New Amnesty appeal for latest arrests. Protesters in court. HM makes CBS list of World's enduring Dictatorships.

Amnesty International have just updated their campaign in support of the arrested peaceful protesters. They also report the verdicts from todays trial in Al Khuwair.

OMAN MUST CHARGE OR RELEASE DETAINED PROTESTERS
Since February, Omanis have called for change in largely peaceful protests
© Demotix

18 May 2011
The Omani authorities must say where and why they are holding some six people arrested during a recent peaceful protest in the capital Muscat, Amnesty International said today, as more than two dozen others faced trial on protest-related charges.

Fifteen people were arrested by Omani security forces on 14 May during a protest in Muscat calling for the release of others detained two days earlier in pro-reform protests.

Prominent female lawyer Basma al-Kiyumi was released on 16 May, and on 17 May some eight other activists were released, among them Muhammad al-Habssi and Ibrahim Sa’id al-Hajri. It is not known where the remaining six – including Nabhan al-Hanashi – are, or if any charges have been brought against them.

“The authorities in Oman must immediately provide details on the whereabouts of all protesters being held and either charge them with a recognizable criminal offence or release them,” said Malcolm Smart, Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa Programme Director.

“If they are being detained solely for participating in a peaceful public protest they should be released immediately and unconditionally.”

“Any charges should be made public, and trials against the accused must conform to international fair trial standards.”

Amnesty International is concerned that those who continue to be held following the protest in Muscat on 14 May are being detained incommunicado and may be at risk of torture or ill-treatment.

Basma al-Kiyumi was charged in connection with participating in an unlawful gathering and released on bail to await trial at future date. It is not clear if other protesters who were released on 17 May were charged or not.

Another group of 27 men who had taken part in protests during March and April appeared before a Muscat court today and were charged with a number of offences including banditry, setting fire to government buildings, and insulting officials. The men pleaded not guilty and the case was adjourned until 23 May. Two of the men, Khaled al-Hantholi, and ‘Ammar al-Hani’i, were not granted bail and remain detained at the Central Prison.

At least three people have been killed and others injured during recent public protests in Oman amid allegations that the security forces have used excessive force against protesters. Many people have been arrested, including dozens who were detained in the northern city of Sohar on 29 March.
...

More 'Oman in the news'
CBS, mega US media corp, just released their latest edition of 'Enduring Dictators, show casing all the world's dictatorships. Naturally, it's Oman. There are a few small errors, but, this is how Oman is seen in some circles.

CBS News: Enduring Dictators.

May 18, 2011 4:54 PM

The world's enduring dictators: Qaboos bin Said, Oman
By Joshua Norman

Oman's leader Sultan Qaboos bin Said attends the third day of celebrations marking 40 years since he took the throne at Midan al-Fath Stadium in Muscat on December 1, 2010. (Credit: Getty Images) This is an installment in the WorldWatch series, "The world's enduring dictators," inspired by events in Tunisia and Egypt, in which CBSNews.com takes a look at the men who continue to rule their lands unimpeded by law. See a complete explanation of the series and a list of others profiled here.
Qaboos bin Said, Oman



Length of rule: 41 years.
Sultan Qaboos took the throne in 1970 after deposing his father in a palace coup, and has put his stamp on his country in many ways, even changing its name from "Muscat and Oman" to the "Sultanate of Oman." His part of the Arabian peninsula has been ruled by the al-Said family since 1744.

Most despotic acts:
The current "Arab Spring"-inspired protests in the country have seen at least two deaths. Protesters have complained about rampant government corruption, high unemployment and the lack of a parliament with legislative powers. There has been several waves of arrests of anti-government protestors amid an ongoing and aggressive crackdown against discontent. Although Oman has been accused of human trafficking - especially of foreign laborers - for some time, the government has allegedly begun enforcing laws against on the practice.

Outlook for change:
As mentioned earlier, several protest leaders have been detained and released in rolling waves of arrests in the past few months, and dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the country is high. While disgruntlement amongst the populace is obvious, the extreme dearth of foreign press coverage and lack of general press freedom there leaves it unclear as to whether the protesters want the sultan to leave, or simply want their government to function better. Beyond the recent protests, there is concern about succession in the country, as there is no heir apparent or any clear legislation on who may be the next Sultan.



Read more: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20064069-503543.html#ixzz1MkSaLBG1

Corruption in Oman: Redux

Corruption.
It was, truth be told, the topic of my first actual post way back in Sept 2007 (that does seem an age ago...)

It is that aspect of Omani society that is driving the continued polically inspired protests in Oman: the commonly held view that there is significant high-level corruption in this country. A few quotes:

Arabian Business, 18th January

"Oman protestors call for fight against corruption"
...Protesters chanted slogans calling for an end to corruption and carried banners saying “Rising prices have destroyed the dreams of ordinary citizens”...

Financial Times March 15th:

"Oman protesters demand corruption investigation"
In spite of a series of concessions made by Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said, the ruler, protesters in Oman are demanding that former ministers be investigated for alleged corruption, according to reports.
...
Despite these concessions, protesters have gathered outside the Majlis al-Shoura building in Muscat, the capital, demanding that a new police chief investigate some of the ministers sacked since unrest started to grip the country.

“The new inspector general must immediately do his job and investigate the sacked ministers for corruption when they were in power,” one demonstrator told Reuters on Tuesday.

Several of the former ministers are members of prominent business families.
...

And perhaps most tellingly, as it was printed in Muscat Confidential's favourite throbbing organ of the local 4th Estate Times of Oman (normally fully aligned with the position of the Omani Government establishment), on March 22nd:

"7,000 sign memo to seek trial"
MUSCAT: Seven thousand protestors from all over the Sultanate signed a memorandum seeking the trial of ousted corrupt ministers and submitted it to Attorney General of Oman Hussain Bin Ali Al Hilali, yesterday.

“Ousting the corrupt ministers and officials will not resolve the prevailing issues in the Sultanate. For the last two decades, these corrupt bigwigs have plundered our country’s wealth. So, they should not be allowed to walk scot-free. They should face the court and stand trial,” Khalil Al Saidi, a protestor, told Times of Oman.

On March 7, His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said responded to unprecedented demonstrations in the Sultanate by conducting a radical cabinet reshuffle and sacking a total of 12 ministers.

“All the financial dealings of the former ministers must be investigated. Their bank accounts, their trips to foreign countries and their investments in various fields should be probed in detail,” Salima Al Rajhi, a protester at the Majlis Al Shura Council headquarters in Muscat, said.

Protestors have put up tents and are staging a sit-in in front of the Majlis Al Shura Council headquarters in Muscat demanding certain social reforms and end to corruption since February 28.

“Ousting the corrupt ministers and reshuffling the cabinet is a positive move. But it is a cosmetic change. Now, we want trial of these corrupt ministers. If His Majesty the Sultan has sacked the corrupt ministers then it shows that we were correct.

Those corrupt ministers should be taken to court. His Majesty the Sultan should not let those corrupt ministers go scot-free. All the murky dealings should be investigated. They should stand trial for misusing public funds. Let them face the court. If they are innocent then they can go and if they are not, they should face the trial. They have plundered our nation a lot,” Khalil added.

In the memorandum, the protestors have demanded that the trial should be open. The proceedings should be made public and those who are found guilty should be given moral punishment.

“The funds of ousted ministers, advisors and officials should be frozen until the probe is completed. The real estate dealings of these bigwigs should also be probed. We know that most of these corrupt people own property in prime locations.

Such lands’ ownership should be considered as leased property in lieu of which rents have to be paid to the state treasury,” Khalil said.

The protestors signing the authorisation urged the Public Prosecution to act as an attorney on their behalf.

“We have urged the release of all developments related to these issues including trials in the presence of the media,” Khalil added.

The memorandum relies on the economic principles stated in the State Basic Law issued by Royal Decree No. 101/1996, which states that “all natural resources are considered property of the state” and stipulated preservation and optimal utilisation of natural resources for the interest of the national economy.

“The petition is based on Article 52 of the State Basic Law, which states that each member of the Council of Ministers is answerable to His Majesty the Sultan.

Article 53 of the same law stipulates that any of the members of the Council of Ministers should not hold chairmanship or membership of a board of a joint stock company and that the government units they run or supervise on should not deal with any company or establishment wherein they have direct or indirect interests. But we can some see violations here. So this should be probed,” said a protestor.

“Future actions will be decided on the outcome of the decision taken by the public prosecution,” protestors added.

You get the idea. Some of it is perhaps pure jealousy. There are some rich people in Oman. Some of them got rich because of hard work, often via trading and generally being good at business. Hey, afterall, Oman is a capitalist system, with no personal income tax or wealth tax and a very low tax on corporate profits at just 12.5%.

Some have gotten rich by doing very little except being the local 'sponsor' of a foreign company, as until recently pure foreign companies would pay 30% income tax, or they could form a local LLC and pay 12.5% but then had to have an Omani sponsor to be able to register a local company. And they tended to pick Omanis who were 'well connected' to be their sponsor, as the sponsor could therefore earn their 5% or 10% commission by 'helping' get Government contracts, and smoothing the planning and permitting processes via their contacts in the Ministries, especially the Ministry of Manpower.

So far I haven't seen any real evidence of this 'corruption' presented in the protesters' arguments. It has all seemed to be based on rumour and scuttlebutt, and the fact that, indeed, many (ex)Ministers are apparently pretty wealthy and own some sweet real estate.

Yet, tales do abound of corrupt Government officials in Oman being occasionally removed from office for corruption, and that they are not punished in the courts to avoid letting ordinary people know that it happened and/or to avoid blaming the Government people tasked with stopping that sort of thing, and/or to avoid bringing shame to their family. This last 'reason' is also used to justify the weird Omani practice of not allowing people convicted of crimes to be identified in the newspapers (in fact, as far as I'm aware, it would be illegal to publish the name or photo of an Omani even after they have been found guilty and sentenced in a public court!)

The very public demolition of the new building next to the airport owned by ex-Minister HE Dr Juma Al Juma was never reported in the traditional Omani media, despite being the talk of the chattering classes. The ex-Head of Muscat Municipality, Eng. Abbas was fired in part over that incident (he authorised the permits for the height despite it being in breach of FIA regulations) and his own alledged misuse of power to get his own building development in Shatti, among many other tales of similar abuses.

There are other obviously suspicious situations. The purchase of WorldCall by Omantel at super inflated prices from a single Omani businessman always raised eyebrows, as blogged here at the time. Result? (after a colossal 95% loss on the US$185mill investment) The CEO later 'resigned for personal reasons' and was then made an undersecretary at the telecoms regulator! So clearly nothing wrong there at all.

Other rumours I've heard. The inflated (200%) prices Gulf Air apparently paid for airplanes in the 90s was never investigated. The extremely low prices (I'm told at a price is equal to just $5/bbl oil equivalent) Oman's scarce natural gas has been sold on fixed long term contracts with no link to either oil price nor inflation to makers of methanol. The rumoured dismissal (but again, no trial) of a Government tenderboard member a couple of months ago for taking 30k rial (US$75,000) payments for assigning contracts to the payers. All just rumours.

But we all know, wasta is wasta. Who gets given nice valuable pieces of free land? Who gets their kids educated overseas at the state's expense? Whose pieces of land in the middle of no-where happen to get roads built and infrastructure laid that dramatically increase the land's value? Whose houses get built slowly by contractors working on big contracts for your Ministry/Municipality? Answer: Those who are connected to the royal family, Ministers, and the powerful. Those with 'wasta'.

We can all see the wastafarian kids of the Ministers and Oligarchs driving around in their Porsches, Lambos and Ferraris. We can see the palaces of the wealthy families along the coast and their private yachts parked in the jetty. The natural question is: where is that money coming from?

Overseas companies tendering for contracts in Oman are continually approached by people who claim - in exchange for an appropriately sized fee - to be able to guarantee their tender will win the contract.

Here is a wonderful 15 min talk by Peter Eigen, founder of excellent NGO Transparency International, on the impact of corruption and what people can do about it.


Video: How to expose the corrupt, talk by Peter Eigen, Founder of anti-corruption NGO Transparency International


Of major concern is that the Sultanate is still not a signatory to The UN Convention against Corruption. Why is this?

...
The UN Convention against Corruption provides a clear framework of laws and actions required to prevent and punish abuse of power for private gain. It addresses the cross-border nature of corruption, includes provisions on the return of ill-gotten assets, and it mandates the participation of citizens and civil society organizations in accountability processes. In the region, only Oman, Syria and Saudi Arabia have not ratified it.
...

This might be a good question for the coordinator for the Arabic Countries at the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA) Sh. Ali Nasser Al-Bualy, formerly the first Omani Attorney General for the Sultanate of Oman and local legal big wig.

In fact, I'm hoping The ex-Public Prosecutor and Attorney General will help us unravel this problem....

Ministers sacked wholesale. HM feeds the Entitlement culture and new (peaceful) protests confirm a sea change in Omani politics

More demands, yet more acquiescence
Protests in Oman have now calmed down to the level of 'sit-ins', with no further violence and a deliberate & explicit expression of support for His Majesty. The focus of demands has crystalised upon more jobs & higher salaries, more Government welfare, action against (high level) corruption, free(er) speech, and significant expansion of the powers of the elected Majlis Al Shura.

The calls for 'give me free stuff' are not going to do anything to reduce the already huge dependency culture. The price of a paternalistic government is that the population then expects big daddy government to solve all problems and be an endless source of cash. Many Omani youngsters seem to approach their long suffering patriarchs the same way, like a personal ATM machine, as if money doesn't have to be earned or loans paid back.

Still, the protesters have started to get their way in an almost breathtaking way - many Ministers were replaced a few days ago on 'the night of the long Khanjars', with even the entire Ministry of National Economy [MONE] dissolved. The fate of its official leader, Minister HE Macki, is yet to be seen.

Meanwhile the protesters continue to press their case for even more Ministers to go, or join the ranks of 'advisors' (usually they stay on a Minister level salary - they are hardly joining the ranks of the unemployed lining up for their newly announced dole of 150 rials a month). It's still to be seen if any high level corruption trials will be held.

The head of the central bank denied rumours of large money transfers out of the country.

Be careful what you wish for...
However, we are starting to see the downside of what happens when such behaviour is encouraged and previous laws making such protests illegal are ignored, with scenes more reminiscent of old school Western 'Trades Union' at Bahwan, Oman Air, Omantel, Towel and even Petroleum Development Oman.

Photo (Gulf News): Protesters at Petroleum Development Oman [PDO] climb on the 'give me even more money' bandwagon

I doubt many Omanis will have too much sympathy for PDO staff. The workers at PDO are probably amongst the most well paid in the nation, with generous pensions too, and the company's Omanisation level is probably well over 80%. The oil company is, after all, majority owned by the Government. It is also the one company in Oman that could most justify having a requirement for skilled foreign workers, as at the end of the day PDO is the source of the life blood that runs through the entire Oman economy - oil and gas production & export. Last year PDO produced about 650,000 bbl/d, plus around 400,000 boe of gas, around 80% of the entire country's production. (more on the implications of this later).

Omantel workers were also sticking their hands out for more money and free loans, despite a history of bureaucratic incompetence, exploitative prices and poor service. Omantel probably exemplifies the argument for why Governments should preferably not run businesses.

So what exactly is illegal these days?
Where will this end? Now that the populace have apparently lost any fear of retribution for striking, protesting, or unlicensed public assembly, where are the new boundaries? There are a load of laws being broken right now, (even if we ignore the clearly illegal burning of private and state property or physically threatening the ROP).

Clarification of what the new laws are would be a boon. Can oil workers or other critical services legally strike? Can the Government now be publicly criticised? Is a call to make the Majlis a legislative body, defacto requiring a new constitution and a radically different philosophy of governance, also now legal? I'm told a blogger who posted photos showing the death certificates of the young Omanis killed in Sohar had his site quickly blocked by Omantel. How will the recent reporting of dramatic events change the laws on media and the press?

Right now the chaotic impact of allowing (and rewarding) previous transgressions seems obvious. Want more money? Think your boss or CEO should be replaced? Heard a rumour that such-and-such a senior Government official is on the take? Hey! Then grab some firends, have a protest and go on strike! Get your unemployed friends to help!

As all these new (and often highly inexperienced) Ministers will not be the fastest when it comes to making decisions, I don't expect much clarification in a legal sense soon.

The spread of protests to oil workers has already spooked the international markets, with Oman's international credit rating put on notice and the Muscat stock exchange plunging 5% in a day. Tourists are cancelling holidays. Foreign investment plans will be put on hold. This could increase Oman's interest payments and make the economy even more dependent on oil. Across the board wage and benefits increases will feed inflation and make Omanis even less competitive in the labour market, hardly what's needed.


Next: How much money is Oman earning from oil and gas? Is there enough money to go around?

Middle East populist 'Contagion' reaches Oman - Violence is without popular support. Sultan Qaboos retains confidence.

Wow. What a week since February 26th. (Note: I've been on the road, little access to the 'net, so apologies for the delay getting back to you!)

The protests that started in Sohar (with some idiotic and pointless violence by some of those 'idle hands') have expanded rapidly, encouraged by the immediate response it got from HM, and it has certainly rattled not just Oman's ruling clique, but also our neighbours to the West ("if it can happen in Oman, no-one is safe"). As a result, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Saudi are even offering Bahrain and Oman aid money to throw at the population.

The foreign press is also variable. Foreign Policy noted that HM Sultan Qaboos, "Oman's renaissance man", shouldn't even be mentioned in the same sentence as the butcher of Tripoli Ghadaffi.The FT's Simeon Kerr posted a great article on his time as "an honoured guest of the Oman military". It sooo captures the spirit of Oman!

Photo: The now infamous Globe roundabout in Sohar. Pic ripped shamelessly from the blog of Dan & Jillian

Note: For up to date info on Oman's riots, as I'm only blogging remotely, please check out Muscat Mutterings. In Sohar: the excellent blog of expat couple Dan & Jillian; in Salalah: Ever reliable Dhofari Gucci. Tourists should not cancel their holidays, by the way. All accounts indicate the country is safe, although actually visiting the sites of the protests should be undertaken carefully.

I have little sympathy for those killed in Sohar while attempting to storm a police station - what did they think was going to happen? It's not something that should have cost Al Mamari his job, IMHO.


Meanwhile,
As you will have read all over the net, Tunisian(?)-style riots were happening in Oman over the past week. It seems there were enough bored youngsters combined with a significant number of those suffering with low salaries to get out and wave plackards. But unlike the other riots in the regions there are a few key differences:

1/ There is no popular support at all for anything against His Majesty.
These riots, especially those with any violence or that show disrespect to the Sultan, are not supported by most adults in Oman. In fact, there is a general disbelief that violent protesters are even 'true Omani'. They're apparently either Emiratis, or 'Baluchis'. Or ... well, anyone else. Afterall, burning a Lulu hypermarket is really, really dumb. They were one of the few sources of unskilled Omani employment they had!

2/ No coherent organisation.
The demands are legion, and often both self serving and facile. 'Forgive all private debts', 'reduce the prices of things' etc. There is also a smattering of Saudi-style religious extremism 'segregate the schools'. As a result, some of the more potent messages, such as turning the Majlis Al Shura into a true legislative body, are being diluted. But the generally accepted demands are: jobs, more action for getting rid of corruption, more power to the Majlis Al Shura.

3/ Mainly stupid unemployed youngsters with nothing better to do.
Other movements have been broad based: including the middle class, military, academics, exiled leaders, women, etc. The ones in Sohar seem to be just ignorant youth with a desire to emulate the other countries and a message mainly involving 'give me stuff for free, especially cash'. How else to explain the total stupidity of trying to attack a police station with stones and molitof cocktails? This is changing however, as protests spread and are increasingly seen to be successful in getting results from the Government - especially in Salalah and now to Petroleum Development Oman staff near Haima.

4/ No agenda of 'regime change'
Even the violent protests have supported His Majesty and the core principles of benign dictatorship. Yes, there are compliants about corruption, but it's all within a general acceptance of the current system. Muscat Mutterer reported a demand for a new constitution however.

As other bloggers on the scene have indicated, there is no danger to the general populace as long as you don't go hanging around the site of a protest (and probably not even then).

The Omani Government's response, however, has been lacklustre.
Come on guys. Since the protest movement spread to Egypt, and certainly Bahrain, could you not have done some thinking in advance about how you would respond if it happened here too?

The announcements so far are unfortunately characteristic of the general ineptitude of the Omani Government of late: poorly thought through, knee-jerk reactions & top down statements of intent with no description of the 'how' or even the underlying principles (perhaps with the one possible exception of the desire to seperate puplic prosecution from the Police). The royal decree to 'create 50,000 jobs' was a classic example: this could have come as a school project from the very high schools that are pumping out these idiotic rioters. Where are 50,000 jobs supposed to come from? Doing what exactly?

As in Saudi, the urge is to throw money at the problem and try putting on a bandaid to cover up the core problems. Announcing a universal unemployment benefit of 150 rials will just make things worse - if anything creating a larger disinsentive to avoid work, and subsiding idleness. And I'm sure the chance of a private business firing an Omani will now become (if this was possible) even more difficult, again, exactly the opposite of what's needed! The general uselessness of the unemployed youth to do anything that generates a profit, combined with their poor education, lack of work ethic, and an overwhelming sense of entitlement already serve to make imported labour (cheaper, smarter, work harder, and essentially bonded to their employer) the way to go.

So, as I watch the Reuters and FT reports, my expectations are low. [Note to foreign journos - please find another adjective to describe Oman than 'sleepy'] All signs are that the system will trundle on, a reshuffle here, a study there, a lot more public money thrown at the squeeky wheels.


What would I do?
OK. Here's some ideas. I'd love to hear what you think. What ideas do you have?

Allow a free media & crack down on mysterious income sources.
Encourage debate of public policy alternatives & allow the exposure of poor government outcomes. Have public trials for corruption cases and name them in the papers. Insist Senior Government figures and their immediate families publish the sources of income, and setting up income tax above say, 50,000 rials per year. Institute a wealth tax for assets (including international assets) above 200k (with an excemption for 1 domestic house up to 500k) at around 1% per annum. Punish tax evasion severely. Put term limits on Ministers so they can only be in power a maximum of 8 years. People should note that even saying the Government system is not perfect is currently illegal in Oman. A lot of these poorly defined and potentially highly draconian laws restricting the media and civil society need to be axed.

Change the political system.
Establish a new constitution that puts the Majlis on a path to take charge of legislation, along with accountability for results. Allow political parties. Ensure the religious extremists cannot overturn the rights of women. Allow real unions, especially for the underclass of manual imported labour.

Improve Educational meaningfulness.
Establish a University dedicated to the study of the business of Government. Ban degrees from useless 'paper mill Universities'. Seperate the delivery of education from its testing, to try and get students actually learning rather than 'passing' fake exams while being allowed to plagiarise and cheat.

Level the employment playing field.
Start to break up the oligarchs by taxing all imported labour at a flat minimum rate, say 30 rials per month, plus a % of their salary above that. At the same time, allow Omani's to be fired much more easily (even if they can only be replaced by another Omani). Over time, crank up the minimum rate and the %. The objective is to make it a lot more expensive to hire a non-Omani, and certainly more than the minimum wage for an Omani employee. Once this is done, make it easier to hire foreign workers to ensure businesses that need specialised labour from overseas can get them.

Stimulate the SME private sector.
Encourage SMEs that actually do something by allowing home run businesses below 50k per year with minimal regulation beyond basic HSE & public health related issues. Make it easy to register and run a business by cutting most of the red tape required by the Municipalities and Ministries. Get lots of low cost Small Claims courts established for matters below 5k. Start to break up the monopolies of the Zubairs, Bahwans, Kimjis, et al.

Bring in Compulsory pseudo-military service.
Start giving all these unemployed youth a job for 18 months between high school and University that brings discipline and on the job training in life skills. Get them building infrastructure projects, helping in orphanages, picking up trash, building housing for the poor, ... anything to get them off their fat asses. Do not allow unemployment benefit to be paid unless they have done this. And make sure any unemployment benefit is time limited - it should be temporary (no more than 6 months).

Widen the tax base.
Bring in a Value Added Tax (not just a sales tax). Compensate lower income earners by increasing the minimum wage. Increase the tax on imports (currently just 5%) to the maximum extent the World Trade Organisation allows and apply to anything that could be made/grown in Oman.

Reduce population growth
The place can't sustain 3rd world birth rates combined with the modern medical care that ensures they survive. Have a child allowance for 1 or 2 kids per male, that then is taken away at 3 or more. Make education free for the first 2, then charge after that (again, by reducing Government handouts).

Reduce tribalism.
Yes, subsidise weddings (as they do in the UAE), but double the subsidy if the couple are from different tribes. Conversely, if the couple are first cousins, there should be no subsidy. There is no reason we should be encouraging further in-breeding.

OK. That's it for now.

Postscript:
Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands is coming to visit (a 'personal' visit at that) after all. It seems the Queen was worried that cancelling would give people the mistaken impression that she was siding with the protesters...

Egypt protestors enable continued rule by the Military, and Iranian irregular verbs

Wow.

They left it to the last minute, but last Friday morning, Egypt's military eventually acted to ensure they didn't get put where they did not want be - in the position of either (1) allowing mob rule in Cairo, or (2) turning their firepower onto their own civilians.

When President Mubarak opted on the Thursday night to announce he was actually still staying, it was to the surprise of everyone: protesters, CIA, President Obama, CNN, and especially, the Generals.

So, at the same time that many of the Egyptian Army's own Majors, Colonels and squaddies were joining the crowd to protest, the Generals finally opted for Option (3):

Coup d'État

"The coup is the most frequently attempted method of changing government, and the most successful." Edward N. Luttwak


Meanwhile, it's rubber bullets in Bahrain, and more protests in Yemen, Algeria and Iran. How Mahmoud Ahmadinejad can both praise the Egyptian protesters while killing and tear-gassing his own protesters is almost too ironic for words. (I guess it's one of those pesky Persian irregular verbs: they have freedom of speech, you have protesters, I have a seditious rioting mob...)


Here is a view on the recent events in Tahrir Square different to that portrayed in the media, from one of Muscat Confidential's favourite Foreign Affairs analysts: George Friedman of STRATFOR.

Enjoy!

Egypt: The Distance Between Enthusiasm and Reality
February 14, 2011 | 0048 GMT

By George Friedman

On Feb. 11, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned. A military council was named to govern in his place. On Feb. 11-12, the crowds that had gathered in Tahrir Square celebrated Mubarak’s fall and the triumph of democracy in Egypt. On Feb. 13, the military council abolished the constitution and dissolved parliament, promising a new constitution to be ratified by a referendum and stating that the military would rule for six months, or until the military decides it’s ready to hold parliamentary and presidential elections.

What we see is that while Mubarak is gone, the military regime in which he served has dramatically increased its power. This isn’t incompatible with democratic reform. Organizing elections, political parties and candidates is not something that can be done quickly. If the military is sincere in its intentions, it will have to do these things. The problem is that if the military is insincere it will do exactly the same things. Six months is a long time, passions can subside and promises can be forgotten.

At this point, we simply don’t know what will happen. We do know what has happened. Mubarak is out of office, the military regime remains intact and it is stronger than ever. This is not surprising, given what STRATFOR has said about recent events in Egypt, but the reality of what has happened in the last 72 hours and the interpretation that much of the world has placed on it are startlingly different. Power rests with the regime, not with the crowds. In our view, the crowds never had nearly as much power as many have claimed.

Certainly, there was a large crowd concentrated in a square in Cairo, and there were demonstrations in other cities. But the crowd was limited. It never got to be more than 300,000 people or so in Tahrir Square, and while that’s a lot of people, it is nothing like the crowds that turned out during the 1989 risings in Eastern Europe or the 1979 revolution in Iran. Those were massive social convulsions in which millions came out onto the streets. The crowd in Cairo never swelled to the point that it involved a substantial portion of the city.

In a genuine revolution, the police and military cannot contain the crowds. In Egypt, the military chose not to confront the demonstrators, not because the military itself was split, but because it agreed with the demonstrators’ core demand: getting rid of Mubarak. And since the military was the essence of the Egyptian regime, it is odd to consider this a revolution.

Mubarak and the Regime

The crowd in Cairo, as telegenic as it was, was the backdrop to the drama, not the main feature. The main drama began months ago when it became apparent that Mubarak intended to make his reform-minded 47-year-old son, Gamal, lacking in military service, president of Egypt. This represented a direct challenge to the regime. In a way, Mubarak was the one trying to overthrow the regime.

The Egyptian regime was founded in a coup led by Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser and modeled after that of Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, basing it on the military. It was intended to be a secular regime with democratic elements, but it would be guaranteed and ultimately controlled by the military. Nasser believed that the military was the most modern and progressive element of Egyptian society and that it had to be given the responsibility and power to modernize Egypt.

While Nasser took off his uniform, the military remained the bulwark of the regime. Each successive president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, while formally elected in elections of varying dubiousness, was an officer in the Egyptian military who had removed his uniform when he entered political life.

Mubarak’s decision to name his son represented a direct challenge to the Egyptian regime. Gamal Mubarak was not a career military officer, nor was he linked to the military’s high command, which had been the real power in the regime. Mubarak’s desire to have his son succeed him appalled and enraged the Egyptian military, the defender of the regime. If he were to be appointed, then the military regime would be replaced by, in essence, a hereditary monarchy — what had ruled Egypt before the military. Large segments of the military had been maneuvering to block Mubarak’s ambitions and, with increasing intensity, wanted to see Mubarak step down in order to pave the way for an orderly succession using the elections scheduled for September, elections designed to affirm the regime by selecting a figure acceptable to the senior military men. Mubarak’s insistence on Gamal and his unwillingness to step down created a crisis for the regime. The military feared the regime could not survive Mubarak’s ambitions.

This is the key point to understand. There is a critical distinction between the regime and Hosni Mubarak. The regime consisted — and consists — of complex institutions centered on the military but also including the civilian bureaucracy controlled by the military. Hosni Mubarak was the leader of the regime, successor to Nasser and Sadat, who over time came to distinguish his interests from those of the regime. He was increasingly seen as a threat to the regime, and the regime turned on him.

The demonstrators never called for the downfall of the regime. They demanded that Mubarak step aside. This was the same demand that was being made by many if not most officers in the military months before the crowds gathered in the streets. The military did not like the spectacle of the crowds, which is not the way the military likes to handle political matters. At the same time, paradoxically, the military welcomed the demonstrations, since they created a crisis that put the question of Mubarak’s future on the table. They gave the military an opportunity to save the regime and preserve its own interests.

The Egyptian military is opaque. It isn’t clear who was reluctant to act and who was eager. We would guess that the people who now make up the ruling military council were reluctant to act. They were of the same generation as Hosni Mubarak, owed their careers to him and were his friends. Younger officers, who had joined the military after 1973 and had trained with the Americans rather than the Soviets, were the likely agitators for blocking Mubarak’s selection of Gamal as his heir, but there were also senior officers publicly expressing reservations. Who was on what side is a guess. What is known is that many in the military opposed Gamal, would not push the issue to a coup, and then staged a coup designed to save the regime after the demonstrations in Cairo were under way.

That is the point. What happened was not a revolution. The demonstrators never brought down Mubarak, let alone the regime. What happened was a military coup that used the cover of protests to force Mubarak out of office in order to preserve the regime. When it became clear Feb. 10 that Mubarak would not voluntarily step down, the military staged what amounted to a coup to force his resignation. Once he was forced out of office, the military took over the existing regime by creating a military council and taking control of critical ministries. The regime was always centered on the military. What happened on Feb. 11 was that the military took direct control.

Again, as a guess, the older officers, friends of Mubarak, found themselves under pressure from other officers and the United States to act. They finally did, taking the major positions for themselves. The demonstrations were the backdrop for this drama and the justification for the military’s actions, but they were not a revolution in the streets. It was a military coup designed to preserve a military-dominated regime. And that was what the crowds were demanding as well.

Coup and Revolution

We now face the question of whether the coup will turn into a revolution. The demonstrators demanded — and the military has agreed to hold — genuinely democratic elections and to stop repression. It is not clear that the new leaders mean what they have said or were simply saying it to get the crowds to go home. But there are deeper problems in the democratization of Egypt. First, Mubarak’s repression had wrecked civil society. The formation of coherent political parties able to find and run candidates will take a while. Second, the military is deeply enmeshed in running the country. Backing them out of that position, with the best will in the world, will require time. The military bought time Feb. 13, but it is not clear that six months is enough time, and it is not clear that, in the end, the military will want to leave the position it has held for more than half a century.

Of course, there is the feeling, as there was in 2009 with the Tehran demonstrations, that something unheard of has taken place, as U.S. President Barack Obama has implied. It is said to have something to do with Twitter and Facebook. We should recall that, in our time, genuine revolutions that destroyed regimes took place in 1989 and 1979, the latter even before there were PCs. Indeed, such revolutions go back to the 18th century. None of them required smartphones, and all of them were more thorough and profound than what has happened in Egypt so far. This revolution will not be “Twitterized.” The largest number of protesters arrived in Tahrir Square after the Internet was completely shut down.

The new government has promised to honor all foreign commitments, which obviously include the most controversial one in Egypt, the treaty with Israel. During the celebrations the evening of Feb. 11 and morning of Feb. 12, the two chants were about democracy and Palestine. While the regime committed itself to maintaining the treaty with Israel, the crowds in the square seemed to have other thoughts, not yet clearly defined. But then, it is not clear that the demonstrators in the square represent the wishes of 80 million Egyptians. For all the chatter about the Egyptian people demanding democracy, the fact is that hardly anyone participated in the demonstrations, relative to the number of Egyptians there are, and no one really knows how the Egyptian people would vote on this issue.

The Egyptian government is hardly in a position to confront Israel, even if it wanted to. The Egyptian army has mostly American equipment and cannot function if the Americans don’t provide spare parts or contractors to maintain that equipment. There is no Soviet Union vying to replace the United States today. Re-equipping and training a military the size of Egypt’s is measured in decades, not weeks. Egypt is not going to war any time soon. But then the new rulers have declared that all prior treaties — such as with Israel — will remain in effect.

What Was Achieved?

Therefore, we face this reality. The Egyptian regime is still there, still controlled by old generals. They are committed to the same foreign policy as the man they forced out of office. They have promised democracy, but it is not clear that they mean it. If they mean it, it is not clear how they would do it, certainly not in a timeframe of a few months. Indeed, this means that the crowds may re-emerge demanding more rapid democratization, depending on who organized the crowds in the first place and what their intentions are now.

It is not that nothing happened in Egypt, and it is not that it isn’t important. It is simply that what happened was not what the media portrayed but a much more complex process, most of it not viewable on TV. Certainly, there was nothing unprecedented in what was achieved or how it was achieved. It is not even clear what was achieved. Nor is it clear that anything that has happened changes Egyptian foreign or domestic policy. It is not even clear that those policies could be changed in practical terms regardless of intent.

The week began with an old soldier running Egypt. It ended with different old soldiers running Egypt with even more formal power than Mubarak had. This has caused worldwide shock and awe. We were killjoys in 2009, when we said the Iranians revolution wasn’t going anywhere. We do not want to be killjoys now, since everyone is so excited and happy. But we should point out that, in spite of the crowds, nothing much has really happened yet in Egypt. It doesn’t mean that it won’t, but it hasn’t yet.

An 82-year-old man has been thrown out of office, and his son will not be president. The constitution and parliament are gone and a military junta is in charge. The rest is speculation.

Egypt: The Distance Between Enthusiasm and Reality is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

All eyes on Egypt... As Mubarak tries an Iranian solution.

Supporters of President Hosni Mubarak, including some riding horses and camels and wielding whips, march towards anti-Mubarak protesters (Nabil/AP)

As plain clothes security forces and hired thugs 'pro-Mubarak' supporters start throwing petrol bombs from roof tops onto protesters trapped below them in Cairo's Tahrir square, charging the demonstrators on camels and horses wirelding clubs, and beating up reporters, Egypt is clearly going to get worse as Mubarak sticks with the iron fist approach, while being carefully watched by the Egyptian Military.

At least reports say the internet and mobile networks in Egypt were turned back on today. Maybe this was only to enable communication with the anti-demonstrators.

As CNN just reported:

...There were immediate suspicions that the pro-Mubarak demonstrators were not simply average citizens standing up for the man who has led Egypt for three decades -- suspicions that proved at least partly founded.

As battles raged between the two sides, some pro-Mubarak protesters were captured by his opponents. Some were terrified to be caught and begged for their lives, screaming that the government had paid them to come out and protest.

Others turned out to be carrying what seemed to be police identification, though they were dressed in plain clothes. An Interior Ministry spokesman denied on state-run television that police identification cards had been confiscated from demonstrators. He said if they had been, they were were stolen or fake.

State television reporting Wednesday did not always match CNN's own observations of what was happening in Tahrir Square. Several CNN journalists heard from pro-Mubarak demonstrators that they worked for the government. Staff from the national petrochemical company said they had been ordered to come and protest.

"These (pro-Mubarak) protests were organized by the government and the ruling National Democratic Party," analyst Kamal Zakher told CNN. The government mustered government workers and lawmakers whose seats are threatened, he said.

"They were ordered to go out today. They are well organized and that is suspicious -- especially the use of camels and horses. These are abnormal techniques to demonstrate," he said, referring to the shocking charge of about 50 or 60 mounted men through Tahrir in the middle of the afternoon.
...

It seems Egypt's regime is trying to use the recent (and successful) Iranian response to the protests rather than the Tunisian one: brute force, violence, murder, arrests & fear. And it seems the Military are (at the moment) letting them do so, or at least watching as the regime digs itself a bigger hole. If things keep going this way, I'd put my money on a coup d'état by 'The Colonels' or even the Generals to bring order and protect their own interests...

Meanwhile, here's a reprint of STRATFORs excellent analysis from a couple of days ago, along with a short history lesson of Egypt's recent past, and the implications for the rest of us.

The Egypt Crisis in a Global Context: A Special Report | STRATFOR
January 30, 2011

It is not at all clear what will happen in the Egyptian revolution. It is not a surprise that this is happening. Hosni Mubarak has been president for more than a quarter of a century, ever since the assassination of Anwar Sadat. He is old and has been ill. No one expected him to live much longer, and his apparent plan, which was that he would be replaced by his son Gamal, was not going to happen even though it was a possibility a year ago. There was no one, save his closest business associates, who wanted to see Mubarak’s succession plans happen. As his father weakened, Gamal’s succession became even less likely. Mubarak’s failure to design a credible succession plan guaranteed instability on his death. Since everyone knew that there would be instability on his death, there were obviously those who saw little advantage to acting before he died. Who these people were and what they wanted is the issue.

Let’s begin by considering the regime. In 1952, Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser staged a military coup that displaced the Egyptian monarchy, civilian officers in the military, and British influence in Egypt. Nasser created a government based on military power as the major stabilizing and progressive force in Egypt. His revolution was secular and socialist. In short, it was a statist regime dominated by the military. On Nasser’s death, Anwar Sadat replaced him. On Sadat’s assassination, Hosni Mubarak replaced him. Both of these men came from the military as Nasser did. However their foreign policy might have differed from Nasser’s, the regime remained intact.


Mubarak’s Opponents
The demands for Mubarak’s resignation come from many quarters, including from members of the regime — particularly the military — who regard Mubarak’s unwillingness to permit them to dictate the succession as endangering the regime. For some of them, the demonstrations represent both a threat and opportunity. Obviously, the demonstrations might get out of hand and destroy the regime. On the other hand, the demonstrations might be enough to force Mubarak to resign, allow a replacement — for example, Omar Suleiman, the head of intelligence who Mubarak recently appointed vice president — and thereby save the regime. This is not to say that they fomented the demonstrations, but some must have seen the demonstrations as an opportunity.

This is particularly the case in the sense that the demonstrators are deeply divided among themselves and thus far do not appear to have been able to generate the type of mass movement that toppled the Shah of Iran’s regime in 1979. More important, the demonstrators are clearly united in opposing Mubarak as an individual, and to a large extent united in opposing the regime. Beyond that, there is a deep divide in the opposition.

Western media has read the uprising as a demand for Western-style liberal democracy. Many certainly are demanding that. What is not clear is that this is moving Egypt’s peasants, workers and merchant class to rise en masse. Their interests have far more to do with the state of the Egyptian economy than with the principles of liberal democracy. As in Iran in 2009, the democratic revolution, if focused on democrats, cannot triumph unless it generates broader support.

The other element in this uprising is the Muslim Brotherhood. The consensus of most observers is that the Muslim Brotherhood at this point is no longer a radical movement and is too weak to influence the revolution. This may be possible, but it is not obvious. The Muslim Brotherhood has many strands, many of which have been quiet under Mubarak’s repression. It is not clear who will emerge if Mubarak falls. It is certainly not clear that they are weaker than the democratic demonstrators. It is a mistake to confuse the Muslim Brotherhood’s caution with weakness. Another way to look at them is that they have bided their time and toned down their real views, waiting for the kind of moment provided by Mubarak’s succession. I would suspect that the Muslim Brotherhood has more potential influence among the Egyptian masses than the Western-oriented demonstrators or Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is emerging as their leader.

There is, of course, the usual discussion of what U.S. President Barack Obama’s view is, or what the Europeans think, or what the Iranians are up to. All of them undoubtedly have thoughts and even plans. In my view, trying to shape the political dynamics of a country like Egypt from Iran or the United States is futile, and believing that what is happening in Egypt is the result of their conspiracies is nonsense. A lot of people care what is happening there, and a lot of people are saying all sorts of things and even spending money on spies and Twitter. Egypt’s regime can be influenced in this way, but a revolution really doesn’t depend on what the European Union or Tehran says.

There are four outcomes possible. First, the regime might survive. Mubarak might stabilize the situation, or more likely, another senior military official would replace him after a decent interval. Another possibility under the scenario of the regime’s survival is that there may be a coup of the colonels, as we discussed yesterday. A second possibility is that the demonstrators might force elections in which ElBaradei or someone like him could be elected and Egypt might overthrow the statist model built by Nasser and proceed on the path of democracy. The third possibility is that the demonstrators force elections, which the Muslim Brotherhood could win and move forward with an Islamist-oriented agenda. The fourth possibility is that Egypt will sink into political chaos. The most likely path to this would be elections that result in political gridlock in which a viable candidate cannot be elected. If I were forced to choose, I would bet on the regime stabilizing itself and Mubarak leaving because of the relative weakness and division of the demonstrators. But that’s a guess and not a forecast.


Geopolitical Significance
Whatever happens matters a great deal to Egyptians. But only some of these outcomes are significant to the world. Among radical Islamists, the prospect of a radicalized Egypt represents a new lease on life. For Iran, such an outcome would be less pleasing. Iran is now the emerging center of radical Islamism; it would not welcome competition from Egypt, though it may be content with an Islamist Egypt that acts as an Iranian ally (something that would not be easy to ensure).

For the United States, an Islamist Egypt would be a strategic catastrophe. Egypt is the center of gravity in the Arab world. This would not only change the dynamic of the Arab world, it would reverse U.S. strategy since the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Sadat’s decision to reverse his alliance with the Soviets and form an alliance with the United States undermined the Soviet position in the Mediterranean and in the Arab world and strengthened the United States immeasurably. The support of Egyptian intelligence after 9/11 was critical in blocking and undermining al Qaeda. Were Egypt to stop that cooperation or become hostile, the U.S. strategy would be severely undermined.

The great loser would be Israel. Israel’s national security has rested on its treaty with Egypt, signed by Menachem Begin with much criticism by the Israeli right. The demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula not only protected Israel’s southern front, it meant that the survival of Israel was no longer at stake. Israel fought three wars (1948, 1967 and 1973) where its very existence was at issue. The threat was always from Egypt, and without Egypt in the mix, no coalition of powers could threaten Israel (excluding the now-distant possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons). In all of the wars Israel fought after its treaty with Egypt (the 1982 and 2006 wars in Lebanon) Israeli interests, but not survival, were at stake.

If Egypt were to abrogate the Camp David Accords and over time reconstruct its military into an effective force, the existential threat to Israel that existed before the treaty was signed would re-emerge. This would not happen quickly, but Israel would have to deal with two realities. The first is that the Israeli military is not nearly large enough or strong enough to occupy and control Egypt. The second is that the development of Egypt’s military would impose substantial costs on Israel and limit its room for maneuver.

There is thus a scenario that would potentially strengthen the radical Islamists while putting the United States, Israel, and potentially even Iran at a disadvantage, all for different reasons. That scenario emerges only if two things happen. First, the Muslim Brotherhood must become a dominant political force in Egypt. Second, they must turn out to be more radical than most observers currently believe they are — or they must, with power, evolve into something more radical.

If the advocates for democracy win, and if they elect someone like ElBaradei, it is unlikely that this scenario would take place. The pro-Western democratic faction is primarily concerned with domestic issues, are themselves secular and would not want to return to the wartime state prior to Camp David, because that would simply strengthen the military. If they win power, the geopolitical arrangements would remain unchanged.

Similarly, the geopolitical arrangements would remain in place if the military regime retained power — save for one scenario. If it was decided that the regime’s unpopularity could be mitigated by assuming a more anti-Western and anti-Israeli policy — in other words, if the regime decided to play the Islamist card, the situation could evolve as a Muslim Brotherhood government would. Indeed, as hard as it is to imagine, there could be an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood designed to stabilize the regime. Stranger things have happened.

When we look at the political dynamic of Egypt, and try to imagine its connection to the international system, we can see that there are several scenarios under which certain political outcomes would have profound effects on the way the world works. That should not be surprising. When Egypt was a pro-Soviet Nasserite state, the world was a very different place than it had been before Nasser. When Sadat changed his foreign policy the world changed with it. If the Sadat foreign policy changes, the world changes again. Egypt is one of those countries whose internal politics matter to more than its own citizens.

Most of the outcomes I envision leave Egypt pretty much where it is. But not all. The situation is, as they say, in doubt, and the outcome is not trivial.

Reproduced with permission from STRATFOR

We're not sleepy folks!

Nice link sent by 'Anon' to the report on the peaceful protest in Oman a few days ago.

WORLD BREAKING NEWS
The Canadian Press - ONLINE EDITION
About 2,000 Omanis demonstrate demanding higher wages and stop rising prices
By: The Associated Press
Posted: 01/17/2011 12:44 PM | Comments: 1

MUSCAT, Oman - About 2,000 Omanis have staged a rare protest demanding higher wages and salaries and a curb to rising prices and the high cost of living.
The demonstration Monday, a rarity in the sleepy sultanate, was called for by the civil society groups and publicized on websites.
Protesters gathered in the district housing most government ministries under close watch by police. The demonstration ended peacefully.
One demonstrator said the march was a request to Sultan Qaboos to personally intervene against the greed of the merchants and raise government employees salaries including those in the police and the army. He refused to give his name fearing of government reprisal.
Banners held by the demonstrators read "no to high prices" and "no to the merchant greed."

and the great comment:

POSTED BY: jduester
JANUARY 18, 2011 AT 8:31 AM
To describe Oman as a "sleepy sultanate" is highly offensive and does not do credit to one of Arabia's oldest and foremost nation states. Oman has a highly educated population and its government displays a skillful and mature regional policy. I am utterly dismayed at this pejorative language and a considerable lack of professionalism by an AP writer.

Hmmm. Highly offensive is lot of offense. Especially as there are only two words quoted that are "offensive", and one of those is just a plain fact: Oman is a Sultanate.

So its official: We're not sleepy.

Remember, [Thanks Observer!] even England also saw large public protests over taxes and Gov spending cuts recently. There's not necessarily any connection to Tunisia at all.

Any pic links?
Update: Youtube [Thanx Al]:




Picture from an American student hunger strike in 2005 kimthewolf

From The Gulf News

...
Though the ministry area was deserted when the protest was held at government department as the staff work only up to 2.30pm. the main Sultan Qaboos Highway saw a huge traffic jam of office goers from the private sector heading home. The curious drivers slowed down the traffic, triggering congestion.
"I could see a huge crowd in the ministry area and the traffic was crawling," an expatriate, who wished not to be named, told Gulf News.
Most participants in the protest were reluctant to be quoted as they were government employees. However, some said they protested against low salaries and soaring prices.
The police kept track of the protesters even as some joggers continued with their routine. The police did not interfere and the protest ended as peacefully as it had started.
The Royal Oman Police (ROP) had no comment to make when Gulf News contacted for details about the protest.
This is not the first time such peaceful protest was held in Oman. Recently some young graduates led a delegation to the Education Ministry, demanding teaching jobs.
Meanwhile, social media was abuzz with the news about the protest.

Oman Tribune reporting improves. Iran blames foreign elements for being dictatorial fascists

Response to my Help Wanted ad has been great. There are still openings, so don't be shy! One position that was filled is that of 'Omani' for the new segment here at Muscat Confidential: 'Ask an Omani'. So, please email me your 'Ask an Omani' questions to undercover(dot)dragon(at)gmail(dot)com

Meanwhile, the Iranian Theocracy tightens their grip, after the Tehran intelligensia got their local version of the Tiananmen square treatment. Reports are coming out of thousands of arrests, including senior opposition leaders, students, journalists, University profs, etc. A protest of a few thousand yesterday were again met with riot police.

...After several days of apparent calm – following the harsh repression of opposition protests - at least 3 thousand people gathered in front of the mosque in Ghoba yesterday. The police charged the crowd with truncheons and tear gas. An elderly woman was beaten and there were clashes between police and young people. ...
Asian News

Some theo-fascist is even calling for many of the opposition supporters to be executed. Nice. It's now pretty easy to see the iron fist that was previously somewhat cloaked in the pseudo-democracy espoused in the Republic. Nice to see the blame being put on foreign elements too, as per usual. Even the shooting of the young woman is being suggested as 'suspicious' by Ahmadinejad and the Iranian media. There is a partial recount of 10%, but apart from a few cosmetic errors the result will be confirmed, nats. Demonisation of the opposition is in full swing.


Iran: Photo of the millions of US, British and Israeli agents all pretending to be Iranian during the protests illegal riots

Lebanon meanwhile got started on the road back to civilisation as they voted for moderate Saad Al Hariri. Great news for the region. Fingers crossed.

Oh, and Michael Jackson, a troubled singer often accused of being a paedophile, died.

Local Supermarket News
Word is - thanks Sythe - we will be getting a Waitrose and Debenhams in Muscat next year, located in the new mall being completed in Al Khuwair. Maybe we'll then be able to buy the rather tasty specialist foods available from Waitrose at reasonable prices, compared to being totally ripped off by Al Fair for these products as we are now.

Oman Tribune: Getting Better?
Is it just me, or has the Oman Tribune been getting a little bolder of late? I think they have also, in just a few years, been able to surpass the bland and occasionally crazy Times of Oman, and the Government controlled Oman Observer ,to the number 1 spot too (they say).



A few days ago the Tribune published the sentencing in court of someone in Nizwa for murder (he deliberately shot someone), and also the tale of the conviction for man slaughter of an electrical engineering supervisor. OK, still no names and no real digging for the sub-story, etc, but the reporting is definitely getting a little better, even if its not yet what I'd call journalism. And today a story on how Shanty Towns are developing around Ruwi. I wish they'd be more explicit on the illegal activity...

Shanty towns on rise
MUSCAT Illegal residential areas are mushrooming around Muscat at an alarming pace.

The shanty towns in Al Hamriya region are now serving as a haven to illegal workers and criminal groups. The localities inhabited by low-income workers are turning into breeding grounds for illegal activities. It is high time that the authorities reviewed the situation and took action.

This menace is not limited to Al Hamriya. Similar shanty residential areas are also found in Ruwi, Matrah, Seeb and Bausher along with the other regions in the Sultanate.

Excellent. Keep it up, The Tribune. Well done Abdul Hamied Al Taie, Editor in Chief.

In this case, the story would be improved by interviews with the shanty town residents, local cops, Municipality comment too would be nice, plus some examination of why it's becoming a problem recently (increased rents for example?), and more photos. But even this is noticeably better IMHO.

Omani youth protest over jobs in Duqm

Perhaps this is a sign of things to come, and it has happened many times before, but interesting that it got reported at all I guess. 100+ 'youths' in the far off place of Duqm had a sit-in protest at not being given jobs in the local construction work for the dry dock being built there - apparently the first of many grand investment plans for the area.

The situation reflects the tremendous importance of job creation to the medium-long term stability of Oman. This is why so many state subsidies are being used to generate new industrial centres (eg Sohar, Salalah), the multitude of tourism plans, and the various other things the Government are trying to do. They know the demographic wave (remember half of Oman's population is under 18) is coming.

I like the way the report basically says the local Wali and ROP guys (who wouldn't be able to take on 100+ youth on their own) seemed to say "OK lads. Fair point. Now stop blocking the road and come down to the walli's office for a chat. I'm sure we'll work something out." Quaint.



There certainly isn't much else to do in Duqm except a bit of fishing and raising goats. Its half-way between Muscat and Salalah, and at least it's by the coast. It is a really beautiful place, and while the development in some ways is a shame, you can't eat landscape, and there's a LOT of landscape in and around Duqm.

Whether the youths will be happy to hump rocks at the wages given to expat labourers is something else, but probably they wouldn't need too much more given their options.

Again, I say establishing a mechanism of some kind to make it more attractive to hire Omani for low-skilled jobs in contruction is required. Minimum wage (for all, not Omani), bigger tax on expat visas for certain jobs, higher standards of construction that rely on more machinery and less guys with shovels... But meanwhile its great to see people taking peaceful action to try to improve their lot.

Anyone got more details on what's happening? Pictures? I hope they didn't wait until winter on purpose! Lugging rocks in summer doesn't sound like much fun.

Times of Oman article

Omani youths stage protest in Duqm
Rashid bin Ahmed Al Baloushi
Monday, October 27, 2008
DUQM — Around 100 Omani youths from the wilayat of Duqm staged a sit-in here yesterday protesting against a company involved in the construction of a dry dock and seaport here not giving jobs to the local citizens.

The protesters blocked the trucks carrying rocks to the seaside causing traffic jams for hours. They demanded of the company give preference to the local citizens in its recruitments.

The protesters said that their job applications had been pending with the company for more than a year and-a-half.

A source at the Royal Oman Police said the Ministry of Interior, represented by the Wali’s Office in Duqm, had asked the protesters to meet the officials concerned in the Wali’s Office and assured them of suitable action on their demands.

Protests: Something you won't be reading in the papers it seems

Recent teacher training graduates from SQU have been holding a huge 'sit-in' outside His Majesty's paalace at Barka, going on for several days (and nights) now. Nothing reported in any of the papers, naturally.


You'll notice perhaps the lack of signs or banners. Ahhh, these guys and gals are smarter than that: that would officially constitute a protest, and leave them open to being 'moved on' by the ROP.


They are, with all due respect, seeking to ask HM for some assistance in their engagement with the Ministry of Education, in whom they have reportedly lost faith after years of unanswered letters, unkept promises and botched administrative systems. They are basically tired of being screwed around. They want jobs teaching in Omani schools, and none seem to be forthcoming.

This is not a common sight in Oman. Anyone with any more info?

I'm not Dutch!

It may soon be a rather bad time to be Dutch - or even blond and Dutch looking - in the Middle East. This has been going around the 'net for a while, (almost 2 weeks) but the response will probably make the Danish Cartoon issue seem trivial by comparison.

Geert Wilders, the Dutch leader of the PVV (a rather right wing) party, is supposedly about to publish a short video on the Quraan and Islaam, which he claims represents a fascist ideology, is not a tolerent or peaceful religion and that the Quraan 'should be banned'. Part of his purpose is to provoke the kind of violent reaction from Muslims to explicitly demonstrate his point that the underlying beliefs and their practice are fundamentally incompatable with Western (and especially Dutch) secular culture, freedom of sppech, and the principal of seperation of Church and State. He's already got 24/7 protection against all sort of death threats, so it won't make a big change to his lifestyle. But if you're Dutch and in a Muslim country, it may change yours!

In the case of Oman, any Dutch readers may wish to purchase key Dutch products they are particularly attracted to now, as it may be some time before they are back on the shelves! Also, if you need to visit the Dutch embassy, do it quick. The Dutch embassies around the world have already been put on alert.

Below is Geert telling his side on Fox News. One indication of his stance is that even Fox seems to find it pretty extreme. And that's saying something!

He essentially touches on issues that have been commented on in many blogs (including this one) about the implications of free speech, secularism and its problem with extremist Islam, political correctness, and what seems to be a firm commitment to religiously motivated violence on the part of many, including people who seem otherwise intelligent, peace loving and kind (but yet are firm belivers that 'mere' insults should be met with assassination).

You can read some right wing Euro-paper comment on his video here
Here's the link from Youtube with the interview with Geert. Caution: just watching this interview may be considered illegal in some countries. Follow the link at your own risk. If you are Muslim, you will find even this interview highly insulting. Don't blame me if you get offended.



part2