Shura given new powers. Oman to offer asylum to Ghaddafi family? News round up.

So the Shura elections were held successfully, with just 1 woman elected (Congratulations to Nu'amah Bint Jamayel Al Busaidi). 1 is better than zero I guess, although most observers were hoping for more female representatives.


Photo: Happy young voters with photo's of their preferred candidates. Sunil K. Vaidya/Gulf News

After the elections, as promised to the protesters earlier this year, HM also issued the first major constitutional change since the Basic Law of the State was issued in 1996, granting (limited) legislative powers to the Shura and allowing the Majlis Ash' Shura to elect their own Chairman. The law even allows 15 members of the Majlis Ash'Shura to summon a 'Services' Minister for a grilling.

The decree updated the process of how a successor to the Sultan is selected, replacing the Defense Council with a small committee that includes the Majlis Chairman.

These are certainly big changes, and represent another step on the path to more effective representative government. Muscat Confidential has long held the view that HM has a goal of leaving Oman with a Constitutional Monarchy, and this is a key part of such a transition. Local legal-eagle BluChi wrote a good summary of the changes here.

Oman Daily Observer
Fri, 21 October 2011
...
Article 58 (bis 35): The draft laws prepared by the government shall be referred to the Majlis Oman for approval or amendment and then directly be submitted to His Majesty to issue them. In case of any amendments by the Majlis Oman on a draft law, His Majesty may return the same to the council for reconsidering the amendments and then shall be submitted again to His Majesty.

Article 58 (bis 36): The Majlis Oman may propose draft laws and refer the same to the government for assessment and returning the same to the Majlis, procedures provide for in Article 58 (bis 35) shall be followed in approving, amending or issuing the said draft laws.
...

Article 58 (bis 43): On a request signed by at least 15 members of the Majlis Ash’shura of any of the services ministers may be subject to interpellation on matters related to exceeding their prerogatives by acting in contrary to the law. The Majlis shall debate the same and submit the outcome to His Majesty the Sultan.
...

The results of the election showed how most of the voting is still done along tribal lines, with some people reporting that they were even told to vote for the local tribal leader. As political parties remain illegal in Oman, this is probably no surprise. Without a coordinated party structure, it is hard for potential Shura members to establish a cohesive manifesto, and even harder for voters to really know what they are voting for wrt specific policies or new legislation. But at least the ban on all polital parties keeps out the election of a dedicated religious extremist party.

It is questionable whether the Shura has the capability to use these new powers. This would require the Shura members be given the budget and authority to assemble a staff of advisors, who could then analyse the draft legislation sent from the Council of Ministers, and have a bigger chance of doing a decent job writing suitable amendments. The Shura need independent lawyers and experienced technocrats to take on the civil servants in the Ministries.

Oman still struggles to overcome the historic burden of tribalism and family-related favouritism. But, hey, this new law is a good start in a region not known for democracy.


Bit of a catch up on miscellaneous news.

Oman to offer Ghaddafi family asylum?
Strange report today that Oman was prepared to give the Ghaddafi family political asylum. Interesting.

While Oman is a signatory (in December 2000) to the International Criminal Court treaty, they have not yet ratified the treaty and so are not at present a 'State Party' to the ICC. So how any ICC arrest warrants would apply in Oman is a bit vague.

Oman 'ready' to give Gaddafi family policial asylum
Oct 27, 2011 22:16 Moscow Time

The authorities of Oman are prepared to grant political asylum to the members of Muammar Gaddafi’s family, Ash-Shark al-Ausat newspaper reports with reference to Libyan sources.

The authorities stressed that members of Muammar Gaddafi’s family will not be involved in politics in Oman.

According to other sources close to Gaddafi’s family, its surviving members may go to South Africa in the coming days where they will be joined by Gaddafi’s son Saadi who is now in Niger. (TASS)

If true, I wonder if we'll see this story in the Times of Oman?

Meanwhile.

Iranian Threat prompts Oman to buy advanced US anti-aircraft missile systems.
It seems releasing Iranian hostages can help get you access to some nice military kit. Oman is buyinga suite of advanced US anti-aircraft missiles. These would be capable of shooting down unmanned drones as well as helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. While the Iranian airforce may not be up to much, I guess it's always nice to be prepared.



Photo: the SLAMRAAM anti-aircraft system by Raytheon. Toys for the boys.

October 28, 2011: The Persian Gulf state of Oman is buying 18 American Avenger anti-aircraft systems, as well as 266 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles for them. Also being purchased on 290 SLAMRAAM (ground launched AMRAAM air-to-air missiles) and twenty Hummers to serve as launchers. A Sentinel radar system is being bought to support the SLAMRAAMs.

Avengers are hummers with a turret mounted on the back. The turret contains two missile pods (each containing four Stinger anti-aircraft missiles). Under one pod there is an M3P .50 caliber (12.7mm) machine gun. The weapons operator has use of a FLIR (night vision device) and a laser range finder. The machine-gun, however, can't be depressed sufficiently to fire at ground targets towards the front of the vehicle. The missiles have a range of four kilometers, the machine-gun about half that. The usual price is $12-15 million per Avenger system, including Stinger missiles, training gear, spare parts and training and technical assistance.
...

Sweet.

US Sec. State Clinton visits HM Sultan Qaboos to say "Thanks" on Iran.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits Oman today, seen here touring the Beit Al-Zubair Museum. Photo AFP



Nice to see US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton dropping by today for a 121 with HM Sultan Qaboos. My take on the US agenda:

1/ Say a big Thanks from the President for paying the Iranians and negotiating the release of those stupid American idiots. We owe you one.

2/ Discuss Iran (again), and the plot to assassinate an Ambassador of a fellow GCC state in the USA. [If true, this would be anathema to HM].

3/ Discuss and coordinate on the situations in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, and the GCC involvement in the search for solutions. Plus Afghanistan & Pakistan; Turkey & Israel. Iraq.

4/ Cautious praise on the recent elections: right direction, more power to Majlis eagerly awaited. And need more women.

5/ Talks on the Arab Spring, esp. Egypt and Libya.

6/ US support for HM. HM has done an excellent job as a regional & moderate peacemaker, and was the first leader to visit Iran after their most recent 'elections', hence the backchannel. Appreciation for his continuing to be a strong US ally in the region, and his cooperation on all levels.






It got Oman into the venerable Washington Post, with the gem:

... talks in Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id’s lavish palace, in the capital of this tiny Gulf state,....

The Secretary certainly praised Oman lavishly in the press release.

..."The Sultanate of Oman has made more progress than any country in the world in the past forty years, which has laid the stability at home and peace with its neighbors. ...It must be for other countries to learn how to become the Sultanate in this short period of time, a unique model of development ... in the Middle East. "

I wonder if she raised civil rights, and developments in the arrest and trials of journalists? (For those who care, the appeal was delayed until the 22nd October)



Also in Bloomberg here:

Clinton in Oman for Talks on Iran, Protests Across Arab World

By Indira A.R. Lakshmanan - Oct 19, 2011 10:10 AM GMT+0400

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is visiting Oman today to thank the Gulf state’s ruler for his role in securing the release of three American hikers jailed by Iran, and to discuss efforts to meet demands for greater economic and political freedoms in the sultanate.

Clinton will also hold talks with Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said on the recent alleged plot by Iran to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington, and protests in nearby Syria and Yemen that have claimed the lives of demonstrators as the countries’ leaders cling to power, a U.S. official told reporters traveling with the secretary of State.

The U.S. is seeking to exert pressure on Iran, which it views as a rogue state that threatens global security, and Oman is key to that effort as a rare U.S. ally that has a friendly relationship with the government in Tehran, said the U.S. official, who spoke on condition that his name not be used because of the sensitive nature of the talks.

Qaboos was instrumental in the release last month of Josh Fattal and Shane Bauer, who spent two years imprisoned in Iran on charges of illegal entry and espionage, and in last year’s release of a third hiker, Sarah Shourd.

Lawyers for the three said Oman arranged for $500,000 in bail to be paid for each as a condition of their release. The trio, who denied spying, said they were trekking in Iraq in July 2009 when they were beckoned to approach a guard who then arrested them for illegal entry into neighboring Iran.
....

The new Great Game? Iran accused of ploting Saudi Ambassador's assassination

Oh oh. This isn't good.

Reuters: Oct. 11 - An Iranian in custody has confessed to an alleged $1.5 million assassination plot to kill the Saudi ambassador of the United States and provided information about involvement by factions of the Iranian government, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder tells a news conference.

Photo: Iranian President Ahmadinejad, said "Who, me?. No way!"


We've all seen the Saudi Bahrain response to the (predominantly Shia, linked to Iran) protests there - massive military force, riot police, imprisonment (including 15yrs for Doctors who had the gall to treat injured protesters), harassment. Sh. Fluffy, the Crown Prince, who called for dialogue and calm was immediately shifted to one side and the iron fist returned. Firmly. Note The reports that the UAE, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar sent troops too. Pakistan sent mercenaries.

.... [Itanian News]
...
attacks come two days after Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar dispatched their armed forces to crisis-hit Bahrain to quash anti-government protests in the tiny Persian Gulf state.
...

[Ms Dragon calls the reports of Oman troops being sent as erroneous. I suspect we probably sent ROP & 'Observers' from ISS]

So the report today from the US Attorney General that the Feds had busted 'factions of the Iranian Government' funding a terrorist plot to kill the Saudi Ambassador (and countless innocents) on US soil, well, that was always going to be a big deal.

Anyway it plays - Iranian Gov did plan it (and how tremendously stupid to do it and then to get caught!), or bits did it (more likely), or it's a cunning Mossad/CIA conspiracy (it won't be the FBI. They're cops), or heck, even a cunning Saudi Intel black op - there are no 'uninteresting' explanations.

But the Saudis are gonna be pissed off in a big way if it was Iranian. EG, here just now on Reuters.

Saudi to 'take measures' in response to Iran-Americans arrested for plot to blow-up top adviser and security confident to King.

(Reuters) - The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will be expected to 'take measures' by its people after U.S. authorities broke up a plot by two men linked to the Iranian government to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in the United States.

"After this incident many in the kingdom will expect the kingdom to take measures, the least of which will be to pull the Saudi ambassador from Iran," said Abdullah Alshammari, a government official in Riyadh. "In the opinion of Saudi decision makers, this situation is not going to pass easily."

Saudi Arabia mistrusts Shi'ite power Iran, and together with the United States accuses Tehran of backing terrorism and pursuing nuclear arms.

"There were always problems with Iran and Saudi Arabia, what is new now is that America is involved... The fact that the Saudi ambassador was the target in the United States, I believe this will mean the kingdom and the United States will take a joint decision together," Alshammari said. "An ambassador of the level of Adel Al-Jubeir, who was an adviser to the royal court, that is a great provocation for Saudi Arabia and therefore we expect that the kingdom will take steps in this matter."

Hmmm. 'Take steps' sounds potentially ominous.

At least the USA will allow a trial and some evidence in public court. So Iran (and Saudi...) can always see what the evidence is I guess. That would NOT happen in Iran or Saudi, bastions of press freedom that they are.

HM once again rescues American prisoners from Iran, and the special relationship between Oman and the USA.

Oman has always had a very close relationship with the USA. His Majesty, as befits a professional diplomat, has long had a consistent foreign policy that Oman - while retaining full sovereignty - should basically get along with both its regional neighbours and the great powers. In fact, a treaty of friendship and navigation, one of the first agreements of its kind between the USA and an Arab state, was concluded between the United States and Muscat way back in 1833.

Oman has not joined the US-led chorus prevalent in the rest of the GCC states to isolate Iran. Instead, Oman has consistently pursued engagement with Iran as being in its own best interests. Oman has never been too friendly with the Saudis, especially as they funded and supported the Iman of Nizwa's rebellion, and sees Iran as a regional balance against any attempted dominance in the region by the Wahabis of Saudi, as exemplified by the recent protests in Bahrain.

This has enabled Oman to act as a trusted intermediary between the US and Iran. The results of this were evident last week as Oman secured the release of the 2 American 'hikers', who were apparently stupid enough to go wandering near the Iraq/Iran border and got nabbed by the Iranians and thrown into jail for 'spying'. (I mean, come on, who would ever think that it's a good idea to go anywhere near Iran if you have an American passport?)

HM not only negotiated for their release, but also personally paid the Iranian's blackmail/blood money 'bail', a nice round sum of half a million US$ per person, which allows the American Administration to state as fact that they did not pay Iran a cent.

So Barack Obama gave HM a call yesterday to personally thank him.

WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama thanked Oman's Sultan Qaboos on Friday for his role in getting Iran to free two US hikers jailed there for spying and illegal entry for over two years.

Josh Fattal and Shane Bauer, both 29, were flown into Muscat on an Omani Royal Air Force plane Wednesday after the Gulf sultanate of Oman paid their $1 million bail to get them released from Tehran's notorious Evin prison. Their case had poisoned already tense ties between Tehran and Washington.

Obama called Sultan Qaboos bin Said "to convey the United States' deepest appreciation for the Sultan's exceptional and successful role in securing the release of the young American hikers from Iranian detention and the cooperation between our governments in this endeavor," the White House said.

"The president expressed our gratitude to the sultan and his special envoy, Salim al-Ismaili, for sparing no effort to secure the release of Sarah Shourd last year, and Shane Bauer and Josh Fattal this past Wednesday, thus ending a painful chapter for the hikers and their families."

Shourd, Bauer's fiancee, was released last year on $500,000 bail also paid by Oman.
During their call, Obama and Sultan Qaboos "affirmed that the friendship and partnership between our two nations, as manifested in our cooperation for the release of the hikers, have only grown stronger, and that the United States and Oman will continue to work together on a broad range of common interests," the White House added in its statement.
...

I just hope HM asked President Obama for a visit (the last visit by a US President was Clinton). Something timed just after the Shura elections next month would be great PR for both of them. The press releases would almost write themselves. What greater contrast with the on-going disaster that is Yemen?



Photo: Judgmentally-challenged American hikers Shane Bauer (L) and Josh Fattal hold a press conference after arriving free in Oman (ripped from AFP, Mohammed Mahjoub)


A history of Military Cooperation
The close relationship between Oman and the USA is something the Omani Government has always avoided discussing in public (see the wikileaks cables), afraid of stirring up those Omanis and other Arabs who would get worked up about such superficial issues as Israel, US foreign policy, etc.

Oman has allowed the US to place emergency war materials [USAF Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel, aka WRM] in Oman for decades, recently extending in December 2010 the 10 year duration Base Access Agreement (BAA) first agreed in 1980. In return, the Americans are being allowed to build (at their own cost) a new 36,000 sqm warehousing facility for this purpose, plus a large refueling capability, at the Oman Airforce base in Al Musannah, north of Muscat, to the tune of a whopping $166 million. This will replace the previous facilities at Seeb. The details are publicly available via the US Airforce budget submission to Congress for funding.

... A requirement exists to construct a new airlift apron, taxiway and lighting along with fuel storage and distribution system to support two C-5 or equivalent commercial wide body strategic airlift aircraft at Al Musanah AB, Oman. The fuel storage delivery system must be capable of sustaining a maximum of four(4) C-5 flights a day for seven (7) consecutive days. Maximum fuel load calculated at 189,270 liters per flight.

In support of Overseas Contingency Operations, Al Musanah AB has been designated as a key strategic location for future US development. The Sultan of Oman has mandated that the US War Reserve Materiel (WRM) outload site at Seeb be relocated due to the commercial development of Seeb International Airport.

The Sultan of Oman has offered Al Musanah AB as a viable alternative to Seeb AB. The US government has accepted the offer and consequently developed a long range strategic and tactical plan that fully develops Al Musanah AB in accordance with future US defense posture plans. The initial phase relocates the entire WRM compound from Seeb by FY 12 (AMAB 08-3000). The follow phase (this project) begins the initial strategic development phase of this effort by developing a limited "Gas-n-Go" capability. This capability will provide aircraft with the ability to land at Al Musanah AB, refuel and then depart toward a final destination.
...

There is a lot of information about the relationship between Oman and US available via the US Congressional Research Service, especially stuff written by their Middle East expert Kenneth Katzman, eg here. A quote:

The Sultanate of Oman is a long-time U.S. ally in the Persian Gulf; it has allowed U.S. access to its military facilities for virtually every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since 1980, despite the sensitivities in Oman and throughout the Middle East about a U.S. military presence there.

The US is also long active at the RAFO airport base on Masirah Island, known as 'Camp Justice' and apparently nicknamed Moon Base Alpha by the American troops stationed there due to being pretty much at the end of the earth.

Egypt protestors enable continued rule by the Military, and Iranian irregular verbs

Wow.

They left it to the last minute, but last Friday morning, Egypt's military eventually acted to ensure they didn't get put where they did not want be - in the position of either (1) allowing mob rule in Cairo, or (2) turning their firepower onto their own civilians.

When President Mubarak opted on the Thursday night to announce he was actually still staying, it was to the surprise of everyone: protesters, CIA, President Obama, CNN, and especially, the Generals.

So, at the same time that many of the Egyptian Army's own Majors, Colonels and squaddies were joining the crowd to protest, the Generals finally opted for Option (3):

Coup d'État

"The coup is the most frequently attempted method of changing government, and the most successful." Edward N. Luttwak


Meanwhile, it's rubber bullets in Bahrain, and more protests in Yemen, Algeria and Iran. How Mahmoud Ahmadinejad can both praise the Egyptian protesters while killing and tear-gassing his own protesters is almost too ironic for words. (I guess it's one of those pesky Persian irregular verbs: they have freedom of speech, you have protesters, I have a seditious rioting mob...)


Here is a view on the recent events in Tahrir Square different to that portrayed in the media, from one of Muscat Confidential's favourite Foreign Affairs analysts: George Friedman of STRATFOR.

Enjoy!

Egypt: The Distance Between Enthusiasm and Reality
February 14, 2011 | 0048 GMT

By George Friedman

On Feb. 11, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned. A military council was named to govern in his place. On Feb. 11-12, the crowds that had gathered in Tahrir Square celebrated Mubarak’s fall and the triumph of democracy in Egypt. On Feb. 13, the military council abolished the constitution and dissolved parliament, promising a new constitution to be ratified by a referendum and stating that the military would rule for six months, or until the military decides it’s ready to hold parliamentary and presidential elections.

What we see is that while Mubarak is gone, the military regime in which he served has dramatically increased its power. This isn’t incompatible with democratic reform. Organizing elections, political parties and candidates is not something that can be done quickly. If the military is sincere in its intentions, it will have to do these things. The problem is that if the military is insincere it will do exactly the same things. Six months is a long time, passions can subside and promises can be forgotten.

At this point, we simply don’t know what will happen. We do know what has happened. Mubarak is out of office, the military regime remains intact and it is stronger than ever. This is not surprising, given what STRATFOR has said about recent events in Egypt, but the reality of what has happened in the last 72 hours and the interpretation that much of the world has placed on it are startlingly different. Power rests with the regime, not with the crowds. In our view, the crowds never had nearly as much power as many have claimed.

Certainly, there was a large crowd concentrated in a square in Cairo, and there were demonstrations in other cities. But the crowd was limited. It never got to be more than 300,000 people or so in Tahrir Square, and while that’s a lot of people, it is nothing like the crowds that turned out during the 1989 risings in Eastern Europe or the 1979 revolution in Iran. Those were massive social convulsions in which millions came out onto the streets. The crowd in Cairo never swelled to the point that it involved a substantial portion of the city.

In a genuine revolution, the police and military cannot contain the crowds. In Egypt, the military chose not to confront the demonstrators, not because the military itself was split, but because it agreed with the demonstrators’ core demand: getting rid of Mubarak. And since the military was the essence of the Egyptian regime, it is odd to consider this a revolution.

Mubarak and the Regime

The crowd in Cairo, as telegenic as it was, was the backdrop to the drama, not the main feature. The main drama began months ago when it became apparent that Mubarak intended to make his reform-minded 47-year-old son, Gamal, lacking in military service, president of Egypt. This represented a direct challenge to the regime. In a way, Mubarak was the one trying to overthrow the regime.

The Egyptian regime was founded in a coup led by Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser and modeled after that of Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, basing it on the military. It was intended to be a secular regime with democratic elements, but it would be guaranteed and ultimately controlled by the military. Nasser believed that the military was the most modern and progressive element of Egyptian society and that it had to be given the responsibility and power to modernize Egypt.

While Nasser took off his uniform, the military remained the bulwark of the regime. Each successive president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, while formally elected in elections of varying dubiousness, was an officer in the Egyptian military who had removed his uniform when he entered political life.

Mubarak’s decision to name his son represented a direct challenge to the Egyptian regime. Gamal Mubarak was not a career military officer, nor was he linked to the military’s high command, which had been the real power in the regime. Mubarak’s desire to have his son succeed him appalled and enraged the Egyptian military, the defender of the regime. If he were to be appointed, then the military regime would be replaced by, in essence, a hereditary monarchy — what had ruled Egypt before the military. Large segments of the military had been maneuvering to block Mubarak’s ambitions and, with increasing intensity, wanted to see Mubarak step down in order to pave the way for an orderly succession using the elections scheduled for September, elections designed to affirm the regime by selecting a figure acceptable to the senior military men. Mubarak’s insistence on Gamal and his unwillingness to step down created a crisis for the regime. The military feared the regime could not survive Mubarak’s ambitions.

This is the key point to understand. There is a critical distinction between the regime and Hosni Mubarak. The regime consisted — and consists — of complex institutions centered on the military but also including the civilian bureaucracy controlled by the military. Hosni Mubarak was the leader of the regime, successor to Nasser and Sadat, who over time came to distinguish his interests from those of the regime. He was increasingly seen as a threat to the regime, and the regime turned on him.

The demonstrators never called for the downfall of the regime. They demanded that Mubarak step aside. This was the same demand that was being made by many if not most officers in the military months before the crowds gathered in the streets. The military did not like the spectacle of the crowds, which is not the way the military likes to handle political matters. At the same time, paradoxically, the military welcomed the demonstrations, since they created a crisis that put the question of Mubarak’s future on the table. They gave the military an opportunity to save the regime and preserve its own interests.

The Egyptian military is opaque. It isn’t clear who was reluctant to act and who was eager. We would guess that the people who now make up the ruling military council were reluctant to act. They were of the same generation as Hosni Mubarak, owed their careers to him and were his friends. Younger officers, who had joined the military after 1973 and had trained with the Americans rather than the Soviets, were the likely agitators for blocking Mubarak’s selection of Gamal as his heir, but there were also senior officers publicly expressing reservations. Who was on what side is a guess. What is known is that many in the military opposed Gamal, would not push the issue to a coup, and then staged a coup designed to save the regime after the demonstrations in Cairo were under way.

That is the point. What happened was not a revolution. The demonstrators never brought down Mubarak, let alone the regime. What happened was a military coup that used the cover of protests to force Mubarak out of office in order to preserve the regime. When it became clear Feb. 10 that Mubarak would not voluntarily step down, the military staged what amounted to a coup to force his resignation. Once he was forced out of office, the military took over the existing regime by creating a military council and taking control of critical ministries. The regime was always centered on the military. What happened on Feb. 11 was that the military took direct control.

Again, as a guess, the older officers, friends of Mubarak, found themselves under pressure from other officers and the United States to act. They finally did, taking the major positions for themselves. The demonstrations were the backdrop for this drama and the justification for the military’s actions, but they were not a revolution in the streets. It was a military coup designed to preserve a military-dominated regime. And that was what the crowds were demanding as well.

Coup and Revolution

We now face the question of whether the coup will turn into a revolution. The demonstrators demanded — and the military has agreed to hold — genuinely democratic elections and to stop repression. It is not clear that the new leaders mean what they have said or were simply saying it to get the crowds to go home. But there are deeper problems in the democratization of Egypt. First, Mubarak’s repression had wrecked civil society. The formation of coherent political parties able to find and run candidates will take a while. Second, the military is deeply enmeshed in running the country. Backing them out of that position, with the best will in the world, will require time. The military bought time Feb. 13, but it is not clear that six months is enough time, and it is not clear that, in the end, the military will want to leave the position it has held for more than half a century.

Of course, there is the feeling, as there was in 2009 with the Tehran demonstrations, that something unheard of has taken place, as U.S. President Barack Obama has implied. It is said to have something to do with Twitter and Facebook. We should recall that, in our time, genuine revolutions that destroyed regimes took place in 1989 and 1979, the latter even before there were PCs. Indeed, such revolutions go back to the 18th century. None of them required smartphones, and all of them were more thorough and profound than what has happened in Egypt so far. This revolution will not be “Twitterized.” The largest number of protesters arrived in Tahrir Square after the Internet was completely shut down.

The new government has promised to honor all foreign commitments, which obviously include the most controversial one in Egypt, the treaty with Israel. During the celebrations the evening of Feb. 11 and morning of Feb. 12, the two chants were about democracy and Palestine. While the regime committed itself to maintaining the treaty with Israel, the crowds in the square seemed to have other thoughts, not yet clearly defined. But then, it is not clear that the demonstrators in the square represent the wishes of 80 million Egyptians. For all the chatter about the Egyptian people demanding democracy, the fact is that hardly anyone participated in the demonstrations, relative to the number of Egyptians there are, and no one really knows how the Egyptian people would vote on this issue.

The Egyptian government is hardly in a position to confront Israel, even if it wanted to. The Egyptian army has mostly American equipment and cannot function if the Americans don’t provide spare parts or contractors to maintain that equipment. There is no Soviet Union vying to replace the United States today. Re-equipping and training a military the size of Egypt’s is measured in decades, not weeks. Egypt is not going to war any time soon. But then the new rulers have declared that all prior treaties — such as with Israel — will remain in effect.

What Was Achieved?

Therefore, we face this reality. The Egyptian regime is still there, still controlled by old generals. They are committed to the same foreign policy as the man they forced out of office. They have promised democracy, but it is not clear that they mean it. If they mean it, it is not clear how they would do it, certainly not in a timeframe of a few months. Indeed, this means that the crowds may re-emerge demanding more rapid democratization, depending on who organized the crowds in the first place and what their intentions are now.

It is not that nothing happened in Egypt, and it is not that it isn’t important. It is simply that what happened was not what the media portrayed but a much more complex process, most of it not viewable on TV. Certainly, there was nothing unprecedented in what was achieved or how it was achieved. It is not even clear what was achieved. Nor is it clear that anything that has happened changes Egyptian foreign or domestic policy. It is not even clear that those policies could be changed in practical terms regardless of intent.

The week began with an old soldier running Egypt. It ended with different old soldiers running Egypt with even more formal power than Mubarak had. This has caused worldwide shock and awe. We were killjoys in 2009, when we said the Iranians revolution wasn’t going anywhere. We do not want to be killjoys now, since everyone is so excited and happy. But we should point out that, in spite of the crowds, nothing much has really happened yet in Egypt. It doesn’t mean that it won’t, but it hasn’t yet.

An 82-year-old man has been thrown out of office, and his son will not be president. The constitution and parliament are gone and a military junta is in charge. The rest is speculation.

Egypt: The Distance Between Enthusiasm and Reality is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

US State Dept Report on exploitative treatment of Foreign expat contract workers in USA's Middle East Embassies - Muscat comes out relatively well.

An interesting recent report by the The Middle East Regional Office (MERO) of the US State Deptartment's Office of Inspector General (OIG) was released last week, titled:

Performance Evaluation of Department of State Contracts to Assess the Risk of Trafficking in Persons Violations in Four States in the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.
Report Number MERO-I-11-06, January 2011

The Muscat US Embassy's gardening and cleaning contractors come out of the report relatively well. In fact, Muscat has the best paid cleaners and gardeners in the GCC, getting 140 rials a month (around US$363.63), the minimum wage for Omani's. There is no official minimum wage for Indian workers in Oman, but its unofficially it's a pitiful 60 rials per month for a 6 day week(US140). Here's the table from the report.



The UAE, Kuwait and Saudi all look terrible, paying less than US$6 per day.

Of course, that's what many Omani and Expat families pay their maids in Oman.

And pity the Sri Lankan gardeners in Saudi - almost half that.

The Embassy in Muscat also had a 'best practice' in the report when the Omani contractor - as per usual - was illegally keeping their passports, they got them access by installing a safe...

...Gardeners in Muscat, Oman were able to access their passports after the GSO requested that the contractor provide a small, secure safe in offices adjacent to workers’ housing. Janitors at Embassy Muscat also reported they signed a release allowing the contractor to hold their passports with the written understanding that they could retrieve them at any time. ...

Worryingly, most workers had paid large sums to agents to bring them to the Middle East. Most workers end up working for more than a year to repay these amounts, usually borrowed at high interest rates. Also, Muscat's workers had about the smallest living space: just 37.5 sq ft each (a space of just 1m x 3.5m). However, it was clean and had a cafeteria at least.

...
In Muscat, the gardeners bunk in a large work camp adjacent to the contractor’s administrative offices. Although personal space is very limited around workers’ bunks, OIG observed ample and regularly maintained common areas for recreation and dining. For example, the sanitary central kitchen shown in Figure 8 (see previous page) is staffed by the contractor and serves meals to 350 workers. The kitchen has a 48-seat adjoining cafeteria and includes several safety and hygiene features.
...
The gardening contract for Embassy Muscat includes a letter of assurance from the contractor stating it will provide to each worker basic and overtime minimum wages (set by the workers’ countries of origin), food, accommodation, medical care, and paid leave every 2 years. Line-by-line cost comparison worksheets detail how each worker’s salary and benefits will be adjusted under a renewed contract. Contract deliverables include attestations from foreign embassies that all labor agreements are legitimate, labor rights policy certification from the Omani Government, and a requirement that employees individually present their passports upon starting the job as evidence that they have not been coerced.

You can even read the declassified 2010 'report card' on the performance of the Muscat US Embassy by the OIG here. The Ambassador got an A, by the way, doing "an excellent job in advancing U.S. interests in Oman and strengthening this important bilateral relationship."


In other news, another oil tanker was hijacked "off the coast of Oman" (although please note by this they mean 350 MILES off the coast!). Calling this off the Omani coast is pretty unfair. It makes Oman look like a hotbed of piracy. The coast of India is probably closer.

Perhaps the Iranian/Omani joint navel exercises in the Gulf of Oman could be more usefully deployed a bit further East?

Just a suggestion chaps.

Iran and Oman hold joint military drills
Tehran Times Political Desk

TEHRAN – Iran and Oman started joint war games in the Sea of Oman on Wednesday.

Four fleets of warships, three jet fighters and a costal helicopter from Oman and four fleets of warships from Iran were used during the war game. Members of the two countries’ joint military committees were present at the event.

The goal of the war game is to increase the level of regional cooperation between the two countries and share experience.

The two countries are scheduled to hold such military exercises in Iran and Oman’s waters every year.

The third joint war game will be held in Iran’s waters during the next Iranian calendar’s year (starting on March 21)

US Embassy Muscat and Secretary of State Clinton respond to Wikileaks

The wikileaks story rages across the world over the weekend. While the New York times and other reputable international media companies (The Guardian, El Pais, Le Monde...) were given a preview of the whole dataset, we are only able to access them as they are released piecemeal by wikileaks (so far just 290 out of 251,287).

Unfortunately there were no new Muscat cables in the second or third wikileaks installments.

I also was amused that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is as annoyed as the Americans over the first round of leaks, and was forced to call the leaks a hoax & conspiracy by the US that's all directed at Iran, because all neighbouring contries like him and want him to be their bestest friend. Yeah. What a joker he is. Perhaps he read my earlier disclaimer that in this tinker tailor soldier spy vs spy situation, all sorts of things are possible. Is this defector really a defector, or a double agent? Is the information real, or planted disinformation, or a mix of both? Is Iran really funding Shia 5th columnists and developing nuclear weapons?

In this specific case, however, it seems clear that Iran has been pissing off a lot of the Gulf countries for some time, and everybody believes they have a covert programme ongoing to develop nuclear arms and associated delivery systems. Thus the cables show it has been the USA who has been the one holding back from aggressive military action, while Saudi, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt and Kuwait all have had enough of Iran's meddling in their internal affairs and urged the US to act, and act quickly. The Gulf States argument has been that because no amount of UN or US/EU sanctions and arm-twisting will ever divert the Iranians from nuking up, it's the lesser of 2 evils to strike them now rather than wait and let the Iranians stall long enough to get the bomb.

The Gulf Governments and their media have all been totally quiet about this aspect of the leaks so far, not surprisingly. I haven't seen any Oman specific stuff reported in Omani papers either, although Times of Oman did print the Reuters feed highlighting how Saudi Arabia was urging the US to attack.

So, with all this going on (and note this is just from the first 0.1% of cables released to date), Muscat Confidential asked the local US Embassy for their comment on the leaks.

Patricia Attkisson, new Public Affairs Officer at the United States Embassy Muscat, was kind enough to promptly sent me this official statement:

"Dear Dragon,

As a matter of policy the Department of State does not comment on materials, including classified documents, that may have been leaked. However, I can certainly state that our relationship with Oman will continue to be as strong as ever, based on mutual respect and common goals."

Fair enough. Patricia has only recently transferred from a previous stint in Jamaica, so a warm welcome to Oman Pat!

Her boss, America's Secretary of State Hillary Clinton couldn't get away with just that short a response with the press in Washington however, and made a comprehensive statement yesterday, which I thought I'd share. It's the longest 'no comment about something someone won't discuss' that I've seen for a while.


Photo: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, not commenting on or confirming what are alleged to be stolen State Department cables.

Secretary Clinton on Wikileaks
By Hillary Clinton

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, good afternoon. Do we have enough room in here? I want to take a moment to discuss the recent news reports of classified documents that were illegally provided from United States Government computers. In my conversations with counterparts from around the world over the past few days, and in my meeting earlier today with Foreign Minister Davutoglu of Turkey, I have had very productive discussions on this issue.

The United States strongly condemns the illegal disclosure of classified information. It puts people's lives in danger, threatens our national security, and undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems. This Administration is advancing a robust foreign policy that is focused on advancing America's national interests and leading the world in solving the most complex challenges of our time, from fixing the global economy, to thwarting international terrorism, to stopping the spread of catastrophic weapons, to advancing human rights and universal values. In every country and in every region of the world, we are working with partners to pursue these aims.

So let's be clear: this disclosure is not just an attack on America's foreign policy interests. It is an attack on the international community - the alliances and partnerships, the conversations and negotiations, that safeguard global security and advance economic prosperity.

I am confident that the partnerships that the Obama Administration has worked so hard to build will withstand this challenge. The President and I have made these partnerships a priority - and we are proud of the progress that they have helped achieve - and they will remain at the center of our efforts.

I will not comment on or confirm what are alleged to be stolen State Department cables. But I can say that the United States deeply regrets the disclosure of any information that was intended to be confidential, including private discussions between counterparts or our diplomats' personal assessments and observations. I want to make clear that our official foreign policy is not set through these messages, but here in Washington. Our policy is a matter of public record, as reflected in our statements and our actions around the world.

I would also add that to the American people and to our friends and partners, I want you to know that we are taking aggressive steps to hold responsible those who stole this information. I have directed that specific actions be taken at the State Department, in addition to new security safeguards at the Department of Defense and elsewhere to protect State Department information so that this kind of breach cannot and does not ever happen again.

Relations between governments aren't the only concern created by the publication of this material. U.S. diplomats meet with local human rights workers, journalists, religious leaders, and others outside of governments who offer their own candid insights. These conversations also depend on trust and confidence. For example, if an anti-corruption activist shares information about official misconduct, or a social worker passes along documentation of sexual violence, revealing that person's identity could have serious repercussions: imprisonment, torture, even death.

So whatever are the motives in disseminating these documents, it is clear that releasing them poses real risks to real people, and often to the very people who have dedicated their own lives to protecting others.

Now, I am aware that some may mistakenly applaud those responsible, so I want to set the record straight: There is nothing laudable about endangering innocent people, and there is nothing brave about sabotaging the peaceful relations between nations on which our common security depends.

There have been examples in history in which official conduct has been made public in the name of exposing wrongdoings or misdeeds. This is not one of those cases. In contrast, what is being put on display in this cache of documents is the fact that American diplomats are doing the work we expect them to do. They are helping identify and prevent conflicts before they start. They are working hard every day to solve serious practical problems - to secure dangerous materials, to fight international crime, to assist human rights defenders, to restore our alliances, to ensure global economic stability. This is the role that America plays in the world. This is the role our diplomats play in serving America. And it should make every one of us proud.

The work of our diplomats doesn't just benefit Americans, but also billions of others around the globe. In addition to endangering particular individuals, disclosures like these tear at the fabric of the proper function of responsible government.

People of good faith understand the need for sensitive diplomatic communications, both to protect the national interest and the global common interest. Every country, including the United States, must be able to have candid conversations about the people and nations with whom they deal. And every country, including the United States, must be able to have honest, private dialogue with other countries about issues of common concern. I know that diplomats around the world share this view - but this is not unique to diplomacy. In almost every profession - whether it's law or journalism, finance or medicine or academia or running a small business - people rely on confidential communications to do their jobs. We count on the space of trust that confidentiality provides. When someone breaches that trust, we are all worse off for it. And so despite some of the rhetoric we've heard these past few days, confidential communications do not run counter to the public interest. They are fundamental to our ability to serve the public interest.

In America, we welcome genuine debates about pressing questions of public policy. We have elections about them. That is one of the greatest strengths of our democracy. It is part of who we are and it is a priority for this Administration. But stealing confidential documents and then releasing them without regard for the consequences does not serve the public good, and it is not the way to engage in a healthy debate.

In the past few days, I have spoken with many of my counterparts around the world, and we have all agreed that we will continue to focus on the issues and tasks at hand. In that spirit, President Obama and I remain committed to productive cooperation with our partners as we seek to build a better, more prosperous world for all.

Thank you, and I'd be glad to take a few questions.

MR. CROWLEY: We'll begin with Charlie Wolfson of CBS in his last week here covering the State Department.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Where are you going, Charlie?

QUESTION: I'll (inaudible) into the sunset, but let me get to a question.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes, sir. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, are you embarrassed by these leaks personally, professionally? And what harm have the leaks done to the U.S. so far that you can determine from talking to your colleagues?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Charlie, as I said in my statement, and based on the many conversations that I've had with my counterparts, I am confident that the partnerships and relationships that we have built in this Administration will withstand this challenge. The President and I have made these partnerships a priority, a real centerpiece of our foreign policy, and we're proud of the progress that we have made over the last 22 months.

Every single day, U.S. Government representatives from the entire government, not just from the State Department, engage with hundreds if not thousands of government representatives and members of civil society from around the world. They carry out the goals and the interests and the values of the United States. And it is imperative that we have candid reporting from those who are in the field working with their counterparts in order to inform our decision-making back here in Washington.

I can tell you that in my conversations, at least one of my counterparts said to me, "Well, don't worry about it. You should see what we say about you." (Laughter.) So I think that this is well understood in the diplomatic community as part of the give-and-take. And I would hope that we will be able to move beyond this and back to the business of working together on behalf of our common goals.

MR. CROWLEY: Kim Ghattas of BBC.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Kim.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, I was wondering whether you could tell us what you think your upcoming trip is going to look like. Presumably, a lot of the people who have been mentioned in those alleged cables are going to have conversations with you. Do you think it's going to cause you discomfort over the coming week as you engage in conversations with those leaders?

And I know you don't want to comment on the particulars of the cables, but one issue that has been brought up into the daylight is the debate about Iran. What do you think the impact is going to be of those documents on the debate about Iran in the coming weeks and months?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Kim, you're right. And I don't know if you're going on this trip or not, but we will be seeing dozens of my counterparts in Astana, and then as I go on from Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and then ending up in Bahrain for the Manama dialogue. And I will continue the conversations that I have started with some in person and over the phone over the last days, and I will seek out others because I want personally to impress upon them the importance that I place on the kind of open, productive discussions that we have had to date and my intention to continue working closely with them.

Obviously, this is a matter of great concern, because we don't want anyone in any of the countries that could be affected by these alleged leaks here to have any doubts about our intentions and our about commitments. That's why I stressed in my remarks that policy is made in Washington. The President and I have been very clear about our goals and objectives in dealing with the full range of global challenges that we face. And we will continue to be so and we will continue to look for every opportunity to work with our friends and partners and allies around the world and to deal in a very clear-eyed way with those with whom we have differences, which of course brings me to Iran.

I think that it should not be a surprise to anyone that Iran is a source of great concern not only in the United States, that what comes through in every meeting that I have anywhere in the world is a concern about Iranian actions and intentions. So if anything, any of the comments that are being reported on allegedly from the cables confirm the fact that Iran poses a very serious threat in the eyes of many of her neighbors, and a serious concern far beyond her region.

That is why the international community came together to pass the strongest possible sanctions against Iran. It did not happen because the United States went out and said, "Please do this for us." It happened because countries, once they evaluated the evidence concerning Iran's actions and intentions, reached the same conclusion that the United States reached - that we must do whatever we can to muster the international community to take action to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state.

So if anyone reading the stories about these alleged cables thinks carefully, what they will conclude is that the concern about Iran is well founded, widely shared, and will continue to be at the source of the policy that we pursue with likeminded nations to try to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

MR. CROWLEY: We've got to let the Secretary get to her airplane and get to her trip. Thank you very much.

SECRETARY CLINTON: I will leave you in P.J.'s very good hands. Thank you.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, did you talk to anyone in Pakistan or India?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you all.

QUESTION: Thank you, Madam. (Inaudible)

Absentee Landlord? News, gossip and a translated Supreme Court Injunction.

Dearest readers. I can be a LAZY dragon sometimes. Although apparently I was in Spain...

There was just no decent news, and it was HOT, and... Nawras have decided to block all encrypted VPNs for some reason, so I had to go back to hated OmanHel. This is the life.

I was also busy at work, earning treasure for my lords and masters at the Ministry. They fortunately took my advice about avoiding the British Petroleum call option, at least for the moment, and saved a few squillion as BP's share price subsequently proceeded to continue to plummet harder than an oil drenched pelican. This is how one earns a crust, dear friends. (But, if you're interested, next week may be a good time to strike, if you're rich, diversified and of a speculative mood.)

So, what's been happening here in Oman?

Well, the Abu Dhabi royal family sorted out their ownership of Blue City's most influential bonds, and celebrated with a mini-PR campaign celebrating the news in Abu Dhabi royal family controlled newspaper The National. Naturally.
All great news for Oman, obviously, and the press flurry included a delightful puff piece by normally quite solid reporter Bradley Hope on the tribulations of poor CEO Richard Russel and how it was all doomed before he even started. Wonderful.

More to come next week on Blue City, as there is lots of stuff settling down behind the scenes on-going, what with Bahraini co-initiators of the project AAJH now backed by also rather flush Qatar, Blue City forced to post loads of interesting documents and letters by the insurers of Anees' vast debt, and AAJH securing an injunction from the Omani Supreme Court while the lawyers do battle again as to who owns the almost bankrupt development holding company...

Supreme Court ---- Judicial decision
Issued at the session on Wednesday, 21st, June, 2010.

From the Supreme Court (Trading Department)

Formed of vice-chairman of the court, attorney Khalifa bin Muhammad bin Abdullah Al Hadhramy, the membership of lawyers;

D. Muhammad Salih Muhammad Sayid Ahmad
Ahmad bin Ayashy Al Jandoobi
Muhammad Jamal Al Deen Sulaiman
Kamal Amin Abd Al Nabi
And Secretary Thabit bin Said Al Humaidi

(Firstly) to look into the request for a stay of the ruling presented in the appeal No. 90/2010 in Verdict No. 349/2008 by appellants:

Oriental and African Strategic Investment Services, Ltd
OASIS Middle East Holding Company, Ltd
Represented by attorney Mona Tahir Ahmad Amer from Qays Al Qasimy and Mona Amer Lawyers and Legal Consultancy Office.

Appealed against:

Al-Zawbaa Company (LLC) represented by Yassir Al Salami and his Associates Lawyers and Legal Consultancy office.

(Secondly) to look into the request for a stay of the ruling presented in the appeal No. 95/2010 in Verdict No. 349/2008 by appellant:
Al-Zawbaa Company (LLC) represented by attorney Yassir bin Obaid bin Mosa Al Salami from Yassir Al Salami and his Associates Lawyers and Legal Consultancy Office.

Appealed againt:
Oriental and African Strategic Investment Services, Ltd
OASIS Middle East Holding Company, Ltd
AAJ Holdings Company represented by Qays Al Qasimy and Mona Amer Lawyers and Legal Consultancy Office.

(Thirdly) to look into the request for a stay of the ruling presented in the appeal No. 98/2010 in Verdict No. 349/2008 by appellant:
AAJ Holdings Company represented by attorney Ez Al Deen Muhammad Othman Al Sharif from Salim Al Suneidy and Ali Al Kasby and Associates Lawyers and Legal Consultancy Office.

After review of appeal papers, it is discerned that the grounds on which the request for a stay of the ruling is based are serious. Thereby, it is difficult to remedy the grave danger in case the ruling is performed prior to the decision subject to the appeal. Consequently, a temporary stay of the ruling will be granted, in accordance with Article (245) in the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, by all appellants except Oriental and African Strategic Investment Services, Ltd for its appeal is not accepted due to removing it without a capacity (according to the document by the notary public in the UK which confirms that Mr. John Willoughby Giles Catchpole is the director of Oriental and African Strategic Investment Services, Ltd, which is different from the appellant, as well as that the power of attorney of the company’s attorney is not signed by Mr. John Willoughby Giles Catchpole. The signature attributed to Mr. John Willoughby is set in a paper independent of the power of attorney, which lessens the validity of it.

For the reasons aforementioned:
The court ordered to suspend the ruling of the impugned decision for appellants Al-Zawbaa Company in appeal No. (95/2010) and AAJ Holdings in appeal No. (98/2010), as well as appellant OASIS Middle East Holding Company, Ltd in only appeal No. (90/2010), pending a decision on appeal and the legal proceedings.
Rejected the request for a stay of the ruling presented by appellant Oriental and African Strategic Investment Services, Ltd. The request expenses are imposed on the appellant.

So a hint of promise for AAJH. Their new lawyer (Saddam Hussein's ex-defense brief) will now at least get a chance to enhance his reputation.

Meanwhile,

HM has been on a visit to Kuwait.

Photo: HM meets the Emir of Kuwait. The party scene at the Emir's pad near Ras Madrakka is probably not HM's sort-a gig... (ripped form the Observer)

It would probably have been easier for him to meet the Emir of Kuwait while he was on one of his very regular (every few weeks or so) private visits to his shag tranquil palace in the south of Oman coast. It seems the tedious constraints of life in Kuwait are not applied in Oman, so cue boats, broads and booze mango juice in his personal paparazzi-free party pad. He flies straight down in his private jet to lands at PDO's nice new airport in Marmul, apparently.

Who can blame him?


In oil and Gas news, yet another new operator decided to quit Oman, with Aussie battlers Oilex deciding to exit Block 56 in south Oman, claiming bigger fish to fry. Sad. They have such cute accents.

The story on BG's exit (broken here) eventually made the mainstream media too.

HE Jashmi, Undersec at the MOG, was quoted in Reuters today that, surprise surprise, 100% Omani Government owned and EP Operator wannabe Oman Oil was "in discussions with the MOG" on taking over the block where BG has proven has lots of (expensive, hard to produce) gas.

As the Deputy Chairman of Oman Oil Co is also, as it happens, the Minister of Oil and Gas, HE Dr. Rumhy, that must have been a rather schizophrenic discussion... LOL. Like I said, expect a deal involving using the gas to develop some heavy oil elsewhere soon... You heard it here first folks.


Finally,
Is Israel about to hit Iran? There are reliable reports they have secured a Saudi air corridor. There does seem to be a concerning flurry of diplomacy readers.

I do hope not... But then one can hardly predict the Israelis... Advice: Avoid Thumrait and Masirah, and secured high bits of Mussandam, for the next few weeks.

Just a thought!

Iran vs USA: Stratfor Analysis

I do appreciate the analysis provided by Stratfor. Here's their article today about 'The Iranian problem'. You may find it interesting. It doesn't mention Oman, and that I also find interesting.

Oman will play a key role in any détente between the US and Iran. Oman is the only country with serious and respectful long-term relationships with both countries. Given the unattractiveness of a military option, and the likely futility of sanctions (unless China can be convinced to support them, which is unlikely), I agree that it is in the best long term interest of America to gradually allow an easing of tensions, while extending the US nuclear umbrella to the Gulf States and emphasising the tried and trusty doctrine of MAD [Mutually Assured Destruction], or in this case, IAD (Iran's Assured Destruction) should they ever use those nukes or provide them to Hezbollah.

As most young Iranians actually support the US, and a significant proportion of their elders do to (or already live there), in the long term the US would be assured of achieving their strategic aims. And their oil firms and other companies could make a nice buck in the meantime.

Thinking About the Unthinkable: A U.S.-Iranian Deal

March 1, 2010
By George Friedman

The United States apparently has reached the point where it must either accept that Iran will develop nuclear weapons at some point if it wishes, or take military action to prevent this. There is a third strategy, however: Washington can seek to redefine the Iranian question.

As we have no idea what leaders on either side are thinking, exploring this represents an exercise in geopolitical theory. Let’s begin with the two apparent stark choices.

Diplomacy vs. the Military Option
The diplomatic approach consists of creating a broad coalition prepared to impose what have been called crippling sanctions on Iran. Effective sanctions must be so painful that they compel the target to change its behavior. In Tehran’s case, this could only consist of blocking Iran’s imports of gasoline. Iran imports 35 percent of the gasoline it consumes. It is not clear that a gasoline embargo would be crippling, but it is the only embargo that might work. All other forms of sanctions against Iran would be mere gestures designed to give the impression that something is being done.

The Chinese will not participate in any gasoline embargo. Beijing gets 11 percent of its oil from Iran, and it has made it clear it will continue to deliver gasoline to Iran. Moscow’s position is that Russia might consider sanctions down the road, but it hasn’t specified when, and it hasn’t specified what. The Russians are more than content seeing the U.S. bogged down in the Middle East and so are not inclined to solve American problems in the region. With the Chinese and Russians unlikely to embargo gasoline, these sanctions won’t create significant pain for Iran. Since all other sanctions are gestures, the diplomatic approach is therefore unlikely to work.

The military option has its own risks. First, its success depends on the quality of intelligence on Iran’s nuclear facilities and on the degree of hardening of those targets. Second, it requires successful air attacks. Third, it requires battle damage assessments that tell the attacker whether the strike succeeded. Fourth, it requires follow-on raids to destroy facilities that remain functional. And fifth, attacks must do more than simply set back Iran’s program a few months or even years: If the risk of a nuclear Iran is great enough to justify the risks of war, the outcome must be decisive.

Each point in this process is a potential failure point. Given the multiplicity of these points — which includes others not mentioned — failure may not be an option, but it is certainly possible.

But even if the attacks succeed, the question of what would happen the day after the attacks remains. Iran has its own counters. It has a superbly effective terrorist organization, Hezbollah, at its disposal. It has sufficient influence in Iraq to destabilize that country and force the United States to keep forces in Iraq badly needed elsewhere. And it has the ability to use mines and missiles to attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf shipping lanes for some period — driving global oil prices through the roof while the global economy is struggling to stabilize itself. Iran’s position on its nuclear program is rooted in the awareness that while it might not have assured options in the event of a military strike, it has counters that create complex and unacceptable risks. Iran therefore does not believe the United States will strike or permit Israel to strike, as the consequences would be unacceptable.

To recap, the United States either can accept a nuclear Iran or risk an attack that might fail outright, impose only a minor delay on Iran’s nuclear program or trigger extremely painful responses even if it succeeds. When neither choice is acceptable, it is necessary to find a third choice.

Redefining the Iranian Problem
As long as the problem of Iran is defined in terms of its nuclear program, the United States is in an impossible place. Therefore, the Iranian problem must be redefined. One attempt at redefinition involves hope for an uprising against the current regime. We will not repeat our views on this in depth, but in short, we do not regard these demonstrations to be a serious threat to the regime. Tehran has handily crushed them, and even if they did succeed, we do not believe they would produce a regime any more accommodating toward the United States. The idea of waiting for a revolution is more useful as a justification for inaction — and accepting a nuclear Iran — than it is as a strategic alternative.

At this moment, Iran is the most powerful regional military force in the Persian Gulf. Unless the United States permanently stations substantial military forces in the region, there is no military force able to block Iran. Turkey is more powerful than Iran, but it is far from the Persian Gulf and focused on other matters at the moment, and it doesn’t want to take on Iran militarily — at least not for a very long time. At the very least, this means the United States cannot withdraw from Iraq. Baghdad is too weak to block Iran from the Arabian Peninsula, and the Iraqi government has elements friendly toward Iran.

Historically, regional stability depended on the Iraqi-Iranian balance of power. When it tottered in 1990, the result was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The United States did not push into Iraq in 1991 because it did not want to upset the regional balance of power by creating a vacuum in Iraq. Rather, U.S. strategy was to re-establish the Iranian-Iraqi balance of power to the greatest extent possible, as the alternative was basing large numbers of U.S. troops in the region.

The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 assumed that once the Baathist regime was destroyed the United States would rapidly create a strong Iraqi government that would balance Iran. The core mistake in this thinking lay in failing to recognize that the new Iraqi government would be filled with Shiites, many of whom regarded Iran as a friendly power. Rather than balancing Iran, Iraq could well become an Iranian satellite. The Iranians strongly encouraged the American invasion precisely because they wanted to create a situation where Iraq moved toward Iran’s orbit. When this in fact began happening, the Americans had no choice but an extended occupation of Iraq, a trap both the Bush and Obama administrations have sought to escape.

It is difficult to define Iran’s influence in Iraq at this point. But at a minimum, while Iran may not be able to impose a pro-Iranian state on Iraq, it has sufficient influence to block the creation of any strong Iraqi government either through direct influence in the government or by creating destabilizing violence in Iraq. In other words, Iran can prevent Iraq from emerging as a counterweight to Iran, and Iran has every reason to do this. Indeed, it is doing just this.

The Fundamental U.S.-Iranian Issue
Iraq, not nuclear weapons, is the fundamental issue between Iran and the United States. Iran wants to see a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq so Iran can assume its place as the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf. The United States wants to withdraw from Iraq because it faces challenges in Afghanistan — where it will also need Iranian cooperation — and elsewhere. Committing forces to Iraq for an extended period of time while fighting in Afghanistan leaves the United States exposed globally. Events involving China or Russia — such as the 2008 war in Georgia — would see the United States without a counter. The alternative would be a withdrawal from Afghanistan or a massive increase in U.S. armed forces. The former is not going to happen any time soon, and the latter is an economic impossibility.

Therefore, the United States must find a way to counterbalance Iran without an open-ended deployment in Iraq and without expecting the re-emergence of Iraqi power, because Iran is not going to allow the latter to happen. The nuclear issue is simply an element of this broader geopolitical problem, as it adds another element to the Iranian tool kit. It is not a stand-alone issue.

The United States has an interesting strategy in redefining problems that involves creating extraordinarily alliances with mortal ideological and geopolitical enemies to achieve strategic U.S. goals. First consider Franklin Roosevelt’s alliance with Stalinist Russia to block Nazi Germany. He pursued this alliance despite massive political outrage not only from isolationists but also from institutions like the Roman Catholic Church that regarded the Soviets as the epitome of evil.

Now consider Richard Nixon’s decision to align with China at a time when the Chinese were supplying weapons to North Vietnam that were killing American troops. Moreover, Mao — who had said he did not fear nuclear war as China could absorb a few hundred million deaths — was considered, with reason, quite mad. Nevertheless, Nixon, as anti-Communist and anti-Chinese a figure as existed in American politics, understood that an alliance (and despite the lack of a formal treaty, alliance it was) with China was essential to counterbalance the Soviet Union at a time when American power was still being sapped in Vietnam.

Roosevelt and Nixon both faced impossible strategic situations unless they were prepared to redefine the strategic equation dramatically and accept the need for alliance with countries that had previously been regarded as strategic and moral threats. American history is filled with opportunistic alliances designed to solve impossible strategic dilemmas. The Stalin and Mao cases represent stunning alliances with prior enemies designed to block a third power seen as more dangerous.

It is said that Ahmadinejad is crazy. It was also said that Mao and Stalin were crazy, in both cases with much justification. Ahmadinejad has said many strange things and issued numerous threats. But when Roosevelt ignored what Stalin said and Nixon ignored what Mao said, they each discovered that Stalin’s and Mao’s actions were far more rational and predictable than their rhetoric. Similarly, what the Iranians say and what they do are quite different.

U.S. vs. Iranian Interests
Consider the American interest. First, it must maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. The United States cannot tolerate interruptions, and that limits the risks it can take. Second, it must try to keep any one power from controlling all of the oil in the Persian Gulf, as that would give such a country too much long-term power within the global system. Third, while the United States is involved in a war with elements of the Sunni Muslim world, it must reduce the forces devoted to that war. Fourth, it must deal with the Iranian problem directly. Europe will go as far as sanctions but no further, while the Russians and Chinese won’t even go that far yet. Fifth, it must prevent an Israeli strike on Iran for the same reasons it must avoid a strike itself, as the day after any Israeli strike will be left to the United States to manage.

Now consider the Iranian interest. First, it must guarantee regime survival. It sees the United States as dangerous and unpredictable. In less than 10 years, it has found itself with American troops on both its eastern and western borders. Second, it must guarantee that Iraq will never again be a threat to Iran. Third, it must increase its authority within the Muslim world against Sunni Muslims, whom it regards as rivals and sometimes as threats.

Now consider the overlaps. The United States is in a war against some (not all) Sunnis. These are Iran’s enemies, too. Iran does not want U.S. troops along its eastern and western borders. In point of fact, the United States does not want this either. The United States does not want any interruption of oil flow through Hormuz. Iran much prefers profiting from those flows to interrupting them. Finally, the Iranians understand that it is the United States alone that is Iran’s existential threat. If Iran can solve the American problem its regime survival is assured. The United States understands, or should, that resurrecting the Iraqi counterweight to Iran is not an option: It is either U.S. forces in Iraq or accepting Iran’s unconstrained role.

Therefore, as an exercise in geopolitical theory, consider the following. Washington’s current options are unacceptable. By redefining the issue in terms of dealing with the consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there are three areas of mutual interest. First, both powers have serious quarrels with Sunni Islam. Second, both powers want to see a reduction in U.S. forces in the region. Third, both countries have an interest in assuring the flow of oil, one to use the oil, the other to profit from it to increase its regional power.

The strategic problem is, of course, Iranian power in the Persian Gulf. The Chinese model is worth considering here. China issued bellicose rhetoric before and after Nixon’s and Kissinger’s visits. But whatever it did internally, it was not a major risk-taker in its foreign policy. China’s relationship with the United States was of critical importance to China. Beijing fully understood the value of this relationship, and while it might continue to rail about imperialism, it was exceedingly careful not to undermine this core interest.

The major risk of the third strategy is that Iran will overstep its bounds and seek to occupy the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. Certainly, this would be tempting, but it would bring a rapid American intervention. The United States would not block indirect Iranian influence, however, from financial participation in regional projects to more significant roles for the Shia in Arabian states. Washington’s limits for Iranian power are readily defined and enforced when exceeded.

The great losers in the third strategy, of course, would be the Sunnis in the Arabian Peninsula. But Iraq aside, they are incapable of defending themselves, and the United States has no long-term interest in their economic and political relations. So long as the oil flows, and no single power directly controls the entire region, the United States does not have a stake in this issue.

Israel would also be enraged. It sees ongoing American-Iranian hostility as a given. And it wants the United States to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. But eliminating this threat is not an option given the risks, so the choice is a nuclear Iran outside some structured relationship with the United States or within it. The choice that Israel might want, a U.S.-Iranian conflict, is unlikely. Israel can no more drive American strategy than can Saudi Arabia.

From the American standpoint, an understanding with Iran would have the advantage of solving an increasingly knotty problem. In the long run, it would also have the advantage of being a self-containing relationship. Turkey is much more powerful than Iran and is emerging from its century-long shell. Its relations with the United States are delicate. The United States would infuriate the Turks by doing this deal, forcing them to become more active faster. They would thus emerge in Iraq as a counterbalance to Iran. But Turkey’s anger at the United States would serve U.S. interests. The Iranian position in Iraq would be temporary, and the United States would not have to break its word as Turkey eventually would eliminate Iranian influence in Iraq.

Ultimately, the greatest shock of such a maneuver on both sides would be political. The U.S.-Soviet agreement shocked Americans deeply, the Soviets less so because Stalin’s pact with Hitler had already stunned them. The Nixon-Mao entente shocked all sides. It was utterly unthinkable at the time, but once people on both sides thought about it, it was manageable.

Such a maneuver would be particularly difficult for U.S. President Barack Obama, as it would be widely interpreted as another example of weakness rather than as a ruthless and cunning move. A military strike would enhance his political standing, while an apparently cynical deal would undermine it. Ahmadinejad could sell such a deal domestically much more easily. In any event, the choices now are a nuclear Iran, extended airstrikes with all their attendant consequences, or something else. This is what something else might look like and how it would fit in with American strategic tradition.

This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR

Oman denies denying offer of Patriot Anti-Ballistic Missiles. Secretary general Ministry of Foreign Affairs misses the memo

Great press release yesterday from Sayyid Badr bin Hamad bin Hamoud Al Busaidi, the Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, denying Oman had denied an offer from the USA of some new generation Patriot Missiles.

Fair enough. Iran and Oman have long maintained cordial relations. And it's true that Oman was most concerned a couple of years ago that the US not stage attacks against Iran from the US 4 airbases based in Oman (Thumrait, Masirah, Seeb and Al-Masanah). Supposedly that's why good ol' Dick Cheney dropped by, to assuage HM's concerns as things were getting extra-tense.

The Iranians would be nuts to lob missiles at Oman. Not only would Thumrait be rather hard to hit, the Patriots would be unlikely to offer too much protection and the bases have hardened bunkers for the planes anyhow.

So either we don't need them because the Iranians will not fire on us, or we don't need them because they would be ineffective if they did fire. A few Aegis ships in the Gulf of Oman and around the Straights of Hormuz can do the job if required to say, protect the big radar installation in Mussandam, without us needing to draw a big target on ourselves with a measly couple of Patriot batteries. The US military assets in the countries that allegedly have accepted Patriots are host to some serious and more vulnerable US kit, like the 5th Fleet. It's rather hard to put an aircraft carrier in a hardened concrete and steel bunker.

Oman and the US military relationship is described at Global Security.org

As the US State dept says "U.S.-Omani relations were deepened in 1980 by the conclusion of two important agreements. One provided access to Omani military facilities by U.S. forces under agreed-upon conditions. "

Photo: Sayyid Al Busaidi, addressing the IAEA (file photo)

It seems pretty obvious that these conditions are along the lines of 'no attacking GCC or Iran'.

However it is common knowledge that the US and the UK based attacks on Iraq from Oman in both Gulf War I and II, and for the attacks on Afganistan (although most ordinary Omani have no idea that the US has big airbases here, nor that Oman was a key staging point for the Gulf wars). In addition, some NATO (and both UK and US military) support for the on-going AFPAK war is based out of Oman.

So perhaps 'the region' in the Ministry's definition does not include Afganistan or Pakistan? And agreeing to host the US airforce and stocks of US war materiel don't count as an alliance.

Ah, of such subtleties is the cloth of Diplomacy woven.

The Ministry's statement is here.

Oman denies receiving any offer from US

Times News Service
02 February 2010 05:52:16 Oman

MUSCAT: The Sultanate yesterday denied that it had received any offer from the United States offering to deploy missile shield in the Gulf against Iran.

This came in response to a report in The New York Times, published on its website on Saturday, indicating that military officials and administrative officials in the Sultanate had rejected this offer, which was apparently accepted by several countries in the Gulf region.

Sayyid Badr bin Hamad bin Hamoud Al Busaidi, secretary general, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that the Sultanate’s position on such matters is fixed and that it does not accept bids from anyone or enter into alliances or axis against any state.

Al Busaidi also stressed that the country does not allow its territory to be used to carry out any military operations against any country in the region.

Patriot missiles
The New York Times, on its website, on Saturday quoted US military and administrative officials as saying that Qatar, the Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait had accepted the deployment of (Patriot) missiles of America in
their territories.

The newspaper quoted a senior official in the US administration, who did not reveal his identity, as saying: “Our first objective is to deter Iranians and the second objective is to reassure Arab countries, so that they do not feel the need for nuclear weapons to defend themselves; there certainly is another factor as well, that is to calm the Israelis.”