Times of Oman revisits a really great story: The Sleazy Massage Parlours of Muscat

How did I miss this great story from... OMG ... The Times of Oman, just published last week on the issue of the Sleazy Massage Parlors of Muscat masquerading as 'health clubs'? [thx SH for the link!]

I mean, it's not often one gets to read a story in the mainstream Oman media that contains things like: Muscat, scantily-clad women, seduction, sexually transmitted diseases, physical needs, sleazy joints and youngsters. OK, they didn't use the words 'happy ending', sex, prostitute, or John, but all in all, a pretty straight story.

I just wish I'd seen some photos.

Photo: Apparently this is not the only pussy that's available in Muscat's 'health clubs'



While TOO's sage advice for people to "verify the credentials of the health club, or you just might encounter something entirely different [than a normal massage]" was, I'm sure, well meaning, I'm now getting even more search requests than normal from hopeful customers in the Sultanate looking especially for those small-time sleazy health clubs / brothels massage parlors The Times alerted them to. Presumably they are looking for the very same "something entirely different" from a scantily clad female 'therapist' that the unmarried man in the article confessed to enjoying often. Such things are, according to the hard-hitting Times, already a "fact of life in Oman".

As such, instead of a mock 'shock horror' story about what is 'a fact of life', a decent independent review of the various establishments might have proved more worthwhile. Prices, services, quality, decor, how warm the hands were, interviews with customers and perhaps the businesses' owners and Omani sponsors, that sort of thing. Just a suggestion. Perhaps Y or the week can do a decent follow-up?

Good to see too that Muscat Municipality, in a rare expression of LGBT friendliness, intends to keep open sleazy massage parlors in the long term, but only for homosexuals and lesbians, as "...workers in a club should be of the same sex as the customer..."

And they say Muscat's a quiet town...

Sleazy massage parlours face closure
FAHAD AL MUKRASHI
Wednesday, March 10, 2010

MUSCAT | A relaxing massage at the end of a hard day can work wonders for that sore back or ease the stiffness in your neck. But what if you walk into an innocuous looking health club and find scantily-clad women offering you something entirely different?

That is exactly what is happening around the city, with sleazy massage parlours in the guise of health clubs mushrooming in and around Muscat. But come May, and the Muscat Municipality is all set to introduce regulations governing health clubs in the Sultanate.

“These health clubs are suddenly as common as grocery stores. There is a sudden fad for getting a ‘massage’,” observes Huzeim Almanei.

Nasir Al Zidi, a teacher, was in for a rude shock when he went to a health club seeking relief from a sore back.

Scantily-clad therapist
“I saw scantily-clad foreigners passing off as therapists. One of them even tried to seduce me. The entire atmosphere was sleazy and what was on offer was anything other than a therapeutic massage,” he says.

Yusuf Al Hatami a government employee avers: “These massage centres have an adverse effect on the youth, and destroy the very fabric of our society.

It is also a fertile ground for spreading sexually transmitted diseases.”

What is more disturbing is the trend of these centres often coming up near residential areas.

Khalil Al Saadi, an engineer, was dismayed to see a teenager trying to sneak into one of these seedy joints. “It’s tough for youngsters to resist the pull of these health clubs. There need to be some sort of monitoring to prevent young people from such activities.”

These special services don’t come cheap either. “Youngsters come and spend a lot of money to avail these services. It’s a vicious circle that they find difficult to break free from,” feels Abdul Rahim Al Balushi, a college student.

There are many health centres with certified professionals that offer genuine services. But many of these centres are getting a bad name thanks to the activities of other centres that are not quite the real thing.

There is another side to the story, however. A fact of life in Oman, in fact!

One person who frequents such sleazy joints confessed to me: “I sometimes sneak into these massage parlours because I am a man and have some physical needs. With the dowry amount skyrocketing, I can’t even imagine ever getting married. The cost of living has also soared. So where is the question of saving to make dowry money? I can’t afford feeding a family and paying the flat rent with my low income.” So what do people like me do?

Health benefits
Sahar, a trained therapist at a health centre points out the health benefits of a proper massage.

“It soothes the body and helps blood circulation. It could even help ease one’s blood pressure. But it is unfortunate that some small-time players are giving us all a bad name.”

Naif Al Shandodi and Saif Al Washahi echoed similar sentiments.

“It’s not fair to label all health clubs shady. There are many certified centres with fully qualified health professionals. However, those that are not should be dealt with severely by the authorities,” he adds.

The authorities are aware of the situation, hence the stricter regime from the month of May. The municipality is all set to introduce stringent regulations to monitor these health clubs.

According to estimates there are more than 230 health clubs in Muscat governorate alone.

A source in the Muscat Municipality says, “We have set a time limit of up to 6 months for these health clubs to modify their conditions consistent with the new regulations, which include separate health clubs for men and women.

He adds: “The new regulation stipulates that workers in a club should be of the same sex as the customer in order to avoid abuse. Also, the workers of these centres need to be certified professionals with genuine diplomas from recognised government-approved centres.”

The municipality has received several complaints from residents living near these health centres about youngsters sneaking into these parlours.

“We are taking these complaints very seriously, and those found violating the existing norms will have punitive measures coming down on them.”

So the next time you step out for a relaxing back rub, do verify the credentials of the health club, or you just might encounter something entirely different.

Guidelines for health clubs:
The masseurs should be qualified, possess diplomas from recognised bodies; the therapists should be of the same sex; there should be separate health clubs for men and women; any complaints from residents in the vicinity will be dealt with severely. — fahadalmakrashi@timesofoman.com

Blue City executes Anees' cunning plan of... bankruptcy. Or, How to blow a billion dollars

In keeping with the theme of financial fraud, Blue City is again in the news.

In UAE newspaper The National today is a nice article on the on-going slow motion financial train wreck that is Blue City.

Black cloud hangs over the future of Oman's Blue City
Bradley Hope
Last Updated: March 12. 2010 1:38AM UAE / March 11. 2010 9:38PM GMT
Blue City, Oman’s largest property development, could be forced into liquidation under plans being considered by the company’s board of directors, The National can reveal.

The board of Al Sawadi Investment and Tourism Company (ASIT), the parent company of the project, last month sent out a notice calling for investors to vote on the “dissolution of the company and filing subsidiaries”. The meeting has since been postponed to Monday.

“The company has lost all of its capital and have no reasonable expectation to meet their debt payment obligations when due,” the letter said. It was signed by Anees Issa al Zadjali, the chairman of ASIT.

Richard Russell, the managing director and chief executive of Blue City’s first phase, said in a statement the meeting had been postponed to allow a restructuring proposal to be made by some bondholders.

“Blue City is pleased to comment that the board meeting has been postponed for a short period to March 15, 2010, since certain Class A note holders have requested time to present a restructuring proposal for consideration by the Blue City shareholders,” Mr Russell said.

“Unlike most projects in the Middle East, our homebuyers in Blue City are secured by mortgage over the project assets of Blue City.”
...

Photo: Annes Al Zedjali, Chairman of a bankrupt company who started out with 32km2 of prime ocean-front real estate and almost a billion dollars in cash.

This has been predicted by Muscat Confidential for some time, with the latest post in January here for example. I continue to expect the scheme will be 'restructured' by the mortgage-backed bond holders, enabling them to get all the land and the works completed to date. GCC money is already coming in to the project. This has been the plan for some time.

Property developing ace and part-time paper boy Chairman Anees Al Zedjali has clearly figured that he's ridden this pony as far as he can, especially now that Bank of NY Mellon have firmly closed the taps. More legal disputes will now be on the way as the tussle between the various bond holders, credit default insurers, escrow account trustee Bank of NY Mellon, shareholders, contractors, sub-contractors and holding companies gets going. The lawyers will pick the bones clean.

Meanwhile, the executives of Blue City and its failed Chairman continue to sit on their fat bank accounts. Remember the project borrowed over $900 million dollars, and has continually pumped itself up on a steam of self agrandising hallucinations. If I was Bank Mellon, the bond insurer or a less secured bond holder I'd be making inquiries as to whether civil or indeed criminal charges should be instigated. There may be no holidays in Florida for Anees for a while...

While publicly the blame will no doubt be laid on the global credit crunch, project delays and AAJH etc etc, probably aided and abetted by support from the pages of Times of Oman, the gross financial mismanagement will presumably be ignored.

Eventually a scaled down phase 1 will be completed, with the hotel, marina, golf course and a load of villas, owned mainly by Kuwaitis, Qataris, Saudis and Iranians. While every businessman in Oman who wants to raise foreign capital, even for a project that's real, will see significantly higher interest payments and a lot less interested lenders. Contractors will factor in higher default risk and counterparty premium. This will damage the entire Oman economy, to an extent. But Anees will be OK.

So that's alright then.

DeVere Oman - Locally somewhat bent "Financial Advisors" - caught engaged in activities outside their license.

** Hi there! Google has brought you here because of the extensive comments section, which is full of stuff about the activities of the De Veer Group of Financial 'advisors'.

In fact, this post has become one of my most popular of all time, because some commentors have said that in many of the internet places similar information has been posted, lawyers from The Group have shut them down. That has not happened here, and I certainly have not experienced anything consistent with such rumours.

So, go read the comments, and feel free to post new ones. If you're interested in Oman, read some other stuff, or even 'like' Muscat Confidential on facebook! **

It's a slow week.

But common knowledge is that local franchise of Global Financial Advisory Giant DeVere Group were totally busted by Inspector Al-Plod a few weeks ago for running yet another Ponzi scheme we caught too late engaging in investment activity beyond the scope of their licence.




Those with children at Muscat British School Muscat probably already knew things were afoot with DeVere. And my sources confirm that the local Omani sponsor of the franchise was also taken into custody to, ahem, "assist with inquiries".

It does however, seem unfortunate that the very man who was parachuted in by DeVere Central Command from Switzerland/London/New York a few months ago, to sort things out, and specifically tasked to deal with the obvious AWOL bonus-driven Ponzi action going on local 'problem', ended up getting arrested and thrown in jail by the ROP, along with the local guy who, let's face it, probably belonged inside from the start.

Really.

That the problem with the local outfit here in little ol' Muscat had been generating a strong enough stench to cross oceans was obvious.

That the guy DeVere Central finally sent out here to "sort it out" on the QT, one Mr. Brent Mayhew, was subsequently temporarily arrested and thrown in detention for a few days, was unfortunate to say the least.

Oops.

Next time chaps, maybe try first engaging with the local ROP/Ministry of Commerce/CBO beforehand ? They can and will help.

That the Omani "sponsor" [he cannot be named, even here at recently blocked MUSCAT CONFIDENTIAL, because of media defamation laws, sorry*] was also totally busted is a great sign. We don't like Ponzi schemes when you get caught.


*try asking Google Oman


(And thanks for the prompt RT)

Want to Advertise on Muscat Confidential? Ethical NGO? Viewing records smashed!

Thanks to YOU dear readers, I must confess, we are smashing internet records here at Muscat Confidential. I never dreamed the rants, gossip and occasional story from Undercover Dragon would prove to be of so great an interest.

Why, you ask?

Well, this week, despite being temporarily banned by the Government, this blog got more than 1000 visitors a day , for the first time ever, AND more than 1800 page views per day**.


Image: This week's Muscat Confidential traffic: Yellow bar is visitors, red bar is 'page views'.



I'm very grateful you all care that much. These are getting to be on-line kind of numbers that even corporate types get excited about in the region, let alone in Oman.

For those outside the GCC Media business, trust me, 1000 people per day on-line in Oman is a big deal. Internet penetration in Oman is at best 3% of a 2 million population (and thats obviously the richest part, and most of those don't speak English).

So, I'm making an incredible offer. To ADVERTISE to these fantastic people.

I'll run your ad here in exchange for providing a significant donation to a charity of my choice.

Let's be honest. My readers are dominated by filthy rich Oman based expats, & educated and sophisticated Anglophile Omanis who are not just highly literate, but who are typically blessed with obscenely rich parents too.

Who could advertise? I'm thinking car sales, banks, restaurants, educational services, recruitment, real estate, mobile phones,...

So. Send me an email. To undercover(dot)dragon(at)gmail(dot)com . Even if you're a small company, or NGO, and think your pitch might fit my readers, hey, who knows? It's not like I'm taking the cash personally.

Make me an offer I can't refuse.

This is a really limited offer, but you can maybe get in now if you're bold!

Meanwhile: If you are an NGO, non-profit, an Official Charity in Oman, or even just have a good idea for how to spend the oodles of cash I'll get from smart advertisers, and you would like to collect some sponsorship, let me know. You too should email me at undercover(dot)dragon(at)gmail(dot)com


Yes, the sky's the limit if only you could advertise on Muscat Confidential.


I have zero interest in taking sponsorship for myself; but maybe I can help an advertiser contribute to your organisation.



** Media types will be amazed to know that average visit length is just short of 4 minutes, documented.

Really. 4 minutes per visitor, 1000 times a day.

Hell, I read the entire local section of Times of Oman in less than 48 seconds...

Human Trafficking, Human Rights, and the thin line: A cautionary tale for wannabe maids.

We all know the shock and embarrassment felt when the annual US State Dept. Report on Human Trafficking demoted Oman to Tier 3 (the lowest level). After a serious tantrum by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supported by the Oman Press and the Official News Agency, the US retrospectively adjusted the rating to Tier 2 Watch List, while the Ministry then finally got around to actually passing a law against human trafficking, arrested some pimps, and held yet more awareness workshops. Now we've even got a Human Rights Commission!

It has often been stated in the press by representatives of His Majesty's Government and their media apologists supporters (like Essa Al Zedjali, Editor in Chief of the hard-hitting Times of Oman), that Oman is a country where fair and equal treatment under the law is the right of all residents, Omani and local alike. And in theory, that's supposedly true.

Only, its not.

So, where is the line between employing a foreign national on terms few of us would ever put up with, vs 'normal for Oman' exploitation, vs effective modern-day slavery?


Photo: The life of a housemaid in Oman can be sometimes brutal. Who's responsible? Image ripped from Desert-69.blogspot.com


Take this story I recently received from a concerned relative of a Filipino housemaid who just arrived in Oman.

Dear Mr. Dragon,
...
My cousin is a female filipino, 35 years old, single, and has 8 family members here for her to support. She is working there in Oman as a domestic helper.

The Filipino agency here does not allow her to photocopy her signed contract here, they only gave it to her before she boards the plane for Oman. Her contract with her Filipino agency is $400 a month(*) and a day off a week, but when she got to Oman she is made by the Oman agency counterpart to sign another contract stating she is not permitted any day off and her monthly wage is reduced to $200. Her employer works at a bank.

She is not allowed to have a cellphone, use the phone or use the mail.

Her employer's wife seized her passport. Her employer told her that Omani law said that without a passport any foreign worker will be put to jail if she goes to the embassy.

She said her employer is good to her but her daily work hours are 5am to 11pm, 7 days a week. She is being paid 85 rials per month.

1. Should a person sign a foreign agency contract in Oman even is he/she has already made a contract in his/her home country agency?

2. Should the contract stated that he/she must have a salary 50% lower than written on his/her original home country agency contract?

3. Should his/her passport be seized by his/her employer?

4. Should he/she be deprived of communication the outside world and a dayoff?

5. In Oman are the above question is legal? If illegal what should he/she do and what Omani agency can help his/her problem?

Thanks for your kind consideration.

[name withheld]

This situation is, I'm afraid to say, not uncommon in Oman, and I blogged about this just last year.

Note: The labour Law (in English) can be found abridged here at the Kerala Monitor or in full here from the Ministry of Manpower. (A hint though, there's a great catch!)

Lets first look at the issues point by point.
1/ Salary.
While it is a recent Filipino law that their citizens must earn at least US$400 a month, this foreign law is not recognised in the Sultanate of Oman (or any other GCC nation). **This is why her employment contract in the Philippines stated the magic minimum of $400 bucks. An MOU between the Omani and Indian Governments last year agreed minimum wages for Indian Maids to be 75 rials (~US$180) a month. This has not been done with the Filipinos as far as I am aware. She shouldn't have signed the new contract, but I can understand why she did. Even the UAE has agreed minimum rules for Filipino domestic staff, agreed back in 2006. There minimum wage is $200 a month with mandatory 1 day off a week that cannot be overtimed.

2/ Confiscating of passport.
Technically, this is now supposed to be illegal in Oman. However, it is both common practice and accepted as totally reasonable by pretty much every Omani I've spoken to, including the Police and the Ministries ("But they might run away!"), and as there is no actual penalty described in the legislation for breaking this particular law, it makes it a rather pointless law, to say the least. (Oh, wait, except for the Foreign Ministry being able to absolutely & honestly state to the US State Dept and the ILO that passport confiscation is illegal in Oman! Silly Dragon!).

3/ 7 days a week, 18hrs a day...
This is also illegal under Omani law, and yet alas, is also not an uncommon practice. The difficult part is - who enforces this law? Statutory minimum is 1 day off per week, but I'm not sure how this is interpreted (with respect to shifts in the interior for example). So it may be that law interprets this as some kind of yearly average requirement, so if you get 40 days off in one lump + overtime, that counts. Legal eagles out there - any guidance?

4/ No passport + show up at Embassy = jail.
I would have seriously doubted this is true. But... in the Muscat Daily just today was a story (page 2) where it was stated that for 40 'illegal' Indian migrants who didn't have identification "As of now, all of them are under detention." Detention sounds a lot like a nice way of saying 'in jail'.

5/ Parasitic Lying Exploitative 'Agents'
This is a sad reality across the undeveloped world and the Gulf. Fellow locals of people in say India or the Philippines dupe desperate people into believing that a land of high wages and easy living awaits them in the Gulf. These are often illiterate and rather naive people. These agents proceed to charge them sometimes thousands of dollars, which they usually have to borrow from relatives or even loan sharks. Omanis are also charged by the local counterparts of these agents to get a maid, who site recruitment expenses and of course, airfares and visa charges. Both parties - expat and Omani - are getting totally ripped off by these unscrupulous parasites and their Omani sponsors. I have no idea why comprehensive laws to control these 'agencies' have not been implemented. And these are just the ones who actually do put them into jobs as domestic workers. The super nasty ones of course sell them straight on to pimps and brothels.

OK, so what does the law say? 'One law to rule them all' and all that good stuff.

Well, for a start, lets look at that nasty sounding 7 days a week, 18 hrs a day stuff.

Omani labour law, issued as per Royal Decree No. 35/2003
...
Working hours
Workers should not be asked to work for more than nine hours per day or 48 hours per week. Rest interval should be given during working hours, provided that work cannot be continuous for six hours.

If a worker is asked to work more than the working hours, the employer should give him/her extra pay equivalent to his/her wage for the extra period plus 25 per cent or give a permission to be absent for the number of hours he/she worked, provided that the worker agrees to this arrangement.

Employer should give worker not less than 24 hours rest after six days of work. ...

Hey, excellent! So that seems pretty clear. Just the sort of thing one would expect for law designed "to control Exploitation of Expatriate Workers" (I'm not making this up).

But wait readers.

Oh oh. The law also states:

General rules
This law is not applicable to the armed forces, security and government departments and domestic servants such as cook or childminder.

So that's alright then.

It seems to me the ultimate Orwellian irony that a law named as being to prevent the exploitation of expatriats explicitly denies coverage to perhaps the most vulnerable expat workers in the entire country.

The crime here is that it is so difficult for these women to get access to information, to assistance, to a fair deal. That the law was expressly denied them. That there is no effective Government monitoring of them; in fact, the Government agencies generally reinforce their defacto imprisionment. The fact that we continue to allow unscrupulous agents to exploit these people.

I could rant on, but to what avail?

So readers, what should this woman do?

If she somehow manages to escape, she'll be an absconder. Her salary is after all just above accepted minimum for a 48hr week. How could she prove she's working 126hrs a week? Even if she gets to the embassy, what will happen? At best, deportation, back to a place where she still has dependents plus loans paid to an agent? At worst, a period of incarceration then being sent back to her "employer". And how would that work out I wonder?

Where are the NGOs who could help? Does anyone know?

What should she do?

What would YOU do?

But, obviously, this is not 'Human Trafficking' Mr Dragon. After all, she's being paid AND she apparently isn't even being beaten and molested! What responsibility would the Government of Oman possibly have in this? Why shouldn't we be Tier 2?

It's just a housemaid. And her employers no doubt paid good money for her.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Telephone Numbers for the Philipino embassy:
24605140; 24605143, 24805335; or 24605176.

(968) 99233596 (Mobile)

Well, that was unexpected! Muscat Confidential finally censored by Oman's Government over ... a photo of women kissing

UPDATE: Muscat Confidential has been unblocked after about 12 hrs of being censored. Thanks to all the emails to Omantel readers - they seem to have worked, along with, I can only presume, my removing of the offending photo of the two girls kissing.

Special thanks too to local bloggers (in no particular order):
Dhofari Gucci, Mr Sythe, Suburban, Muscato, Angry in Oman, Jet Driver, The Restless Quill, Non-Crowned Princess, and all the others.

Thank you for the support. It worked. Normal business is resumed. And to the haters who were crowing and bragging... well. You just KNOW what I'm thinking... heh heh.

And thanks Omantel and/or Mr. TRA for listening. Next time, maybe send me an email about what you're objecting to? Sometimes just asking will get results, you know?

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes, well, I can hardly say it was a surprise. It seems today the internet censors here in the Sultanate of Oman have blocked Muscat Confidential.

Nice pic - image credit: deviantart.com

As a result, standard requests through the only internet gateway available to people within Oman will not connect to this site right now. Those outside Oman obviously continue to have access. As do those within Oman who either use a VPN or who know how to circumvent the filters (quite trivial, in reality).

It would seem likely that the cause of the block was a photo used to illustrate the post where Muscat Confidential interviewed a local blogger from Community Queer, who is an Omani bi-lesbian woman. Some people objected to the photo as being against the 'cultural and religious traditions of Oman', even though it was quite a tame photo of two young women exchanging a kiss. Shocking, I know. But obviously enough to convince the censors to block the whole website.

The offending photo has been removed, as it was not Oman specific (in fact, the women were almost certainly not from Oman) and was purely used to provide an image to support the interview.

Lets now see if the block will be reversed as a result of appeals to Omantel.

It's actually most surprising to me that this what what finally got Muscat Confidential blocked, after a couple of years of this blog annoying various important people and posts ranging from Government corruption through to expropriation of land and various shady dealings among the great and the good.

In the end, all it took was 1 image of 2 fully clothed young ladies kissing. One has to laugh at the irony.

Supporters of Muscat Confidential within Oman can submit a request on the 'This site is blocked' form that appears when you try to access the site normally. This seemed to work for the recent blocking and rapid unblocking of Community Queer, so its true that Omantel do respond to public opinion.

Those outside Oman can send a request by clicking here:
here, which will also let you experience the magic of having someone tell you what sites you can visit!

More on this to come.

Note: Normal service at Muscat Confidential will be maintained. The block doesn't mean I'm in prison or anything equally crazy.

Tomorrow: A Cautionary Tale for Filipino housemaids intending to come to the Sultanate of Oman.

The murder of Hamas leader Al-Mabhouh in Dubai. Another STRATFOR analysis

The recent murder of Hamas' No.1 arms supply procurer/manager, Al-Mabhouh, was only minor news to start with. I don't think there is anyone at all knowledgeable about covert operations or the situation in Gaza who didn't immediately know that there was only ever 1 outfit that would be able and willing to perform such a brazen assassination: Israel's Mossad.

Even if there had been no evidence at all, that much was obvious.

But I must admit, Dubai have been exceptionally good at pursuing the story, publishing hard evidence, and controlling the new cycle by periodically releasing information. The most interesting things from my point of view have been:

1/ How a system of CCTV in an urban environment, combined with the 1000's of tiny electronic trails we all leave as we conduct our daily lives, make it trivial for a modern police/intelligence force to track us, learn a scary amount about us, and monitor what we do. Jack Bauer of 24 fame would be proud (well, except it was all after the fact). That Dubai are releasing this capability so blatantly is a bit reactionary. Usually a good intelligence outfit conceals this sort of stuff.

2/ How pissed off Dubai is that it was done on their patch. Following the assassination (by gun-fire in the open, in a parking lot in Jumeira) of the Chechen ex-rebel leader last year, Dubai Inc. is super pissed off at being shown to be a bit of a pussy and not a safe place for terrorists and arms dealers. Being a haven for those who are rich but wanted criminals or political fugatives, on the run from their home countries [Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Russia, Chechniya, Egypt, Pakistan ...], as well as a great place to do all sorts of shady deals between Iranians and others, has lately been a minor business model for the nation-state. Money laundering controls are famously lax if the price is right.

3/ The recent story that those 'suspected' of being Israeli will be barred entry to the UAE was almost too comical to be true. Apparently now no matter what passport you're holding (even if its a real one), UAE Immigration will now be playing a game of 'Spot the Jew', based on such objective measures as accent and mannerisms. Perhaps they will be able to get some consultancy training from Borat...


Note: The satirist who plays Borat, the wonderfully talented Sasha Baron-Cohen, is very, very Jewish.


Here's the UAE official describing the new plan:

... "Earlier, Israeli dual citizens could easily enter the country even if officials recognised them as Israelis from their accents and traits," he said.
"But [from] now on they will be carefully scrutinised, regardless of what passport they hold."
The Dubai Police Chief added that this did not mean anyone would be mistreated. He said immigration officers are to undergo intensive training to study Israeli people and identify their traits, accents, body language and manners.

Of course, the issue of why a well known wanted terrorist and murderer was welcomed into the UAE in the first place has not been discussed. Naturally.

And we all know how critical the Arab world is on the general topic of immigration, travel and racial stereotyping at airports, as long as its the West we're criticising...

Ah well.


And as promised, that Stratfor Analysis.

"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

Using Intelligence from the al-Mabhouh Hit
By Fred Burton and Ben West

The assassination of senior Hamas militant leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh on Jan. 19 is still generating a tremendous amount of discussion and speculation some six weeks after the fact. Dubai’s police force has been steadily releasing new information almost on a daily basis, which has been driving the news cycle and keeping the story in the media spotlight. The most astounding release so far has been nearly 30 minutes of surveillance camera footage that depicts portions of a period spanning the arrival of the assassination team in Dubai, surveillance of al-Mabhouh, and the killing and the exfiltration of the team some 22 hours later.

By last count, Dubai police claim to have identified some 30 people suspected of involvement in the assassination; approximately 17 have been convincingly tied to the operation through video footage either as surveillants, managers or assassins, with the rest having only tenuous connections based on information released by the Dubai police. In any case, the operation certainly was elaborate and required the resources and planning of a highly organized agency, one most likely working for a nation-state.

Pre-Operation
While the 22-hour period depicted in the video showcased the tactical capabilities of the various teams, it hardly tells the whole story. In order to pinpoint the location of al-Mabhouh on the day of his killing, the organization responsible for this operation would have had to have tracked al-Mabhouh for months, if not years. This can be done in three ways: technical surveillance, utilization of human sources and physical surveillance.

Technical surveillance of al-Mabhouh would include monitoring his e-mail, telephone calls and other forms of electronic communications such as online credit-card transactions and travel reservations. This could reveal his physical location and future plans, which would allow the assassination team to anticipate his location and prepare well ahead of time. With such a large team involved in the assassination, careful coordination and planned movements would have been required to ensure that all members were in place without attracting attention.

But technical surveillance has limitations. An experienced operative like al-Mabhouh (who had been the target of two previous assassination attempts in as many years) would most likely have taken precautions that would have limited his electronic visibility. The operational team likely used human sources with close ties to al-Mabhouh who could corroborate the information and possibly influence the target’s movements, putting him in place for the operation. Human sources could have included al-Mabhouh’s colleagues within Hamas or a member of a rival group such as Fatah. (Three Palestinians suspected of being members of Fatah were arrested by Dubai authorities in connection with the assassination, indicating that the group may have provided human intelligence to the organization responsible for al-Mabhouh’s assassination.) Other people could have been recruited using a number of incentives (including cash) without their knowing the consequences of their assistance. Both the technical and human intelligence operations would have been run by intelligence officers operating abroad and at locations separate from the operational team.

According to Dubai police, physical surveillance was conducted by members of the operational team during al-Mabhouh’s previous trips to the United Arab Emirates. Physical surveillance is a critical part of any effective assault (whether it’s a clandestine intelligence operation or a car-jacking) because it gives the operatives an opportunity to become familiar with their surroundings and recognize their target in his or her “natural” environment.

Once all this homework was done to establish al-Mabhouh’s normal routines and determine his approximate location and duration of his stay in Dubai, the intelligence-collection process moved into the deployment phase and an operational team was sent into action.

The Operation
Prior to Mabhouh’s arrival, surveillance teams set up in the airport and at different hotels to make sure they could obtain a visual confirmation of their target. Based on their intelligence of his prior trips to Dubai, planners placed teams in two hotels to wait for al-Mabhouh approximately an hour before his arrival. They also had a surveillance team waiting for him at the airport to follow him as soon as he entered the country and report his movements to the rest of the team. While it wasn’t captured on video, we suspect that a mobile surveillance group tracked al-Mabhouh from the airport by car. To help ensure a successful outcome, the operational team used overwhelming force to prevent the target from ever seeing the same face twice. When it was established that al-Mabhouh was staying at the Al Bustan Rotana, the team responded by abandoning their other posts and directing their focus to that hotel.

Once al-Mabhouh was identified, the team locked on to him at the hotel and started initiating further steps in the operation. The first surveillance team watched al-Mabhouh register at the front desk and then followed him to his room, noting the target’s specific room number. This was relayed to other members of the team, who then placed a reservation for the room across the hall from al-Mabhouh, which gave them direct access to their target. The selection of the room is very interesting for two reasons. First, it was directly across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s room, giving the team a perfect spot from which to monitor his movements. Second, the room was just behind the video camera for that floor and the camera was trained on the emergency stairwell exit, which allowed the assassination team to carry out the attack on his room without being filmed.

Meanwhile, down in the hotel lobby, surveillance teams were rotating to monitor the target’s movements in and out of the hotel. At one point, a surveillant is seen following al-Mabhouh out to the street to relay by cell phone the type of vehicle he had entered. These surveillants, operating in teams of two, used disguises such as hats, sunglasses, beards and work-out gear to establish a cover for action and better conceal their identities. While many members of the operational team were identified on closed-circuit television (CCTV), hats and sunglasses helped distort their images and reduce the already low risk of being recognized by the target or any protective team during the operation.

Another necessity in any operation like this is communications. Surveillance video of the team involved in this operation shows them using cell phones to send text messages and talk to other members of the team. According to reports from Dubai police, the cell phones used in the operation were dialed to an Austrian number, likely the operations and support center for the team on the ground and any others involved in the operation. This might have been an open conference line into which all members of the operational team could dial to monitor the movement of their target. It is unlikely that the center was actually in Austria; it probably used a proxy phone line to mask its true physical location.

Assassination and Exfiltration
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on Jan. 19, after al-Mabhouh returned to his hotel room from a meeting, the assassination team moved in. It was important to carry out the killing at a time and in a manner that would give the team the maximum window of opportunity. They suspected that al-Mabhouh was in for the night, which meant that nobody would miss him until early the following afternoon, giving the team ample time to flee the country. The team carried out the assassination smoothly, with video surveillance showing only two operatives casually talking outside the elevator (a cover for monitoring the hall for possible distractions) — in other words, nothing out of the ordinary. The assassination team members also exhibited no unusual behavior when they departed the scene. Demeanor is extremely important, and the ability of the team to act calmly and naturally and not catch the attention of security guards monitoring CCTV ensured that the act remained a secret until hotel cleaning staff found the body more than 17 hours after the entire team had departed Dubai.

The assassination team also killed al-Mabhouh in a way that apparently confounded medical examiners trying to determine the cause of death, delaying the announcement of a criminal case for nine days. This delay gave the operational team ample time to cover its tracks, possibly by using third- and fourth-country border crossings, additional false identities and safe-houses, making it much harder for Dubai authorities to track team members to their ultimate destinations. This confusion appears to have been created by the use of a muscle relaxant called succinylcholine (also known as Suxamethonium), which, if used in large enough quantities, can cause the heart to stop, making it appear that the victim died of cardiac arrest. The drug also has a very short half-life, meaning that traces would degenerate and virtually disappear shortly after injection, making it ideal for covert operations such as this one.

The team was not able to pull off the operation with complete anonymity — it is virtually impossible to operate in a modern environment without leaving some kind of electronic trace. The Dubai police were able to use video surveillance from the airport, hotels and a nearby shopping center to trace back the movements of the operatives and establish their identities according to the passports that they used. These later proved to be fraudulent passports from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany and France — but they were extremely well-made fraudulent passports that were discovered later, only after video surveillance prompted closer scrutiny; customs officials were unable to detect this when the operatives were arriving or departing. Moreover, the credit cards used by several members of the operation team were linked to a company called Payoneer. The company’s CEO is a former member of Israel Defense Forces special operations, and Payoneer has financial backing from a company based in Israel.

Dubai police have announced that they retrieved DNA evidence from at least one of the members on the assassination team and fingerprints from several others, giving authorities pieces of evidence that are unalterable, unlike a passport. However, DNA evidence is only helpful when it can be compared against an exemplar. If Dubai police are unable to find a match to the DNA sample or a fingerprint, then these clues will offer little immediate help.

The passports also provide little immediate help in terms of tracking down the suspects. The discovery that fraudulent British, Irish, German and French passports were used has created a diplomatic problem for Israel (Mossad is understandably at the top of the list of suspects), which raises the profile of the operation considerably. This is certainly not what a clandestine operation is supposed to do. Although the operatives will probably never be found and handed over to UAE authorities, the fact that so many details of the assassination have been made public jeopardizes the anonymity that is supposed to surround this kind of operation.

Potential Consequences
Al-Mabhouh was hardly a likable character. As a senior Hamas military commander, arms smuggler and liaison to Iran, he was already on the terrorist watch lists in the countries that have complained about the use of fraudulent passports. Public indignation is a necessary and expected reaction from these countries to save diplomatic face, but when it comes down to it, there would be few incentives to seriously punish Israel, if it indeed sponsored the hit. The police of Dubai and the United Arab Emirates, rightfully frustrated that they are tasked with solving an unsolvable case, will still probably not miss al-Mabhouh. Their efforts to stir up outrage over the assassination are likely fueled by their desire to save face in the Arab world, where the Palestinian cause is of high rhetorical importance but little strategic importance.

The fact is that the high level of complexity involved in this assassination, along with the smoothness with which it was carried out, is evidence that the operation was undertaken by an elite covert force, the likes of which could only be sponsored by a nation-state. The ability to conduct preliminary intelligence collection, to muster a large and coordinated team of skilled operatives, to fabricate passports to an exacting degree, to successfully exfiltrate all members of the team — all of this requires a significant and well-funded effort that, we believe, exceeds the current capabilities of any non-state terrorist group. It is worth noting here that the most impressive aspect of the operation was the team’s tradecraft and demeanor. All the members of this team were professionals.

Indeed, with so much time having already elapsed, and if the operation was sponsored by a nation-state, it is highly improbable that any of the operatives involved will ever be caught. However, countries around the world are offering their assistance in the case, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia. Few officials from these countries actually believe any of the operatives will be apprehended, but that is not the real reason to participate in the investigation. What officials are really looking for are the granular details of how this group of assassins and surveillants operated. These details are extremely valuable in ongoing counterintelligence efforts by countries to thwart foreign intelligence agencies operating on their home turf. The information can provide clues to past and future cases, and it can be used to build databases on covert operatives, so that if any of these people show up unexpectedly at an airport, hotel or embassy in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia or elsewhere, the alarms can be sounded more quickly.

Another exclusive interview: Bi-Lesbian Omani 'Scudder' from Community Queer

In the second part of our little mini-series on the Omani Gay scene, Muscat Confidential is proud to have been given an exclusive interview with local blogger Scudder, from Community Queer. She is a bisexual, but prefers women. She is also Omani.

(Part One can be found here by the way: Interview with An English Gentleman)


Photo: There are just as many Bi-Women and Lesbians in Oman as anywhere else. No matter what many people might want to believe.



Personally, I've always found it to be a tribute to the incredible power of hormones that there any women at all who are actually interested in men. Shallow and stereotypical it may be on my part, but I've always figured that if I had been born a woman, I would definitely prefer to have been also born a lesbian. Women are, in my experience, generally harder working, more balanced, more loving, more generous, smarter and (it seems almost too obvious to say), tend to look much better naked.

Scudder agreed to share with us her observations, experiences and advice on being bisexual in the Sultanate of Oman. Note, "Finn" is her male (and queer) co-blogger at Community Queer.

Muscat Confidential: Thank you for speaking to us Scudder. First of all, how big is the gay scene in Oman? Is it just in Muscat, or is there an active scene in say, Nizwa or Salalah?

Scudder: That's the thing. There is definitely a gay scene in Muscat, and undoubtedly in Salalah and Nizwah as well, but it is so hush-hush between those involved that you cannot determine the exact numbers. There are small gatherings here and there, and certain places here in Muscat are popularly known for their once-a-week 'gay' gatherings. It's mostly word of mouth stuff… Finn and I have each other, but entrenched in conservative society, it's almost impossible for a true community to form. We started our blog hoping to create a way of truly connecting with Omani gay youth.


MC: How do you get dates? Given the attitude to homosexuality in Oman, it must be pretty tense trying to figure out if the person you're keen on is amenable to a proposition!

Scudder: Haha, dates. That's a sad topic. As the female half of Community Queer, I can say with some certainty that it's easier for me to get dates with women than it is for Finn to get dates with men. There are many girls I've met, Arab and well-educated, who have been more open about their 'unconventional' desires. At the same time, in terms of getting a date, it's no where near as easy as heterosexual dating probably is. Being as closeted as we are, our feelings for others are often in the closet with us, things we cannot openly share with those we want to connect with. Honestly, there are a lot of women around here confused about their sexuality, especially among teenagers. Sexual experimentation is not a myth in that respect …I think it just takes honesty with yourself and your closest friends. Tell people (but make sure they aren't CID and/or narrow-minded). Muscat is small and a friend (granted a tolerant, accepting one) could be connected to someone else who is gay or bi or lesbian. And they could know others…



MC: Do you know of anyone who has come out to their family in Oman? If so, how did it work out? Would you ever consider coming out?

Scudder: No. Things like that are really not spoken of around here. I could never come out to my family. My mother might understand, but the rest of my family would probably have me stoned to death.



MC: What is the attitude of the ROP? Are they 'actively' seeking out homosexual activity, or ignoring it, or even consciously turning a blind eye? Is it easier for lesbians and bi-females than for male gays?

Scudder: Homosexuality is illegal in Oman. I have heard stories about police seeking out popular places where gays gather and jailing them, but I'm unsure of the real truth behind these stories. I know if any activity is caught in public, even behind tinted car windows, that's definite jail time. As much as possible, I think the ROP is making efforts to seek out homosexual activity, especially if it were flamboyantly displayed. They probably don't care too much about foreign homosexuals, but if they knew Omanis were gay...



MC: Have you ever been subjected to harassment for your sexual orientation, or subjected to threats? In Iran and Iraq (and unfortunately many other places) we read of vigilante gangs murdering homosexuals. Is this a problem in Oman?

Scudder: Just the typical ignoramuses with ugly words at the tip of their tongue, the sort of people who make assumptions based on your clothing choices. It's surprising how many shallow, thoughtless people are around. Since no one is openly gay, many are saved from such murders as in Iran and Iraq.



MC: Do you think that homosexuality will ever be decriminalised in Oman?

Scudder: Not in this kind of ignorance-fuelled lifetime. We can do what we can with the words we have in the hopes that people can find empathy and understanding in their hearts. But in a country that stands on religious foundations, it is unlikely that it will be decriminalized any time soon. All I hope for is a change of mentality from complete denial/disgust to at least tolerance… I think I have enough faith in Oman for at least that.



MC: There are a lot of 'body building' mags on sale in Oman. Are body building and gyms a common cover for homosexuality? Specifically, are the Rock Bottom bouncers gay? (I probably won't be able to publish the answer to that one, but still curious...)

Scudder: Hahaha. Honestly, I've never thought about the Rock Bottom bouncers being gay. They are HUGE, but they get paid for their girth. Sorry. Dirty pun haha. I guess there is the stereotype that those who pay more attention to their looks are probably gay, but in this case I really have no idea.



MC: I guess Finn would be better at handling that question! OK. Where is the region's most gay friendly city?

Scudder: I'm not sure. I think Lebanon is the only country in the region with official gay bars. I remember an aunt of mine saying that homosexuality is most prevalent here in Oman which brought it to the rest of the Middle East (in a disdainful tone of voice). Obviously, we don't know the exact numbers. Homosexuality in Oman, from what you hear, is not pretty. There are many married men who reject the idea of being a 'homosexual', yet participate in 'homosexual activity', because somehow that doesn't make them 'homosexual'. That's why taxi drivers think it's okay to stick their hand down passenger's pants. You're only homosexual when you have romantic feelings for your sex object which is a sickening perpetuation of denial and ignorance.



MC: What would be your advice to a young person in Oman who thinks they're gay, or bi? What should they do? I would imagine - as in the west - growing up gay in a small village must be very lonely and worrying.

Scudder: Be honest with yourself, though I know from experience that it seems like the easiest thing to do is stifle who you are inside. No one around you needs to know, but YOU need to know YOURSELF. It feels like you're alone, like what you're going through is the worst thing. But, cliché aside, you have to embrace the beauty of who you are. Read, listen to music, marvel at art – realize that some of the greatest artists and thinkers have been homosexual. Embrace that.



MC: How do you avoid getting set up in a straight marriage? It's commonly gossiped that many gay guys (and girls I guess) just get married to get it over with.

Scudder: Get good grades and flee the country. Study for as long as you can. Come visit once in a while, but make your home elsewhere. If it's marriage you are escaping, you have to be far, far away. As a female, I will never reach the age where my family will stop pestering me to marry a man, which is a possibility, though an unlikely one. Hence, my life devoted to academia. It is expected, no, required, of men and women to marry and have children. Marriage is the priority. Love is often a bonus… you hear all these stories about gay men and women marrying to shut their families up, then searching for alternative outlets for their sexual desire… It's incredible, the kind of underground drama going on behind the veil of the 'Perfect Arab Family.'



MC: Again, thanks for sharing with Muscat Confidential and my readers. And good luck with the blog, especially now you've been through the blocked/unblocked drama!

Scudder: Thanks!

Anyone - straight, gay or bi - having sex is strongly advised to read about protecting yourself and your partner(s) from harm, sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy. See Wikipedia - Safer Sex.

And anyone looking for 'straight' answers about real sex and sexuality from a fantastic gay Agony Aunt can do no better than columnist Dan Savage. Recommended reading if you're over 18. Note, this week's column is an absolute classic.

Iran vs USA: Stratfor Analysis

I do appreciate the analysis provided by Stratfor. Here's their article today about 'The Iranian problem'. You may find it interesting. It doesn't mention Oman, and that I also find interesting.

Oman will play a key role in any détente between the US and Iran. Oman is the only country with serious and respectful long-term relationships with both countries. Given the unattractiveness of a military option, and the likely futility of sanctions (unless China can be convinced to support them, which is unlikely), I agree that it is in the best long term interest of America to gradually allow an easing of tensions, while extending the US nuclear umbrella to the Gulf States and emphasising the tried and trusty doctrine of MAD [Mutually Assured Destruction], or in this case, IAD (Iran's Assured Destruction) should they ever use those nukes or provide them to Hezbollah.

As most young Iranians actually support the US, and a significant proportion of their elders do to (or already live there), in the long term the US would be assured of achieving their strategic aims. And their oil firms and other companies could make a nice buck in the meantime.

Thinking About the Unthinkable: A U.S.-Iranian Deal

March 1, 2010
By George Friedman

The United States apparently has reached the point where it must either accept that Iran will develop nuclear weapons at some point if it wishes, or take military action to prevent this. There is a third strategy, however: Washington can seek to redefine the Iranian question.

As we have no idea what leaders on either side are thinking, exploring this represents an exercise in geopolitical theory. Let’s begin with the two apparent stark choices.

Diplomacy vs. the Military Option
The diplomatic approach consists of creating a broad coalition prepared to impose what have been called crippling sanctions on Iran. Effective sanctions must be so painful that they compel the target to change its behavior. In Tehran’s case, this could only consist of blocking Iran’s imports of gasoline. Iran imports 35 percent of the gasoline it consumes. It is not clear that a gasoline embargo would be crippling, but it is the only embargo that might work. All other forms of sanctions against Iran would be mere gestures designed to give the impression that something is being done.

The Chinese will not participate in any gasoline embargo. Beijing gets 11 percent of its oil from Iran, and it has made it clear it will continue to deliver gasoline to Iran. Moscow’s position is that Russia might consider sanctions down the road, but it hasn’t specified when, and it hasn’t specified what. The Russians are more than content seeing the U.S. bogged down in the Middle East and so are not inclined to solve American problems in the region. With the Chinese and Russians unlikely to embargo gasoline, these sanctions won’t create significant pain for Iran. Since all other sanctions are gestures, the diplomatic approach is therefore unlikely to work.

The military option has its own risks. First, its success depends on the quality of intelligence on Iran’s nuclear facilities and on the degree of hardening of those targets. Second, it requires successful air attacks. Third, it requires battle damage assessments that tell the attacker whether the strike succeeded. Fourth, it requires follow-on raids to destroy facilities that remain functional. And fifth, attacks must do more than simply set back Iran’s program a few months or even years: If the risk of a nuclear Iran is great enough to justify the risks of war, the outcome must be decisive.

Each point in this process is a potential failure point. Given the multiplicity of these points — which includes others not mentioned — failure may not be an option, but it is certainly possible.

But even if the attacks succeed, the question of what would happen the day after the attacks remains. Iran has its own counters. It has a superbly effective terrorist organization, Hezbollah, at its disposal. It has sufficient influence in Iraq to destabilize that country and force the United States to keep forces in Iraq badly needed elsewhere. And it has the ability to use mines and missiles to attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf shipping lanes for some period — driving global oil prices through the roof while the global economy is struggling to stabilize itself. Iran’s position on its nuclear program is rooted in the awareness that while it might not have assured options in the event of a military strike, it has counters that create complex and unacceptable risks. Iran therefore does not believe the United States will strike or permit Israel to strike, as the consequences would be unacceptable.

To recap, the United States either can accept a nuclear Iran or risk an attack that might fail outright, impose only a minor delay on Iran’s nuclear program or trigger extremely painful responses even if it succeeds. When neither choice is acceptable, it is necessary to find a third choice.

Redefining the Iranian Problem
As long as the problem of Iran is defined in terms of its nuclear program, the United States is in an impossible place. Therefore, the Iranian problem must be redefined. One attempt at redefinition involves hope for an uprising against the current regime. We will not repeat our views on this in depth, but in short, we do not regard these demonstrations to be a serious threat to the regime. Tehran has handily crushed them, and even if they did succeed, we do not believe they would produce a regime any more accommodating toward the United States. The idea of waiting for a revolution is more useful as a justification for inaction — and accepting a nuclear Iran — than it is as a strategic alternative.

At this moment, Iran is the most powerful regional military force in the Persian Gulf. Unless the United States permanently stations substantial military forces in the region, there is no military force able to block Iran. Turkey is more powerful than Iran, but it is far from the Persian Gulf and focused on other matters at the moment, and it doesn’t want to take on Iran militarily — at least not for a very long time. At the very least, this means the United States cannot withdraw from Iraq. Baghdad is too weak to block Iran from the Arabian Peninsula, and the Iraqi government has elements friendly toward Iran.

Historically, regional stability depended on the Iraqi-Iranian balance of power. When it tottered in 1990, the result was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The United States did not push into Iraq in 1991 because it did not want to upset the regional balance of power by creating a vacuum in Iraq. Rather, U.S. strategy was to re-establish the Iranian-Iraqi balance of power to the greatest extent possible, as the alternative was basing large numbers of U.S. troops in the region.

The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 assumed that once the Baathist regime was destroyed the United States would rapidly create a strong Iraqi government that would balance Iran. The core mistake in this thinking lay in failing to recognize that the new Iraqi government would be filled with Shiites, many of whom regarded Iran as a friendly power. Rather than balancing Iran, Iraq could well become an Iranian satellite. The Iranians strongly encouraged the American invasion precisely because they wanted to create a situation where Iraq moved toward Iran’s orbit. When this in fact began happening, the Americans had no choice but an extended occupation of Iraq, a trap both the Bush and Obama administrations have sought to escape.

It is difficult to define Iran’s influence in Iraq at this point. But at a minimum, while Iran may not be able to impose a pro-Iranian state on Iraq, it has sufficient influence to block the creation of any strong Iraqi government either through direct influence in the government or by creating destabilizing violence in Iraq. In other words, Iran can prevent Iraq from emerging as a counterweight to Iran, and Iran has every reason to do this. Indeed, it is doing just this.

The Fundamental U.S.-Iranian Issue
Iraq, not nuclear weapons, is the fundamental issue between Iran and the United States. Iran wants to see a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq so Iran can assume its place as the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf. The United States wants to withdraw from Iraq because it faces challenges in Afghanistan — where it will also need Iranian cooperation — and elsewhere. Committing forces to Iraq for an extended period of time while fighting in Afghanistan leaves the United States exposed globally. Events involving China or Russia — such as the 2008 war in Georgia — would see the United States without a counter. The alternative would be a withdrawal from Afghanistan or a massive increase in U.S. armed forces. The former is not going to happen any time soon, and the latter is an economic impossibility.

Therefore, the United States must find a way to counterbalance Iran without an open-ended deployment in Iraq and without expecting the re-emergence of Iraqi power, because Iran is not going to allow the latter to happen. The nuclear issue is simply an element of this broader geopolitical problem, as it adds another element to the Iranian tool kit. It is not a stand-alone issue.

The United States has an interesting strategy in redefining problems that involves creating extraordinarily alliances with mortal ideological and geopolitical enemies to achieve strategic U.S. goals. First consider Franklin Roosevelt’s alliance with Stalinist Russia to block Nazi Germany. He pursued this alliance despite massive political outrage not only from isolationists but also from institutions like the Roman Catholic Church that regarded the Soviets as the epitome of evil.

Now consider Richard Nixon’s decision to align with China at a time when the Chinese were supplying weapons to North Vietnam that were killing American troops. Moreover, Mao — who had said he did not fear nuclear war as China could absorb a few hundred million deaths — was considered, with reason, quite mad. Nevertheless, Nixon, as anti-Communist and anti-Chinese a figure as existed in American politics, understood that an alliance (and despite the lack of a formal treaty, alliance it was) with China was essential to counterbalance the Soviet Union at a time when American power was still being sapped in Vietnam.

Roosevelt and Nixon both faced impossible strategic situations unless they were prepared to redefine the strategic equation dramatically and accept the need for alliance with countries that had previously been regarded as strategic and moral threats. American history is filled with opportunistic alliances designed to solve impossible strategic dilemmas. The Stalin and Mao cases represent stunning alliances with prior enemies designed to block a third power seen as more dangerous.

It is said that Ahmadinejad is crazy. It was also said that Mao and Stalin were crazy, in both cases with much justification. Ahmadinejad has said many strange things and issued numerous threats. But when Roosevelt ignored what Stalin said and Nixon ignored what Mao said, they each discovered that Stalin’s and Mao’s actions were far more rational and predictable than their rhetoric. Similarly, what the Iranians say and what they do are quite different.

U.S. vs. Iranian Interests
Consider the American interest. First, it must maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. The United States cannot tolerate interruptions, and that limits the risks it can take. Second, it must try to keep any one power from controlling all of the oil in the Persian Gulf, as that would give such a country too much long-term power within the global system. Third, while the United States is involved in a war with elements of the Sunni Muslim world, it must reduce the forces devoted to that war. Fourth, it must deal with the Iranian problem directly. Europe will go as far as sanctions but no further, while the Russians and Chinese won’t even go that far yet. Fifth, it must prevent an Israeli strike on Iran for the same reasons it must avoid a strike itself, as the day after any Israeli strike will be left to the United States to manage.

Now consider the Iranian interest. First, it must guarantee regime survival. It sees the United States as dangerous and unpredictable. In less than 10 years, it has found itself with American troops on both its eastern and western borders. Second, it must guarantee that Iraq will never again be a threat to Iran. Third, it must increase its authority within the Muslim world against Sunni Muslims, whom it regards as rivals and sometimes as threats.

Now consider the overlaps. The United States is in a war against some (not all) Sunnis. These are Iran’s enemies, too. Iran does not want U.S. troops along its eastern and western borders. In point of fact, the United States does not want this either. The United States does not want any interruption of oil flow through Hormuz. Iran much prefers profiting from those flows to interrupting them. Finally, the Iranians understand that it is the United States alone that is Iran’s existential threat. If Iran can solve the American problem its regime survival is assured. The United States understands, or should, that resurrecting the Iraqi counterweight to Iran is not an option: It is either U.S. forces in Iraq or accepting Iran’s unconstrained role.

Therefore, as an exercise in geopolitical theory, consider the following. Washington’s current options are unacceptable. By redefining the issue in terms of dealing with the consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there are three areas of mutual interest. First, both powers have serious quarrels with Sunni Islam. Second, both powers want to see a reduction in U.S. forces in the region. Third, both countries have an interest in assuring the flow of oil, one to use the oil, the other to profit from it to increase its regional power.

The strategic problem is, of course, Iranian power in the Persian Gulf. The Chinese model is worth considering here. China issued bellicose rhetoric before and after Nixon’s and Kissinger’s visits. But whatever it did internally, it was not a major risk-taker in its foreign policy. China’s relationship with the United States was of critical importance to China. Beijing fully understood the value of this relationship, and while it might continue to rail about imperialism, it was exceedingly careful not to undermine this core interest.

The major risk of the third strategy is that Iran will overstep its bounds and seek to occupy the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. Certainly, this would be tempting, but it would bring a rapid American intervention. The United States would not block indirect Iranian influence, however, from financial participation in regional projects to more significant roles for the Shia in Arabian states. Washington’s limits for Iranian power are readily defined and enforced when exceeded.

The great losers in the third strategy, of course, would be the Sunnis in the Arabian Peninsula. But Iraq aside, they are incapable of defending themselves, and the United States has no long-term interest in their economic and political relations. So long as the oil flows, and no single power directly controls the entire region, the United States does not have a stake in this issue.

Israel would also be enraged. It sees ongoing American-Iranian hostility as a given. And it wants the United States to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. But eliminating this threat is not an option given the risks, so the choice is a nuclear Iran outside some structured relationship with the United States or within it. The choice that Israel might want, a U.S.-Iranian conflict, is unlikely. Israel can no more drive American strategy than can Saudi Arabia.

From the American standpoint, an understanding with Iran would have the advantage of solving an increasingly knotty problem. In the long run, it would also have the advantage of being a self-containing relationship. Turkey is much more powerful than Iran and is emerging from its century-long shell. Its relations with the United States are delicate. The United States would infuriate the Turks by doing this deal, forcing them to become more active faster. They would thus emerge in Iraq as a counterbalance to Iran. But Turkey’s anger at the United States would serve U.S. interests. The Iranian position in Iraq would be temporary, and the United States would not have to break its word as Turkey eventually would eliminate Iranian influence in Iraq.

Ultimately, the greatest shock of such a maneuver on both sides would be political. The U.S.-Soviet agreement shocked Americans deeply, the Soviets less so because Stalin’s pact with Hitler had already stunned them. The Nixon-Mao entente shocked all sides. It was utterly unthinkable at the time, but once people on both sides thought about it, it was manageable.

Such a maneuver would be particularly difficult for U.S. President Barack Obama, as it would be widely interpreted as another example of weakness rather than as a ruthless and cunning move. A military strike would enhance his political standing, while an apparently cynical deal would undermine it. Ahmadinejad could sell such a deal domestically much more easily. In any event, the choices now are a nuclear Iran, extended airstrikes with all their attendant consequences, or something else. This is what something else might look like and how it would fit in with American strategic tradition.

This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR

A Plug: Suburban's Muscat Crime Survey

Local Expat blogger Suburban is running a poll on burglaries in Muscat. If you know of anyone who's been burgled lately in Oman, you can send her an anon comment.

I think its a great idea, if totally non-scientific. Muscat Confidential is a big fan of data.

General word around the place is that the past 2-3 years has seen a tremendous surge in the number of house robberies in what used to be considered a non-event in Oman, both while people are away and more worryingly while people are in the house, asleep or even awake (with knives used to threaten occupants).

The cause is harder to pin down. Is it growth in heroin addicts? (who will do anything to get some cash to buy a fix). The illegal arrivals from AFPAK? The rapidly increasing numbers of unemployed or underpaid Omani youth? The Ministry crack down on free visa expats?

It would be very interesting to see some ROP data on this (oops, update: see end of this post!!!): numbers of cases solved vs unsolved, rates over the past few years, nationalities, locations, etc etc etc. Perhaps something for Y magazine or The Week to follow up? DATA is what we need.

Crime statistics are commonly public information in the West. The associated 'data driven' policing methodology is in part behind recent sustained drops in crime in the USA. When will we see this in Oman?


One problem with the lack of transparency and hard objective data in the public domain is that urban myths propagate needlessly. For example, the rape of an Expat woman who was playing tennis at the Intercon some time ago, by (allegedly) a gang of ex-ROP constables who she had previously had punished for sexual harassment, has been Chinese-whispered into 10s of different rapes, terrorising expat women across the Muscat area of an organised gang committing crimes at will*.

Almost all Omani I know say the burglaries couldn't be done by Omani, certainly not, because "Omani's don't commit crimes". Not 'true' Omani anyhow. They will refer to them being 'Baluchis' or 'Half Omani'. In a bizarre Omani version of detective classics where 'The Butler did it', the No. 1 suspect according to Inspector Plod in the Sultanate when there is a crime is always "The Housemaid", or the wonderful catch-all, "Indians"**.

While on many levels Oman is a weird Middle-Eastern twilight-zone cross between 1950s America and Victorian England, it seems Oman is continuing it's path to be just like everywhere else, at least when it comes to crime.

This is the life.


*This rape is a whole post on its own. Maybe I'll get around to being able to do it justice in a proper post soon. According to my pretty good sources, yes, it happened.

**This is just what happens in real life folks, that doesn't mean I agree with it! But perhaps it does reflect a statistical reality?

STOP PRESS 2008 Crime Stats online (convictions)

Wow. Thanks to anon commenter, there are some stats available! Follow this link from the Ministry of National Economy (page 16 and beyond.)

News Round Up. Tour of Oman and Amouage gets us some good PR

A few miscellaneous stories readers.

The Tour of Oman seems to have been a reasonable success. It got us some great tourism friendly advertising in Europe and US with shots of the country looking pretty and safe, and the event itself seemed to go relatively smoothly. OK, there were a few problems with the traffic and access, because of the fundamental geography of Muscat using the picturesque roads for cycling means there are few other roads to either get anywhere or to actually get to the cycling or park once you did. They could have used more motorbikes to protect the riders and announce who the on-coming riders were. But all in all, a good job. I don't know how much it cost us, but at least we got the press and TV. The Wall St Journal even managed a story that worked the pun on bicycle and business cycle, Escaping the Business Cycle, Oman Embraces Cycling, that nicely noted the way Oman escaped the worst of the recent global crash.

Contrast that good news with the free press being generated across the globe by the new Dubai Mall aquarium springing a leak. Nicely summarised in quality Dubai-based blog Life in Dubai, the stories naturally drew a link with the closure of 'the world's highest viewing platform', and noted the instinctive response of those who run the mall to try and stop people taking photos. LOL. When will it sink in with the powers that be in this region that, thanks to the internet and a truly global media industry, the old methods for controlling information just don't work anymore. Thanks to camera phones, 3G networks, twitter and, yes, even blogs, stories need to be managed, and managed fast, not blocked. Sh. Maktoum's infamous "Shut up" comment to analysts, as he was under a bit of pressure to pay his vast debts, was beamed around the world in an instant. Stamping one's feet and behaving like a spoiled brat in the face of a bad news story being reported, or trying to suppress stories that are obviously already in the infosphere, are not how to handle PR problems. Toyota and Tiger Woods are lessons to learn too.

Photo: Twitter had the Dubai Mall Aquarium leak out within minutes. See Twitpic


So I'd just say, Oman, please learn these lessons from others. As our economy becomes more dependent on tourists and foreign trade, our reputation and brand need active professional management. I just hope that's what we are getting. What people want to see when a bad story breaks is not cover-ups and non-answers. Evidence of a problem being confidently and professionally handled is essential. Like any celebrity brand, long won gains aquired over decades can be eroded in an instant. It is essential we learn from the PR disaster that is Dubai. I emphasise that this is not about spin (although that is important), but about the fundamentals. For example, getting stories out about how progressive we are wrt women's rights in the Sultanate are OK, but when one sees stories about the ROP stupidly trying to stop an Omani lady getting a motorbike licence because of prejudice, this inconsistency between reality and PR is a problem.


Moving on. In news just in from Moscow, Omani crude oil may see a slightly lower market price in the future as a new Siberian Oil blend 'ESPO' hits the trading markets in the far east. As its closer to the far east markets (hence cheaper to ship) and is a higher quality oil (lighter, less sulphur) it looks like being a fast winner. This will impact not just Omani crude, but a lot of the Gulf too. OK, as long as global growth resumes, it won't be a huge problem, people will still need our crude, but it does indicate Oman will probably take some sort of trading hit on the price people are willing to pay for Omani Blend. Even if it's as low as $0.50 per barrel, remember that's over $120mln a year. Ouch.

...
"The crude is much better than other Persian Gulf grades, and the voyage is much shorter, so it's attractive for most of us," said a trader with an East Asian refiner that may soon try ESPO.

"ESPO is a very vanilla kind of grade, a good grade, much more pleasant than Oman, so refiners in Northeast Asia should be all over it," a trader said.

The completion of a pipeline to China from the Siberian town of Skovorodino by 2012 will take output to about 600,000 bpd from 250,000 bpd projected in the first quarter, making it easier for Chinese refiners to buy ESPO regularly, possibly via term deals.

"Once you have that kind of volume and consumer acceptance, you are looking at a situation where Middle East grades would be at a disadvantage," said Tchilinguirian from BNP Paribas.

And finally, Amouage does well.
Even perfume can create good press when handled correctly. Kudos to shockingly young Amouage CEO David Crickmore and his team for getting the good press out on their launch in Dubai (urh, wouldn't Abu Dhabi be better?) and London. Read the CNN story at Oman's royal family scents global profit in luxury perfumes. (yes, all headline editors love puns)


Photo: Left to right: David Crickmore, Amouage CEO with Syrian Actress Soulaf Fawakherji and Sayyid Khalid bin Hamad Al Busaidi, Amouage Chairman, during a private tour of the new flagship store in Muscat [AME info].

I didn't realise that Amouage was started at the direction of HM in 1983 by His Highness Sayyid Hamad bin Hamoud Al Busaidi, nor that the 'Amouage Gold' scent was created by a famous Parisian Nose & legendary French parfumier, Guy Robert. Its a pity the CEO, Art Director and Nose are expats, but hey, that's how it goes sometimes when you want the best and the best is what it takes in the International Smellies business. At least most of the employees are, I believe, Omani. You can read more about Amouage in an excellent article here.

I also like the idea of further investment in developing and extending the Amouage brand. It could be a very good way of high-grading and expanding local products, as long as extreme quality and (always an ephemeral thing) 'class' are maintained.

But well done Amouage.