community's hierarchy.



The Zawawi Family - OMZEST Group
¶5. (C) The Zawawis, a merchant family with origins in Saudi
Arabia, have had a close relationship with the ruling al-Said
family for over a century. The relationship blossomed under Sultan
Qaboos as Oman's economy rapidly expanded. Omar Zawawi, who
attended Harvard in the 1960s and was trained as a physician and
holds an MD, is currently the head of the family and possibly the
richest man in Oman. He is also a member of the Sultan's "kitchen
cabinet," a handful of individuals who are not government cabinet
members, but have regular access to the Sultan and advise him on
key matters. Zawawi's brother Qais had a more visible role in the
government as Deputy Prime Minister until his death in 1995. Omar
Zawawi's official title, Senior Advisor for External Affairs, is
somewhat misleading, as he plays a highly influential role in
domestic economic policy making in addition to foreign policy
matters. He has an unmatched combination of acuity regarding
international affairs and direct access to the Sultan; his hand may
be detected in Oman's recent and surprisingly quick decision to
permit the transit of anti-piracy security teams (ref A.).



¶6. (SBU) Zawawi's company, OMZEST Group, is the umbrella for 75
wholly owned and associated companies with an estimated 4,000
employees. The group's activities include agriculture, banking,
contracting, manufacturing, and travel and tourism, among others.
OMZEST's key business, however, is manufacturing, from which it
derives approximately 43 percent of its revenue. (Note: OMZEST's
exact revenue and profits are not known. End Note.) OMZEST is
heavily involved in new manufacturing ventures at the burgeoning
Sohar port, which the government has targeted for development as
part of its drive to diversify the Omani economy. OMZEST, for
example, controls a 30 percent stake in Oman Methanol Company, a
joint venture that has built a $450 million methanol plant with a
production capacity of one million tons per annum (tpa). Oman
Methanol is in the midst of constructing a second plant, also
capable of producing one million tpa. OMZEST also holds a 10
percent stake in Alsig, a joint venture that owns an industrial gas
production facility in the Sohar port area with an initial
production capacity of 200 tons per day of nitrogen. The plant may
be upgraded over time to produce oxygen and other gases, depending
on demand from industries in the Sohar Port complex.



¶7. (C) OMZEST is a player in the banking arena, with a controlling
interest in Oman's third largest bank, Oman International Bank.
While it benefited, as did all Omani banks, from the liquidity
generated from high oil prices, as well as several government and
Royal Diwan accounts under its purview, the bank appears not to be
particularly well-run and therefore by local standards vulnerable
in the face of regional and international economic difficulties.
One banking contact noted that he would "never work for Oman
International Bank," while another complained about the
difficulties in working under the bank's micro-managing chairwoman
- Reem Zawawi, Omar's daughter.



The Bahwan Family - Suhail and Saud Bahwan Group
¶8. (C) The Bahwans, members of the Mukhaini tribe from the coastal
city of Sur, got their start as the exclusive agents for Toyota in
Oman, a right they received thanks to Sultan Qaboos' direct
intervention. Until 2002, brothers Suhail and Saud Bahwan jointly
operated the Bahwan group, most likely the second largest
conglomerate in Oman in terms of profits. While the brothers have
split the firm, the two new companies remain leaders in the
economy. Much has been made about the alleged bad blood in the
separation, but post contacts believe that it is overplayed, and
that the two companies remain somewhat aligned. One company
official noted to Econoff that while the brothers are fiercely
competitive, even with each other, they remain "family."

¶9. (SBU) The Suhail Bahwan Group appears to be the larger and more
diversified of the two. It employs approximately 10,000 people and
includes interests in engineering and construction, automobile
sales, telecommunications, software design, structural steel, and
chemicals and fertilizer products, among others. While the group
retains some ties to the original family automobile business as the
exclusive agent in Oman for BMW, Nissan and Renault, like OMZEST,
Suhail Bahwan has invested heavily in industrial projects,
including recent projects near the ports at Sohar and Salalah, as
well as in the National Bank of Oman, the country's second-largest
financial institution. The group is expanding its profile in
vocational training and education; partnered with Virginia Tech, it
is currently waiting for Ministry of Higher Education permission to
found Oman's fourth private university.

¶10. (SBU) Bahwan Engineering is a heavyweight in the local
economy, and has grown its business beyond Oman's borders by
establishing offices in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. It has participated
in the construction of a number of high-profile projects in Oman,
including LNG facilities (Oman LNG, Qalhat LNG), power stations
(Sohar, Barka, Ghubra), hospitals (Ibra), industrial plants (Sohar
Aluminum), banks (Central Bank, Bank Dhofar, Oman International
Bank), shopping malls (Msucat's two City Centre malls, along with
th city's thid largest mall, the Markaz al-Bahja), and hotels
(Muscat Intercontinental, Muscat Crowne Plaza).

¶11. (U) The company's industrial ventures include Suhail Chemical
Industries, which manufactures sulfuric acid in the Sohar
Industrial Area, and the Sohar Fertilizer Project, a $638 million
complex that includes an ammonia plant with a production capacity
of 2,000 metric tons per day (mtd) and two granular urea plants
with a combined production capacity of 3,500 mtd. The group also
plans to add 30,000 tons per year of structural steel component
manufacturing capacity at Sohar. Finally, Suhail Bahwan is an
investor in Octal Petrochemical, a U.S.-based firm which controls a
plant in the Salalah free zone that produces 30,000 tons per year
of polyethylene plastics and has plans for major expansion (ref D).


¶12. (C) The Saud Bahwan Group has approximately 9,400 employees
and annual sales of more than $3 billion. Growing in recent years
from a base of 3,000 employees, the company's primary business is
automotive and heavy equipment sales, as well as sales of
automotive parts and accessories. The group represents Toyota,
Ford and MAN commercial trucks, as well as Komatsu construction
equipment in Oman. In addition, the group acts as the exclusive
agent for Hertz Rent-a-Car. Patriarch Saud Bahwan died in late
2008, but as he had in recent years passed most executive authority
to his children, the company's direction has been relatively
unaffected. Sheikh Saud was long Oman's highest profile
(non-royal) philanthropist, one whose gifts included a generous
(anonymously given ) sums to The American International School of
Muscat (TAISM).



The Zubair Family - Zubair Corporation
¶13. (C) The Zubairs are ethnically Baluchi from the Huti tribe, a
group traditionally with a humble social status. However, the
family's long-standing personal relationship with Sultan Qaboos has
brought them tremendous wealth. The founder of Zubair Corporation,
Mohammed Zubair, is believed to have been a childhood companion of
the Sultan, as their mothers were close friends. Zubair became
Minister of Commerce in 1974, four years after Sultan Qaboos took
power, and remained in that position until 1983, after which he
became the Sultan's advisor for economic planning affairs. (Note:
While like Zawawi a "special advisor" to the Sultan, he is not as
close to Oman's ruler. And, unlike Zawawi, Zubair has generally
steered clear of politics, domestic or international, to focus on
his business interests. End Note.) While Mohammed Zubair remains
associated with Zubair Corporation, his son Hani al-Zubair now
serves as its chairman. The Zubairs have long been considered
locally the Sultanate's most cultured family; the family's private
collection of Omani arts and crafts are now housed in Oman's only
truly world-class museum, the Bait al-Zubair.

¶14. (SBU) Zubair Corporation has an estimated 2,400 employees and
is the parent company of 60 firms, subsidiaries, and associated
ventures. The company's divisions include automotive sales, art
and heritage, hospitality, telecom and IT, construction, retail
manufacturing, and advertising and publishing. Zubair represents
Volkswagen, Chrysler, Jeep, Mitsubishi, Peugeot, and Yamaha, among
other companies.

¶15. (SBU) One of the Zubairs' most prominent and successful
ventures to date is the Shangri La Barr Al Jissah hotel complex,
which opened outside Muscat in 2006. The Zubairs, in partnership
with the government, invested $180 million in the site, which
covers 124 acres and contains three hotels with a total of 640
rooms. Further development on the project has added luxurious
private residences, including apartments and villas. The success
of the Barr Al Jissah complex has encouraged more large-scale real
estate development construction in Oman, including projects under
construction at Sifah, Yenkit, and Blue City.

¶16. (SBU) The Zubair Corporation is dabbling in the Sohar port
industrial area as well. It holds a 10% stake in the Sohar Power
Company, the owner of the $550 million Sohar Power and
Desalinization Plant, which has a power generation capacity of 585
megawatts (MW) and desalinization capacity of 33 million gallons
per day. Recently, the Zubairs entered into a $30 million joint
venture with an Indian engineering and construction company, Larsen
and Toubro, to build a plant in Sohar that will manufacture
products for the offshore oil and gas sector.

¶17. (C) Post contacts report that the Zubair Corporation is
undergoing a shake-up in personnel to inject new blood into the
company. In 2008, Zubair appointed Giles Cunningham as the
company's new Chief Executive Officer. In a conversation with
Econoff, Cunningham viewed the company as a leading economic
powerhouse in Oman, but commented that it needed to gain focus in
determining which new opportunities to pursue. A former banker in
the region, Cunningham stated that the company's potential for
growth and the Zubairs' keen sense of business attracted him to
Oman.



The Sultan Family - W.J. Towell
¶18. (SBU) The Sultan family is an established Lawatiya Shi'a clan
(Ref B) that in 1866 founded W.J. Towell in partnership with the
company's namesake William Jack Towell. Towell, who is believed to
have been an American citizen, later, sold his share in the firm to
the Sultans in the 1890s. After Sultan Qaboos came to power in
1970, W.J. Towell managed some of the country's first major
infrastructure projects.

¶19. (C) The family's head is Kamal Sultan, who is now
incapacitated and serves as Honorary Chairman of the firm. His
son, Jawad Hussein Sultan, is Chairman. The company's main market
advantage is family member Maqbool bin Ali Sultan, who was a
director of the firm before he became Minister of Commerce and
Industry in 1991. Maqbool is well-connected in Oman's business
landscape, as he also serves as the Chairman of Oman Oil Company, a
primary investment arm of the government, and Chairman of the Sohar
Industrial Port Corporation, the landlord of the Port of Sohar. He
also is a close colleague of Ahmed bin Abdul Nabi Macki, who is the
Sultanate's powerful National Economy Minister, as well as the
Deputy Chairman of the National Resources Council, Chairman of Oman
Shipping Company, and Chairman of Oman Air.

¶20. (SBU) W.J. Towell currently has an estimated 1,000 direct-hire
employees and is involved in healthcare products, furniture sales,
automobile sales, cleaning services, construction services, real
estate, and grocery retailing and distribution, among other areas.
The firm also represents a variety of foreign companies in Oman,
including Mazda, Mars, and Chicago Pneumatic. Given the family
connection to Sohar, W.J. Towell has become involved in
industrialization efforts in the port city. The company drafted
the port's master plan, holds a 10% stake in Sohar Power Company,
and for years been the chief advocate for constructing a
multi-billion aluminum smelter near Sohar, a project that is now
being implemented as a joint venture of Abu Dhabi Water and
Electricity Authority, Oman Oil Company and Alcan. Towell is a
major property developer in Oman, with signature projects in the
expat-heavy neighborhoods of Madinat al-Sultan Qaboos and Shatti
al-Qurm, developments whose success has cushioned the cancellation
or postponement of additional residential and resort properties.



Al Sa'id Family - A Growing Force in Business?
¶21. (C) The royal Al Sa'id family has long had a notable, if low
profile, role in the private sector, but in recent years some
members have expanded their commercial activities. The more
traditional (less commercially minded) branch of the family is led
by the Sultan's paternal uncle, Sayyid Shabib bin Taimur Al Sa'id.
In 1982, Sayyid Shabib established the Tawoos Group, a diversified
firm with interests in telecommunications, agriculture, and oil
field supplies. Tawoos Group is now run by Sayyid Shabib's
half-brother, Samir Fancy, and has not significantly changed its
business in recent years. Tawoos' main division, Renaissance
Services, was one of the first family-owned companies to become
publicly traded on the Muscat Securities Market. Renaissance
focuses primarily on services, including facilities management,
cleaning and catering, IT services, and education and training.
Tawoos is interested in further expanding its overseas presence,
evidenced by the company's participation in an official Omani
commercial delegation to Baghdad in 2008 (ref C).


¶22. (C) The business interests controlled by Sultan Qaboos'
cousin, Sayyid Haitham bin Tariq Al Sa'id, the Minister of Heritage
and Culture and one of the possible successors to the Sultan, and
his brother, Sayyid Talal, appear far more dynamic than those
controlled by Sayyid Shabib. The brothers have interests in two
major firms - National Trading Company and Oman Holdings
International (OHI) - which are active in advertising and media,
telecommunications, tourism, energy services and construction,
among other sectors. National Training Company's financial results
are not available publicly.

¶23. (SBU) National Trading Company is the quieter of the two
firms. Established in 1982, the company - like the Zubair
Corporation and W.J. Towell - holds a 10% stake in the Sohar Power
and Desalinization Plant. It also has a 6.4% stake in Oman
Chlorine, a publicly traded firm that controls a chemical plant in
Sohar. It created "National Trading and Projects Company" in 2005,
which works closely with OHI in the fields of oil and gas, water,
power, and telecommunications.

¶24. (C) Sayyid Haitham and another brother, Sayyid Qais, are the
primary investors in the Muscat Hills Golf and Country Club, a
swank development near Muscat International Airport. The $110
million venture includes an 18-hole championship golf course
surrounded by a planned community. Phase 1 of the community is
expected to be complete by late 2009 and consists of 80 deluxe
villas around Muscat's first green golf course. The course itself
opened only after Sayyid Haitham shook up the project management
staff and reportedly brokered a deal with Muscat Municipality
Chairman Abdullah bin Abbas for use of the municipality's recycled
water.

¶25. (C) Sayyid Haitham's most important and visible project,
however, is the mega-real estate venture Blue City, in which he
shares a 30% stake with another investor. Blue City (Al Medina Al
Zarqa in Arabic), was announced as by far Oman's most ambitious
development, with a total expected cost of $20 billion. Its
original plans called for the construction of an entirely new urban
area, with residences, schools, health facilities and hotels for
200,000 people. The development was the subject of a legal battle
in which Sayyid Haitham's company "Cyclone" unsuccessfully tried to
acquire full ownership of the project from Bahrain-based AAJ
Holdings, which controls 70% of Blue City (Ref F). Its prospects
have been the subject of significant local gossip over the past
year, as ambitious plans for an urban center that would have
challenged Sohar and even Muscat have been gradually scaled back to
a more realistic (if still highly ambitious)
residential/resort/commercial complex. The project's difficulties
have, to an extent, tarnished Sayyid Haitham's reputation, if not
his prospects in the succession.


Ma'shani Family - Muscat Overseas Group
¶26. (C) The Ma'shanis are another family with close ties to Sultan
Qaboos, in this case through his late and much-loved mother; the
clan elder, Sheikh Mustahail bin Ahman al-Ma'shani, is the Sultan's
maternal uncle. He previously served as Minister of Social Affairs
and Labor and is now a State Advisor, as well as chairman of the
family company he started in 1974, Muscat Overseas Group. One of
his sons, Salim bin Mustahail, is an advisor at the Diwan of Royal
Court (a position that carries ministerial rank), as well as
vice-chairman of the family business. In July 2008, Salim was
appointed chairman of Nawras Telecommunications, the second largest
provider of cellular phone service in Oman. (Note: Qatar Telecom
is the majority shareholder in Nawras. End Note.)

¶27. (SBU) Reflecting the family's power base in the southern
Dhofar region, Muscat Overseas Group is the most powerful business
group in Salalah, Dhofar's capital. Its business operations
include trading, contracting, oil field supplies and drilling,
tourism, agriculture and real estate. It also is a 4% stakeholder
in Bank Muscat, Oman's largest bank.

¶28. (SBU) The firm's investments are channeled, in part, through
the Dhofar International Development and Investment Holding Company
(DIDIHC), where Sheikh Mustahail's son Khalid was appointed
chairman in 2008. (Note: The Shanfari family from Dhofar is also
a player in DIDIHC, with the family patron, Saeed bin Ahmen Al
Shanfari, previously serving as the chairman. End Note.) DIDIHC
holds a 30% stake in Bank Dhofar, 25% in Dhofar Insurance, 25% in
Salalah Medical Supplies Manufacturing Company, 16% in Dhofar
University, 14% in Dhofar Tourism Company, 10% in Salalah Port
Services Company, 5% in Oman Oil Company, 4% in Dhofar Power, and
an unknown stake in Octal Petrochemicals.



Shanfari Family - Shanfari Group
¶29. (C) The Shanfari represent the other prominent Dhofari family.
Shanfari Group Chairman Saeed al-Shanfari was a close contact of
Sultan Qaboos before his ascent to power. In 1974, Shanfari was
rewarded for his loyalty by being named Minister of Oil and Gas, a
position he held until 1997, when he was "retired" by the Sultan.
Post contacts report that his personal connection to the Sultan has
all but disappeared.

¶30. (C) Nevertheless, the Shanfari Group of Companies, established
by Saeed in 1970, remains a well-known trading house in Oman. In
addition to military sales, the group is involved in the
construction, transport and logistics, manufacturing, and tourism
sectors. It serves as one of the representatives of the Jeep and
Harley Davidson brands in Oman. (Note: the Shanfari Group had
exclusive rights to Jeep until 2005, when it reluctantly agreed to
share the brand with the Zubair Corporation after the U.S.-based
vehicle manufacturer complained of poor marketing efforts.
However, in 2008, Chrysler awarded Shanfari the right to market
Dodge, a brand previously reserved for Zubair. End Note.) The
Shanfari Group also holds the exclusive rights to a string of
luxury brands, such as Ferrari, Lamborghini, Maserati, and also
Saab, though one company official admitted to Econoff that those
are "just for show," since they generate negligible business in
terms of volume. Saeed Shanfari further retains significant stakes
in Dhofar-based projects through his stake in DIDIHC.

¶31. (C) Saeed's son Adil serves as the Shanfari Group's chairman
and CEO and is fond of the U.S., with several of his children
studying at a military school in Kansas. Another of Saeed's son,
Thamer, a U.S. university graduate and former participant in a
State Department International Visitor Program, was in 2008
designated for sanctions by the U.S. Treasury Department for his
questionable business dealings - which did not involve other family
members - in the Democratic Republic of the Congo benefiting
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe.



Darwish Family - Mohsin Haider Darwish (MHD LLC)
¶32. (C) The Darwish family is part of Oman's Baharna Shi's
community (Ref B), a group that is believed to have its roots in
Bahrain. The Darwishes have been notable merchants in the Gulf
since the late nineteenth century. Mohsin Haider Darwish is the
family's patriarch and managing director of the family company, MHD
LLC, while his two daughters, Lujaina Mohsin Darwish and Areej
Mohsin Darwish, serve as deputy managing directors (as such, they
are among the Sultanate's leading businesswomen). MHD, which has
an estimated 750 employees, remains an important player in the
local economy, but observers do not see it as being as dynamic as
top-tier firms such as OMZEST, Bahwan, and Zubair. MHD's divisions
include automotive sales, electrical goods and electronics
merchandising, chemicals, medical equipment and building materials.
In the automotive sector, MHD represents Jaguar, Land Rover and
Volvo. MHD retains a 10% stake in the industrial gas venture
"Alsig," in which OMZEST also has a 10% share.



Khimji family: Khimji Ramdas and Ajit Khimji
¶33. (C) the Khimjis are of Indian origin with commercial ties to
Oman that go back more than a century. The family lent money to
Sultan Qaboos' father, Sultan Sa'id; Sultan Qaboos granted Omani
citizenship to the Khimjis after he came to power. Notably, as
Hindus, the family traditionally has not intermarried with
non-Indians, but one member of the family, Rishi Khimji, is now
married to Sayyida Tania al-Sa'id, the daughter of Sayyid Shabib
al-Sa'id, the founder of Tawoos Group; Sayyida Tania is an
increasingly visible environmental activist and among the most
publicly active female al-Saids.

¶34. (SBU) Established in 1870, the family's operations are now
split into two - Khimji Ramdas and Ajit Khimji. Khimji Ramdas is
divided into four sectors: consumer products, lifestyle,
infrastructure, and projects and logistics. Much of its business
revolves around the retaining sector; it represents such prominent
brands as Proctor & Gamble, Ralph Lauren, and Samsonite. In
addition, the company acts as the exclusive agent for Pizza Hut,
and runs its own "Khimji Mart" consumer goods stores. The projects
and logistics division supplies military and firefighting equipment
to the government, while in the defense sector the company
represents Humvee.

¶35. (SBU) Ajit Khimji's business line takes a smaller, though
parallel, focus on consumer products, dining, and retailing. It
runs a number of well-known and highly regarded restaurants (among
the handful of non-hotel-based restaurants to hold liquor
licenses), , holds the franchise for Europcar, and serves as the
general services agent for Swiss (the national carrier) through its
travel agency. In addition, it owns an insurance company, several
coffee shops, bookstores, and dry-cleaning outlets.



State Reigns Supreme
¶36. (SBU) The strong position of Oman's leading families will
continue to benefit from the government's pre-eminent role in the
economy. At the forefront of the government's significant holdings
is Petroleum Development Oman (PDO), which s the country's primary
oil producer. Established in 1951, PDO is 60%-owned by the Omani
government and 34%-owned by Royal Dutch Shell, with the remaining
shares held by French-based Total and Portuguese-based Partax. PDO
controls 90% of Oman's reserves, 109 of the 130 fields, and the
lion's share of total production. In 2004, the government renewed
PDO's concession for another 40 years, though there was some
grumbling about the generosity of the extension, given falling
production rates and Shell's fudging of its Omani reserves
estimates, which greatly embarrassed the Omani government.
Nevertheless, the government has committed itself to making
significant investments in enhanced oil recovery techniques on
behalf of PDO during the course of the current five-year economic
plan (2006-2011), with an estimated investment in 2008 of $1.74
billion in petroleum production.

¶37. (SBU) In spite of the significant investment figures in PDO,
the government has moved to allow greater foreign competition in
the development of its petroleum fields. It is careful, however,
to retain a sizable equity stake in new oil-related ventures. For
example, complementing PDO's production is U.S.-based Occidental
Petroleum, which is investing over $3 billion in its Mukhaizna
field concession. In transferring the concession to Oxy from PDO,
the government acquired a 20% stake in "Occidental Mukhaizna"
through its Oman Oil operations. (Note: Occidental retains a 45%
stake, while Shell Oman has 17% and UAE-based Liwa Energy has a 15%
share. End Note.)

¶38. (SBU) In addition to its efforts in the petroleum sector, the
Omani government has substantially invested in the liquefied
natural gas (LNG) industry. In 1994, the government established
Oman LNG, which began operations in April 2000 with two 3.3 metric
ton pr annum (MTPA) LNG production trains. Heading the consortium
is the government, with a 51% stake, followed by Royal Dutch Shell
(30%), Total (5.5%), and Portuguese and Japanese equity holders.
In 2003, the Omani government formed Qalhat LNG to operate a third
train along side those managed by Oman LNG. Qalhat's primary
stakeholder is the government (47%), followed by Oman LNG (36.8%),
Union Fenosa (7%), and a collection of Japanese equity partners.
LNG shipped from Oman to points in Asia and Europe is carried by
seven tankers owned by the Oman Shipping Company, which is 80%
owned by the Ministry of Finance and 20% owned by the Oman Oil
Company. Domestic distribution of gas is handled by the Oman Gas
Company, which is 80% owned by the Ministry of Oil and Gas, and 20%
owned by the Oman Oil Company.



Investing through Oman Oil
¶39. (U) The Oman Oil Company plays a key role in the private
sector. In 1992, the government established Oman Oil to invest
surplus oil revenues both domestically and internationally. The
company is chaired by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, with
the Minister of Oil and Gas serving as the Vice chairman. Other
government officials, including the Secretary General of the
Ministry of National Economy and a Board Member of the Central
bank, round out the board. On the domestic front, in addition to
its stakes in Oman gas Company and Oman Shipping Company, Oman Oil
is involved in the Dolphin Energy Project (cross-border gas sales
to the UAE) and the Oman Oil Marketing Company (retail distributor
of gasoline).



¶40. (U) In 2002, the government entered into a 50-50 joint venture
with the Port of Rotterdam to create the sohar Industrial Port
Corporation (SIPC), which serves as the landlord for the industrial
complex. (Note: The Minister of Commerce and Industry serves as
the Chairman of SIPC. End Note.) Since SIPC's establishment, Oman
Oil has attracted a number of foreign participants into joint
ventures, including a polypropylene and aromatics plant with
Korea-based LG and an aluminum smelter with Canada-based Alcan.
Oman Oil is also a 20% owner in the Sohar Refinery Company, with
the Ministry of Finance holding an 80% stake.




Tuesday, November 30, 2010

US Embassy Muscat and Secretary of State Clinton respond to Wikileaks

The wikileaks story rages across the world over the weekend. While the New York times and other reputable international media companies (The Guardian, El Pais, Le Monde...) were given a preview of the whole dataset, we are only able to access them as they are released piecemeal by wikileaks (so far just 290 out of 251,287).

Unfortunately there were no new Muscat cables in the second or third wikileaks installments.

I also was amused that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is as annoyed as the Americans over the first round of leaks, and was forced to call the leaks a hoax & conspiracy by the US that's all directed at Iran, because all neighbouring contries like him and want him to be their bestest friend. Yeah. What a joker he is. Perhaps he read my earlier disclaimer that in this tinker tailor soldier spy vs spy situation, all sorts of things are possible. Is this defector really a defector, or a double agent? Is the information real, or planted disinformation, or a mix of both? Is Iran really funding Shia 5th columnists and developing nuclear weapons?

In this specific case, however, it seems clear that Iran has been pissing off a lot of the Gulf countries for some time, and everybody believes they have a covert programme ongoing to develop nuclear arms and associated delivery systems. Thus the cables show it has been the USA who has been the one holding back from aggressive military action, while Saudi, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt and Kuwait all have had enough of Iran's meddling in their internal affairs and urged the US to act, and act quickly. The Gulf States argument has been that because no amount of UN or US/EU sanctions and arm-twisting will ever divert the Iranians from nuking up, it's the lesser of 2 evils to strike them now rather than wait and let the Iranians stall long enough to get the bomb.

The Gulf Governments and their media have all been totally quiet about this aspect of the leaks so far, not surprisingly. I haven't seen any Oman specific stuff reported in Omani papers either, although Times of Oman did print the Reuters feed highlighting how Saudi Arabia was urging the US to attack.

So, with all this going on (and note this is just from the first 0.1% of cables released to date), Muscat Confidential asked the local US Embassy for their comment on the leaks.

Patricia Attkisson, new Public Affairs Officer at the United States Embassy Muscat, was kind enough to promptly sent me this official statement:

"Dear Dragon,

As a matter of policy the Department of State does not comment on materials, including classified documents, that may have been leaked. However, I can certainly state that our relationship with Oman will continue to be as strong as ever, based on mutual respect and common goals."


Fair enough. Patricia has only recently transferred from a previous stint in Jamaica, so a warm welcome to Oman Pat!

Her boss, America's Secretary of State Hillary Clinton couldn't get away with just that short a response with the press in Washington however, and made a comprehensive statement yesterday, which I thought I'd share. It's the longest 'no comment about something someone won't discuss' that I've seen for a while.


Photo: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, not commenting on or confirming what are alleged to be stolen State Department cables.


Secretary Clinton on Wikileaks
By Hillary Clinton

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, good afternoon. Do we have enough room in here? I want to take a moment to discuss the recent news reports of classified documents that were illegally provided from United States Government computers. In my conversations with counterparts from around the world over the past few days, and in my meeting earlier today with Foreign Minister Davutoglu of Turkey, I have had very productive discussions on this issue.

The United States strongly condemns the illegal disclosure of classified information. It puts people's lives in danger, threatens our national security, and undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems. This Administration is advancing a robust foreign policy that is focused on advancing America's national interests and leading the world in solving the most complex challenges of our time, from fixing the global economy, to thwarting international terrorism, to stopping the spread of catastrophic weapons, to advancing human rights and universal values. In every country and in every region of the world, we are working with partners to pursue these aims.

So let's be clear: this disclosure is not just an attack on America's foreign policy interests. It is an attack on the international community - the alliances and partnerships, the conversations and negotiations, that safeguard global security and advance economic prosperity.

I am confident that the partnerships that the Obama Administration has worked so hard to build will withstand this challenge. The President and I have made these partnerships a priority - and we are proud of the progress that they have helped achieve - and they will remain at the center of our efforts.

I will not comment on or confirm what are alleged to be stolen State Department cables. But I can say that the United States deeply regrets the disclosure of any information that was intended to be confidential, including private discussions between counterparts or our diplomats' personal assessments and observations. I want to make clear that our official foreign policy is not set through these messages, but here in Washington. Our policy is a matter of public record, as reflected in our statements and our actions around the world.

I would also add that to the American people and to our friends and partners, I want you to know that we are taking aggressive steps to hold responsible those who stole this information. I have directed that specific actions be taken at the State Department, in addition to new security safeguards at the Department of Defense and elsewhere to protect State Department information so that this kind of breach cannot and does not ever happen again.

Relations between governments aren't the only concern created by the publication of this material. U.S. diplomats meet with local human rights workers, journalists, religious leaders, and others outside of governments who offer their own candid insights. These conversations also depend on trust and confidence. For example, if an anti-corruption activist shares information about official misconduct, or a social worker passes along documentation of sexual violence, revealing that person's identity could have serious repercussions: imprisonment, torture, even death.

So whatever are the motives in disseminating these documents, it is clear that releasing them poses real risks to real people, and often to the very people who have dedicated their own lives to protecting others.

Now, I am aware that some may mistakenly applaud those responsible, so I want to set the record straight: There is nothing laudable about endangering innocent people, and there is nothing brave about sabotaging the peaceful relations between nations on which our common security depends.

There have been examples in history in which official conduct has been made public in the name of exposing wrongdoings or misdeeds. This is not one of those cases. In contrast, what is being put on display in this cache of documents is the fact that American diplomats are doing the work we expect them to do. They are helping identify and prevent conflicts before they start. They are working hard every day to solve serious practical problems - to secure dangerous materials, to fight international crime, to assist human rights defenders, to restore our alliances, to ensure global economic stability. This is the role that America plays in the world. This is the role our diplomats play in serving America. And it should make every one of us proud.

The work of our diplomats doesn't just benefit Americans, but also billions of others around the globe. In addition to endangering particular individuals, disclosures like these tear at the fabric of the proper function of responsible government.

People of good faith understand the need for sensitive diplomatic communications, both to protect the national interest and the global common interest. Every country, including the United States, must be able to have candid conversations about the people and nations with whom they deal. And every country, including the United States, must be able to have honest, private dialogue with other countries about issues of common concern. I know that diplomats around the world share this view - but this is not unique to diplomacy. In almost every profession - whether it's law or journalism, finance or medicine or academia or running a small business - people rely on confidential communications to do their jobs. We count on the space of trust that confidentiality provides. When someone breaches that trust, we are all worse off for it. And so despite some of the rhetoric we've heard these past few days, confidential communications do not run counter to the public interest. They are fundamental to our ability to serve the public interest.

In America, we welcome genuine debates about pressing questions of public policy. We have elections about them. That is one of the greatest strengths of our democracy. It is part of who we are and it is a priority for this Administration. But stealing confidential documents and then releasing them without regard for the consequences does not serve the public good, and it is not the way to engage in a healthy debate.

In the past few days, I have spoken with many of my counterparts around the world, and we have all agreed that we will continue to focus on the issues and tasks at hand. In that spirit, President Obama and I remain committed to productive cooperation with our partners as we seek to build a better, more prosperous world for all.

Thank you, and I'd be glad to take a few questions.

MR. CROWLEY: We'll begin with Charlie Wolfson of CBS in his last week here covering the State Department.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Where are you going, Charlie?

QUESTION: I'll (inaudible) into the sunset, but let me get to a question.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes, sir. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, are you embarrassed by these leaks personally, professionally? And what harm have the leaks done to the U.S. so far that you can determine from talking to your colleagues?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Charlie, as I said in my statement, and based on the many conversations that I've had with my counterparts, I am confident that the partnerships and relationships that we have built in this Administration will withstand this challenge. The President and I have made these partnerships a priority, a real centerpiece of our foreign policy, and we're proud of the progress that we have made over the last 22 months.

Every single day, U.S. Government representatives from the entire government, not just from the State Department, engage with hundreds if not thousands of government representatives and members of civil society from around the world. They carry out the goals and the interests and the values of the United States. And it is imperative that we have candid reporting from those who are in the field working with their counterparts in order to inform our decision-making back here in Washington.

I can tell you that in my conversations, at least one of my counterparts said to me, "Well, don't worry about it. You should see what we say about you." (Laughter.) So I think that this is well understood in the diplomatic community as part of the give-and-take. And I would hope that we will be able to move beyond this and back to the business of working together on behalf of our common goals.

MR. CROWLEY: Kim Ghattas of BBC.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Kim.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, I was wondering whether you could tell us what you think your upcoming trip is going to look like. Presumably, a lot of the people who have been mentioned in those alleged cables are going to have conversations with you. Do you think it's going to cause you discomfort over the coming week as you engage in conversations with those leaders?

And I know you don't want to comment on the particulars of the cables, but one issue that has been brought up into the daylight is the debate about Iran. What do you think the impact is going to be of those documents on the debate about Iran in the coming weeks and months?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Kim, you're right. And I don't know if you're going on this trip or not, but we will be seeing dozens of my counterparts in Astana, and then as I go on from Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and then ending up in Bahrain for the Manama dialogue. And I will continue the conversations that I have started with some in person and over the phone over the last days, and I will seek out others because I want personally to impress upon them the importance that I place on the kind of open, productive discussions that we have had to date and my intention to continue working closely with them.

Obviously, this is a matter of great concern, because we don't want anyone in any of the countries that could be affected by these alleged leaks here to have any doubts about our intentions and our about commitments. That's why I stressed in my remarks that policy is made in Washington. The President and I have been very clear about our goals and objectives in dealing with the full range of global challenges that we face. And we will continue to be so and we will continue to look for every opportunity to work with our friends and partners and allies around the world and to deal in a very clear-eyed way with those with whom we have differences, which of course brings me to Iran.

I think that it should not be a surprise to anyone that Iran is a source of great concern not only in the United States, that what comes through in every meeting that I have anywhere in the world is a concern about Iranian actions and intentions. So if anything, any of the comments that are being reported on allegedly from the cables confirm the fact that Iran poses a very serious threat in the eyes of many of her neighbors, and a serious concern far beyond her region.

That is why the international community came together to pass the strongest possible sanctions against Iran. It did not happen because the United States went out and said, "Please do this for us." It happened because countries, once they evaluated the evidence concerning Iran's actions and intentions, reached the same conclusion that the United States reached - that we must do whatever we can to muster the international community to take action to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state.

So if anyone reading the stories about these alleged cables thinks carefully, what they will conclude is that the concern about Iran is well founded, widely shared, and will continue to be at the source of the policy that we pursue with likeminded nations to try to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

MR. CROWLEY: We've got to let the Secretary get to her airplane and get to her trip. Thank you very much.

SECRETARY CLINTON: I will leave you in P.J.'s very good hands. Thank you.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, did you talk to anyone in Pakistan or India?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you all.

QUESTION: Thank you, Madam. (Inaudible)

Monday, November 29, 2010

Wikileaks: It begins. Report of an interview with HM.

I guess it's like that old phrase of advice to anyone interacting with the media - "always treat every mike as live". It's now applicable to professional diplomats too - "remember that cable/discussion/meeting may be leaked to the public someday..."

For those living in the proverbial cave these past weeks, infamous internet site Wikileaks has finally started to publish its vast silo of leaked US State Department cables (around 250,000 in total). The largest release of confidential government information EVER. Please google it to get the background.

I'll leave it to others way more talented than I to debate the main issues, as they are indeed historic, earth shaking, world changing, unprecedented, shocking, etc, etc. Although I'd note that I think wikileaks has it wrong when they say:

Wikileaks began on Sunday November 28th publishing 251,287 leaked United States embassy cables, the largest set of confidential documents ever to be released into the public domain. The documents will give people around the world an unprecedented insight into US Government foreign activities.

The cables, which date from 1966 up until the end of February this year, contain confidential communications between 274 embassies in countries throughout the world and the State Department in Washington DC. 15,652 of the cables are classified Secret.

The embassy cables will be released in stages over the next few months. The subject matter of these cables is of such importance, and the geographical spread so broad, that to do otherwise would not do this material justice.

The cables show the extent of US spying on its allies and the UN; turning a blind eye to corruption and human rights abuse in "client states"; backroom deals with supposedly neutral countries; lobbying for US corporations; and the measures US diplomats take to advance those who have access to them.

This document release reveals the contradictions between the US’s public persona and what it says behind closed doors – and shows that if citizens in a democracy want their governments to reflect their wishes, they should ask to see what’s going on behind the scenes.
...



This uber-leak is NOT so much about such details as 'the extent of US spying on its allies and the UN'. All the US's allies already knew the US spies on them, and that in return by spying on the US that the US knew about that too.

The big impact (at least outside the US State Dept) is going to be much more about the leaking of the global international diplomatic equivalent of confidential gossip: i.e. such gems as what KSA's King Abdullah thinks of the Pakistan President*:

President King Abdullah firmly believes that Asif Zardari is the primary obstacle to the government's ability to move unequivocally to end terrorist safe havens there ("when the head is rotten, it affects the whole body").


So, what about Oman? I hear you ask.

Well readers, there will eventually be around 1000 cables from Oman's American Embassy released, but as of today there are just 3: here, here, and here. I'll be super interested on how Omantel and the government treat these wikileaks. Apparently Australia has blocked them already, so let me know if the same happens there!

In all of them Oman comes out of it really well: US assessments of Omani senior Government officials as super competent; Oman urging non-military solutions to Iran; HM encouraging improvement of Oman's Government's responsiveness to its citizenry; HM making explicit efforts to strengthen the role of women in Omani society; Oman supportive of the US in its effective Pax Americana in the Gulf region... and that's just from 3 cables.

This is information overload already readers. (EG IMHO, Sh. Maktoum comes across as a lightweight.)

So here is my pick of the three, fresh of the wire. Having never been honoured with a meeting with HM, much as I would wish for it, this is ... precious to me. A report of a meeting from March 2008 between HM, US Admiral Fallon and the US Ambassador to Oman. Enjoy. Its almost like you're there. There will hopefully be a lot more to come. Please note my disclaimer at the end of this post.

Photo: US Admiral Fallon.

S E C R E T
...
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON'S MEETING WITH SULTAN
QABOOS

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (C) Sultan Qaboos discussed both domestic and regional
issues during his February 19 meeting with Admiral William J.
Fallon, CENTCOM Commander. On the domestic front, the Sultan
described his desire to empower the government to be more
responsive to citizen concerns. Seeking to strengthen the
role of Omani women, the Sultan plans to convene a conference
in 2009 designed to increase the participation and leadership
of women in all aspects of Omani society. Sultan Qaboos also
shared plans for continued infrastructure development in Oman
and described efforts underway to obtain more natural gas.
On Iraq, the Sultan advised against a premature withdrawal of
U.S. forces and stated that more regional assistance would be
forthcoming if Iraqis would "come together" to take charge
of, and invest in, their own country. Sultan Qaboos shared
U.S. concerns about Iranian meddling in Iraq and elsewhere,
but contended that Tehran knew confrontation with the U.S.
was not in its interest. Iran's "charm offensive" in the GCC
had succeeded in lessening suspicions of some officials about
the true intentions of Iranian policies. End Summary.

¶2. (C) CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon, accompanied by the
Ambassador, met February 19 with Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id for
approximately 2 hours at one of the Sultan's castles -- Husn
al Shumugh -- in the interior of Oman. (Note: The Sultan
was outside of Muscat on his annual 4-6 week "meet the people
tour" during which he visits selected sites outside the
capital. End Note.) The Sultan appeared in good health and
was cheerful, although he commented that his role as ruler of
Oman was demanding and did not allow him time to do all the
things he wanted to do, such as reading more books. "My
office is wherever I am," he stated, noting that he
constantly had to attend to paperwork and urgent requests
from his staff, among other tasks. The Sultan added that
despite his busy schedule, he always made time to "watch the
news," though he did not elaborate on his preferred media
outlet.

-------------------
CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQ
-------------------

¶3. (C) The Sultan expressed concern over a premature
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Recognizing recent
improvements in the security situation, he counseled that
American troops should only leave "when the time is right."
He stressed that Iraqis had to "take charge" of the fate of
their country, but questioned whether the different factions
would be able to "come together" to accomplish this. He
pointedly asked the Admiral, "Do you really think Prime
Minister Maliki and his government are capable of pulling the
country together?" The Sultan did not directly respond to
Admiral Fallon's comment on the need for assistance and
investment for Iraq from elsewhere in the region. Instead,
he stated that if the Iraqi people helped themselves and
invested in their own country, others would follow suit.

¶4. (C) The Sultan appeared to follow events in Iraq closely.
He commented, for example, that the Kurds had apparently
"come out well" in recent central government talks on budget
issues, and asked about the status of electricity production
in Iraq. The Sultan seemed to take a particular interest in
Admiral Fallon's discussion of Iraqi Shia leader Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim, including the status of Hakim's health and his
possible successors.

--------------------------
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
--------------------------

¶5. (C) In addition to emphasizing the need for outside
investment in Iraq, Admiral Fallon highlighted the importance
of assistance from regional states for infrastructure
development in Afghanistan and other Central Asian nations.
Again the Sultan sidestepped the issue and shifted the
conversation to the critical role of roads and highways in
economic development. He then mentioned infrastructure
projects for Oman currently under consideration, including
construction of a new dam and a freight rail line from the
northern port of Sohar to the planned port in Duqm. The
Sultan hoped that the southern port of Salalah could be
linked by rail to Muscat and, eventually, to other GCC
states.

--------------
IRANIAN ISSUES
--------------

¶6. (C) The Sultan commented that the Iranians are "not
fools," and claimed that Tehran realized there are "certain
lines it cannot cross" (i.e., direct confrontation with the
U.S.). Regarding GCC relations with the Iranian government,
he stated, "Iran is a big country with muscles and we must
deal with it." He continued that Iran's "charm offensive" in
the region had achieved a degree of success as some GCC
authorities (he did not mention names) were now less
suspicious of Iranian intentions. The Sultan added,
laughing, that "I must say that as long as (the U.S.) is on
the horizon, we have nothing to fear."

¶7. (C) Responding to Admiral Fallon's frustration with
Iranian interference in Iraq, the Sultan remarked that
Iranian meddling abroad was "almost a game" to the regime in
Tehran, and said that Iran's leaders would have to stop this
practice if Iran wanted to "join the world as a noble
country." The Sultan hoped that Iraqi leaders would clearly
tell and convince Iranian President Ahmadinejad during his
upcoming visit to Iraq to cease Iran's unhelpful interference
in their internal affairs. On the possibility that Iran is
waiting out the President's final term before re-assessing
its strategy, the Sultan said that Tehran should realize that
it has to deal with the U.S. as a country, and not just the
current administration.

------------------
THE SEARCH FOR GAS
------------------

¶8. (C) After noting Iranian dependence on imports of refined
fuel, the Sultan described Oman's efforts to obtain more
natural gas to fuel growing domestic power needs and
large-scale industrial projects. Oman had committed too much
of its limited gas production to long-term liquefied natural
gas (LNG) export contracts. As a result, the government was
trying to boost production by taking smaller and less
productive gas fields away from Petroleum Development Oman
(PDO) -- 60% owned by the government and 34% owned by Royal
Dutch Shell -- and awarding them to outside companies such as
British Gas and BP. The Sultan claimed these firms were in a
better position to increase productivity in these fields, and
pointed to the progress of U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum
Company in raising oil production in former PDO concession
areas, such as Mukhaizna.

¶9. (C) Looking offshore, the Sultan said he hoped that new
gas fields would be found in the Gulf of Oman to help ease
the country's natural gas shortage. India's Reliance
Industries was currently exploring a deepwater oil and gas
block in this body of water, but had made no significant
discoveries yet. Qatar would begin supplying gas to Oman by
2013, the Sultan noted, but not in quantities sufficient to
meet outstanding needs. He added that Oman was still
supplying limited gas from Musandam to Ras al-Khaimah in the
UAE due to an agreement he made with its emir -- and which
the Sultan felt he could not break -- well before Oman was
squeezed for this resource.

---------------------------
THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION
---------------------------

¶10. (C) Sultan Qaboos shared that he placed a great deal of
importance on education, and noted that a study of history
provided the context needed to better understand present
trends and events. Regarding claims that some rulers in the
region wanted to keep their people uneducated in order to
more easily control them, the Sultan explained that this
strategy could easily backfire as it also left the populace
more susceptible to influence by extremists, such as the
Muslim Brotherhood. Former Egyptian president and
pan-Arabist leader Gamal Abdal Nasser, the Sultan said, had
"set the region back" by being "anti-everything" and engaging
in vitriolic rhetoric designed to keep the masses ignorant.

-----------------------------------
EMPOWERING THE GOVERNMENT AND WOMEN
-----------------------------------

¶11. (C) On domestic politics, the Sultan announced that he
would hold the first-ever combined meeting of his Cabinet of
Ministers and the Majlis al-Shura (the directly elected lower
house of Oman's bicameral advisory body) on February 26. By
meeting together, the Sultan hoped that the Cabinet and the
Majlis would learn how to cooperate better and jointly focus
on important issues. He commented that both bodies also
needed to "demonstrate more leadership" and avoid past
foot-dragging on promises made to the populace. "People need
to see the results of decisions," the Sultan stated.

¶12. (C) Letting Admiral Fallon and the Ambassador in on a
"secret," the Sultan confided that he planned to call for a
conference of all "notable women" in Oman in 2009 in a bid to
encourage Omani women to expand their participation and
leadership in different aspects of Omani society. Minister
of Social Development, Dr. Sharifa bint Khalfan al-Yahyaiya
(one of Oman's three female cabinet ministers) will chair the
meeting on the Sultan's behalf. Lamenting that no women won
seats in the October 2007 election for the Majlis al-Shura,
Sultan Qaboos observed that Omani women were stuck in
tradition and needed to be empowered to "take more charge"
and to be "less shy." "Some customs (regarding women)," he
added, "shouldn't be kept." Nevertheless, gradual change is
occurring in Oman, the Sultan asserted. His philosophy was
to "let it happen," rather than hold it up to public debate,
as the latter course of action often led to factional
fighting, internal strife, and other ills.

---------------------------------------------
A RECURRENT THEME: MORE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT
---------------------------------------------

¶13. (C) In concluding the meeting, Sultan Qaboos returned to
his goal of improving the responsiveness of the Omani
government to citizen concerns. He stated that he would be
pressing "harder" on his ministers to engage in more and
better public relations efforts before the Omani police and
to effectively enforce their decisions so that the people
could see the benefits of announced actions. Giving one
particular example, the Sultan said that rather than simply
announce a new development project, the government should
explain the downstream employment opportunities the project
would generate for Omani citizens. Effective cooperation
between ministries and the Majlis Oman was also needed to
strengthen the civil institutional framework in Oman, the
Sultan added.

-------
COMMENT
-------

¶14. (S/NF) In discussing his desire for operational change
in the senior government ranks, the Sultan twice implied (but
did not directly state) that such change was needed to
prepare the country for his eventual departure from power.
The Sultan's comments indicated that he may feel the
government is too dependent on his authority and should be
empowered to run more effectively without constant direction
from the palace. End Comment.

¶15. (U) This message has been reviewed by Admiral Fallon.
GRAPPO


Wow.

I can't wait for more. HM totally rocks.


DISCLAIMER: * or more accurately "what wikileaks and their anonymous source purports to be what those representatives from the US State department chose to commit formally in writing (and after editing and review) to the US Secretary of State about what King Abdullah was perceived by them via a translator to have probably said, or inferred, to them about what his (King Abdullah's) opinions were on the Pakistani President, in an unstated context, and when knowingly shared by the King with official representatives of the US State Department in a non-121 meeting attended by other persons". Gedit? Caveat Emptor indeed. In this world, some (or most) of these cables may be official unoffical propaganda/black intel, from almost anyone. It's just the internet after all. So readers are advised that all this is for entertainment value only. Treat it as a novel. For god's sake don't go off and do anything real based on these digital bits and bytes. And that advice applies to professionals and amateurs alike!